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       DEMYSTIFYING A SEXUAL PERVERSION: 
 An Existential Reading of Sadomasochism and Erich Fromm’s Call to Love 
       
                                         
Introduction 
 
     The history of sadomasochism is an elusive and complicated narrative that 
involves more than the discovery and classification of a sexual transgression.  A 
complete examination of this concept would involve a review of psychiatry, 
philosophy, psychoanalysis, anthropology, psychology, pornographic literary 
fiction, autobiographies, art, theology, ethics, and film.  Such an exhaustive 
survey of sadomasochism however, is beyond the scope of this dissertation, 
which will remain within the purview of psychology.  At the same time, I will draw 
from other disciplines in order to help clarify some of the problems that have 
interfered with a full understanding of sadomasochism as a psychological 
disorder. 
     The controversy and confusion surrounding sadomasochism began when 
sadism and masochism were first classified as two separate sexual perversions 
by Richard von Krafft-Ebing (1886/1965).  He separated sexual sadism and 
sexual masochism according to the “intercourse of the sexes [where] the active 
or aggressive rôle belongs to man; [and the] woman remains passive” (Krafft-
Ebing, 1886/1965, p. 56).  According to Krafft-Ebing, sadism was “the experience 
of sexual pleasurable sensations (including orgasm) produced by acts of cruelty, 
bodily punishment afflicted on one’s own person or when witnessed in others, be 
they animals or human beings” (p. 53).  Masochism was considered as the 
feminine “counterpart of sadism” (p. 34) by Krafft-Ebing.  He defined it as “a 
 2
peculiar perversion of the psychical sexual life in which the individual affected, in 
sexual feeling and thought, is controlled by the idea of being completely and 
unconditionally subject to the will of a person of the opposite sex” (p. 86).  It was 
Krafft-Ebing who first coupled sadism and masochism as “perfect counterparts” 
(p. 140), though he never used the term “sadomasochism” when describing their 
relationship and viewed them as opposites.  The actual first usage of the term 
“sado-masochism” is unclear.  One source makes reference to the term being 
coined in 1922 to explain the derivation of pleasure from the infliction of physical 
or mental pain on others or oneself (“Sadomasochism,” 2006, p. 1).1 
Nevertheless, while Krafft-Ebing viewed sadism and masochism as separate 
entities, he reported numerous cases where instances of both could be found in 
the same individual.  In every case however, he maintained that one of the two 
perversions always dominated and admitted he was unable to explain their 
simultaneous occurrence in the same person (Krafft-Ebing, 1886/1965, p. 142).    
     Havelock Ellis (1903/1936) was the first to declare that elements of sadism 
and masochism should not “be regarded as opposed manifestations” (chap. 3, p. 
119).  He viewed sadism and masochism as interchangeable components of the 
same psychological entity and argued to abolish their distinction (Robinson, 
1976, p. 24).  Moreover, Ellis downplayed the differences between active and 
passive roles according to gender and posited that sadism and masochism are 
always present in the same individual, and should therefore be seen as 
complementary states.  It was Ellis’s assumption that the sadomasochist is an 
                                                 
1 Laplanche and Pontalis (1973) report that the term “sadomasochism” is used in sexology to 
highlight the interplay between the intersubjective conflict of domination and submission with the 
intrapsychic conflict of self-punishment (p. 401)  
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individual with an abnormally low supply of sexual energy who requires the 
energies of fear or anger to become sexually aroused (p. 24).   
     Freud (1905/1957d) followed Ellis’s lead by treating sadism and masochism 
as two faces of a single perversion that “are habitually found to occur together in 
the same individual” (p. 159).  At the same time, he depicted the entity in active 
and passive forms similar to the binary conceptualization established by Krafft-
Ebing.  Freud was the first to conceive sadomasochism as part of normal 
character development instead of merely as a sexual perversion.  Freud spent 
two decades reworking a theory that privileged sadistic aggression (sexual and 
non-sexual) as the primary drives that determine sadomasochism in the 
personality.  He later reversed his position and subordinated sadism to a 
secondary process of masochism based on his formulation of the death instinct 
(Freud, 1924/1962e, pp. 157-170).  At this point, before continuing with the 
history of sadomasochism theories that followed Freud, I will pause briefly to 
discuss how I examined the theories of Krafft-Ebing, Ellis, and Freud.    
     Daniel Burston (personal communication, March 10, 2006) has suggested that 
the late seventeenth-century abandonment of Aristotelian2 scientific methods and 
procedures for Galilean3 approaches resulted in a corresponding shift from pre-
                                                 
2Aristotelian physics uses normative concepts taken from ethics, which combined valuative and 
non-valuative ideas.  For example, the heavenly movements of the stars represented the 
“highest” form of “good” and a striving towards perfection.  On the other side, the “earthly” sub-
lunar motion of inferior bodies was associated with “disturbances” and the forces of evil.  This has 
been referred to as an anthropomorphic and inexact  concept of “heavenly” and “earthly” and it 
foreshadowed the notions of “normal” and “pathological” in late nineteenth-century 
psychopathology, a conceptualization that has played a significant role in shaping scientific ideals 
within the field of psychology (Lewin, 1931/1999, p. 38).      
3 The Galilean model of quantitative physics takes a homogeneous view of the physical universe.  
It views the movements of the stars and the physical world to be governed by the same laws of 
pure mathematics.  What can be called a “post-Galilean” model refers to the empirical 
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modern to modern conceptualizations of sex and sexuality -- a shift that 
culminated in the late nineteenth century during the Victorian era, the period 
during which the concepts of sadism and masochism were born.  Krafft-Ebing, 
Ellis, and Freud were all, to varying degrees, products of these changing times in 
scientific attitudes.  The Aristotelian notion of the bodily passions adopted a 
primarily moralistic view of "natural law" whose function was mainly to instruct 
individuals on how to embrace good and avoid evil.  "Sin" represented a 
deviation from the natural law, which was coterminous with Aristotelian 
standards.  There was little attempt to develop a purely descriptive or theoretical 
account of the passions or of sexual desire because it seldom occurred to 
medieval minds that this might be useful.  Forms of sexual conduct were deemed 
either “natural” or “unnatural”, and these words were synonyms for “good” and 
“bad”, respectively.   
     In the late 1880s, a more modern attitude toward sex had begun to develop 
as a rebellion against the late nineteenth-century mentality referred to as 
Victorianism.4  As the newer scientific frameworks began to supplant the 
prescriptive assumptions of premodern models, an epistemic shift was also 
taking place in the disciplines of medicine, psychiatry, and in the social sciences, 
                                                                                                                                                 
approaches of scientific psychology which gained ascendancy in the twentieth century.  
“Serialization” is a good example of a post-Galilean concept used by Freud.  Serialization 
collapses the boundaries between the “normal’ and the “pathological” in Freud’s psychosexual 
theory of development because it implies a process of continuous variation that views transition 
stages as always present (Lewin, 1931/1999, p. 52). Freud’s serialized approach to psychosexual 
development replaced Krafft-Ebing’s (1886/1965) Aristotelian model based on a decadent 
nervous system (see pp. 3-4). 
4 Victorianism can best be summarized as a series of movements for moral, social, and 
educational reform that emerged as a reaction to the growing dissolution of mores in English 
society that followed the French Revolution (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 257).  It is important to note 
that Victorianism was not nearly as monolithic or as repressive as is commonly imagined. 
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including the newly emerging field of psychology.  These changing methods were 
reflected in the work of the first sexologists such as Krafft-Ebing, Ellis, and Freud, 
who were analyzing sexuality from a naturalistic psychological point of view.5  In 
essence, the first sexologists replaced the concept of “sin” with the naturalistic 
concept of “psychopathology.”  These early theories tended to use descriptive, 
quantitative measurements that aspired to be "value free" and anti-speculative -- 
that is, based on “fact” and not philosophical reflection.  The concept of normality 
in these modern theories was idealized as a purely objective reality, yet normality 
also underwrote the assumption that corrective action was needed to address 
any kind of deviation from the norm.  This therapeutic ideology was buttressed by 
the authority of biologists and physicians, who extended their reach into the 
realms of philosophy and psychology (Canguilhem, 1989, p. 43).  
      However desirable a naturalistic, that is, purely objective account of sexual 
passion may have been, this pursuit was in the end fraught with difficulties and 
ideological biases.  In retrospect, it has become clear that the normative judgments 
and teleological assumptions embedded in the first modern theories of 
psychopathology, were often unbeknownst to the theorists themselves.  For 
example, Krafft-Ebing (1886/1965) viewed any sexual behavior that did not aim at 
procreation to be “tainted with antipathic sexual instinct” and derived from a 
“hereditary degenerate condition” (p. 187).  A closer contemporary inspection of 
                                                 
5The naturalistic scientific view of sex and the rest of human passions rested on the idea that 
nature is basically physical and that the realm of the spirit or “soul” -- love, knowing, valuing, and 
judging -- are causally based upon corporeal processes (Stumpf, 1983, p. 453).  Krafft-Ebing 
(1886/1965) modified this view to a hierarchical perspective by privileging the “sexual feeling” 
over all other passions including love, ethics, aesthetics, and religion (see p. 1).  The 
psychophysical term “drives” was substituted for passions by the early sexologists and is an 
important premise behind both Krafft-Ebing’s and Freud’s theories of sadomasochism.    .       
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these supposedly "objective” theories and developmental norms reveal the 
moralistic underpinnings that masqueraded as disinterested clinical observation, 
theorization, and therapeutic intervention.   
     The belief, common among Victorian scientists, that philosophical reflection 
was antithetical to scientific practice (Canguilhem, 1989, p. 44) was another 
obstacle to a broad understanding of sadomasochism.  It did not occur to most 
scientists that philosophical premises were embedded in their own methods of 
scientific inquiry.  Many sexologists who claimed to be objective and therefore 
dismissive of philosophy were heavily influenced by philosophical assumptions 
that imposed limits on their findings.  Krafft-Ebing’s (1886/1965) approach to 
sadism and masochism is a prime example.  He was critical of the philosophy of 
Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, who argued that sexuality takes a subordinate 
position to the passion of love.  He called their philosophical perspectives 
“pessimistic” and “thoroughly incorrect and illogical, so far as science is 
concerned” (p. xxi).  At the same time, his own theory of sadism and masochism, 
which was also referred to as degeneration theory took the position that all 
psychological manifestations of sexual behavior can be traced back to “their 
anatomical and physiological sources” (p. xxi).  This idea, that all psychic 
phenomena have their roots in anatomy and physiology, comes from a German 
philosophical perspective known as mechanistic materialism (Fromm, 1969/1970, 
p. 46), which for sexologists like Krafft-Ebing was assumed to be a “lawful 
condition” (Krafft-Ebing, 1886/1965, p. xxii). It did not occur to Krafft-Ebing that 
degeneration theory was a philosophical speculation rather than a fact or a law of 
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science.  One may also critique Freud’s theories of sadomasochism from the 
same perspective. 
     Returning to the history of sadomasochism theories, it was after Freud’s 
primary masochism theory based on the death instinct when other theories of 
sadomasochism began to proliferate.  The parameters of the sadomasochism 
discourse were extended from a restricted libidinal scope to a more generalized 
context of everyday social living (Horney, 1937; Sullivan, 1953), including the 
issues of race (Fanon, 1967), gender   (Beauvoir, 1952; Butler, 1997), and 
institutional relations (Chancer, 1992).  Nonetheless, with a few notable 
exceptions, the theoretical underpinnings of most modern and post-modern 
theories of sadomasochism have remained wedded to the themes of sexuality, 
gender, and aggression.  This includes recent hermeneutic-phenomenological 
studies of sadomasochistic identities by Landridge and Butt (2004), and queer 
theories of subjection and power (Butler, 1992, 1997).  This leads to my reasons 
for choosing to focus on the existential theories of Fromm and Sartre. 
     When the sadomasochism theories of Jean-Paul Sartre (1943/1956) and 
Erich Fromm (1939, 1941, 1956) appeared, they were unlike other theories of 
sadomasochism during their era because neither approach posited sex as the 
primary locus of sadomasochism.  Sartre and Fromm both rejected the natural 
scientific attitude towards the understanding of the human passions, such as the 
corporeal striving for love and the need for erotic pleasure.  Instead, each 
appropriated an understanding of the passions that focused on interactions 
between a self and another person.  Each existential thinker also shared the 
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belief that the striving for dominance and submission extends beyond the 
presumably drive-based sexual sphere as well.  However, Fromm and Sartre did 
more than dethrone sexuality as the primary drive behind sadomasochism; they 
also opposed the medieval concept of "sin” and the “spirit of seriousness”6  
which, I will argue, ran through most theoretical accounts of sadomasochism—
including Freud’s.  Moreover, Sartre and Fromm both rejected the tendency to 
base modern dualistic standards of normality and pathology on psycho-neurotic 
concepts.  During a time when most theorists used an intrapsychic model that 
reduced sadomasochism to an individual pathology based on a set of 
unconscious drives independent from external influences, Fromm and Sartre 
took the position that sadomasochism needs to be understood as taking place 
between human beings, who are interactively engaged with each other in a 
particular socio-historical context.  Alongside their assumption of the primacy of 
human sociality in their approaches, Fromm and Sartre also stressed a notion of 
subjectivity that conveys an active sense of agency and the ability to make 
choices that impact others as well.  Clearly, Fromm and Sartre viewed 
sadomasochism as more than a pathology confined to psychoneurotic 
parameters.  One can see how both existential thinkers viewed sadomasochism 
as a primarily social, pervasive, and surprisingly “ordinary” human tendency that 
takes place within multiple human contexts.             
                                                 
6 Sartre (1943/1956) coined the term “spirit of seriousness” (l’esprit de sérieux) to describe any 
perspective that views man as an object and subordinates him to the world.  In the spirit of 
seriousness, values are considered as having an absolute existence independent of human 
reality (p. 806)  
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     Following an examination and comparison of Fromm’s, Sartre’s, and various 
post-Sartrean theories of sadomasochism, I will argue that Erich Fromm’s theory 
of love, which he first proposed as an alternative to what he referred to as 
sadomasochistic pseudo-love in “Selfishness and Self-Love” (Fromm, 1939, pp. 
507-523) is a highly suitable theoretical framework for the understanding of 
sadomasochism that bridges an important gap between existentialist and 
psychoanalytic thought.  Fromm drew a clear distinction between productive love 
based on freedom that is able to overcome separateness and sadomasochistic 
pseudo-love, which is borne out of desperation and seeks to escape 
separateness and form attachments based on the need to avoid anxiety.  I will 
argue that Fromm’s (1939, 1941, 1956) differentiation of productive love from 
sadomasochistic pseudo-love effectively displaced sexuality as the primary 
cause of sadomasochism in a transformative way.  A central theme of this 
dissertation is that Fromm’s theory of love, which emphasizes the importance of 
strong, individuated, and mutually reciprocal relationships, is the best deterrent to 
sadomasochistic attachments.  I further contend that Fromm’s theory of love and 
sadomasochistic pseudo-love has gone underappreciated in the history of 
psychology in general, and continues to be overlooked in the current mind-set of 
sadomasochism theorists in particular. 
     Given that this dissertation is theoretical by design its methodology is 
organized around a systematic process of argumentation, that is, around the 
critical analysis of key texts addressing the topic of sadomasochism.  To 
organize my analysis, I evaluate the theories of sadomasochism discussed in 
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light of four guiding criteria:  internal consistency; how each theory is in dialogue 
with findings from other disciplines; the presence or absence of prescriptive 
norms; and the economy of a theorist’s framework that may explain different 
expressions of sadomasochism.  While some of these points are explicitly 
identified with certain theories others are implicit to my analysis throughout the 
text.  
     First, I am concerned with the degree of internal consistency between a 
theorist’s conceptual framework of sadism and masochism and his or her own 
espoused ideals.  For example, as I show in chapter 2, in “Instincts and 
Vicissitudes” (Freud, 1915/1962g, pp. 109-140), Freud espoused a method that 
stressed a strict and detached empirical attitude towards “the facts,” which were 
to be examined in light of “the scientific concepts underlying [them]” (p. 109).  For 
the most part, he contrasted this loosely empirical approach with that of 
speculation and philosophical reflection, “to the latter’s discredit” (Holt, 1989, p. 
48; see also Roazen, 2001, p. 83).  Instead, Freud preferred making 
comparisons to the “science of physics” (Freud, 1915/1962g, p. 110) to explain 
how he developed his psychoanalytic concepts.  Freud believed that all psychic 
phenomena have their roots in physiological processes, a speculative notion 
based on the philosophy of mechanistic materialism (Fromm, 1969, p. 46).  Many 
of his most popular and influential theories fail to meet the criteria consistent with 
the empirical standards for physiological science that were prevalent during his 
era (Lewin, 1937/1999, p. 67).  In fact, it is recognized by some that 
 11
psychoanalysis is more of an anthropological philosophical system than it is “an 
empirical discipline” (Holt, 1989, p. 365; also, see Lewin, 1937/1999, pp. 67-74). 
     A second criterion I employ is whether or not a given theorist has incorporated 
other findings, conceptualizations, criticisms, and contemporaneous findings from 
other disciplines.  An example is how Krafft-Ebing incorporated the literature of 
Sade and Masoch to help him formulate his theory of sadism and masochism.  At 
the same time, he downplayed how philosophical speculation might be useful to 
help him understand his new diagnostic framework for sadism and masochism.  
Another example, as noted by Havelock Ellis (1903/1936), was how Krafft-Ebing 
overlooked extant evidence of sadistic behavior in normal female sex play, 
which, according to Ellis, “occurs through a large part of nature” (p. 128).  Krafft-
Ebing mainly emphasized the hypersexual behavior of men, which he attributed 
to “the natural shyness and modesty of women towards the aggressive manners 
of the male” (1886/1965, pp.53-54).  One could conclude based on Krafft-Ebing’s 
statements and conclusions that he was either unaware of or ruled out other 
findings which did not support his claim of a binary equation between 
male/sadism and female/masochism.  
     This leads to my third criterion, which is to critique the prescriptive norms that 
may be embedded in a specific theorist’s framework.  Staying with Krafft-Ebing 
(1886/1965) for the moment, I argue that one of his major problems was his 
presentation of heterosexual intercourse as the “gold standard” for his 
construction of sadism and masochism (p. 56).  Granted, he presented this 
standard of sexual behavior during the Victorian era.  Nonetheless, despite how 
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current critiques have debunked the idea of gendered polarities as intrinsic to 
sadomasochism, the popular imagination of sadomasochism as a gendered 
sexual perversion has yet to be dismantled.  Krafft-Ebing’s heteronormative 
account of sadism and masochism engendered a biological literalism that despite 
a lack of support from clinical evidence became etched in the minds of most 
sexologists’ theoretical framework of sadomasochism that persists in many 
guises to this day.        
     The last criterion concerning my analysis of theories of sadomasochism draws 
from the principle known as “Ockham’s Razor.”  Ockham’s razor may also be 
referred to as the “law of parsimony.”  It suggests that “what can be explained on 
fewer principles is explained needlessly by more” (Stumpf, 1983, p. 191) and 
therefore, according to Ockham’s law, a theory which demonstrates integrity of 
premise and elaboration is preferable to one that requires excessive 
reformulation or addenda.  For example, as I recount in chapter 2, Freud 
frequently revised his theory of sadomasochism.  He first switched from a 
mechanistic model based on physics to a psychological theory based on his 
Oedipal schema.  When his findings did not support the Oedipal theory the way 
he hoped, he shifted once again to a biologically minded theory of 
sadomasochism which rested on the death instinct.  A major tendency in Freud’s 
theories, which could be considered a flaw, was how he continually deferred 
unresolved problems, such as the relationship between aggression, sexuality, 
and death to new theoretical schemas. At the same time, he was the first to 
notice that in certain instances, such as, mourning, melancholia, (Freud, 
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1915/1962h, p. 251) and moral masochism (Freud, 1924/1962e, p. 162) the 
explanation of sadomasochistic enactments could not be restricted to one or two 
simple drives.  One can argue then, that Freud’s theories of sadomasochism 
were lacking in an economy of vision and required an exorbitant amount of 
revisions.    
     Erich Fromm’s theory of love on the other hand, provides a theoretical 
framework from which the understanding of sadomasochistic relationships can 
make sense and stand on its own without reformulation.  Fromm’s emphasis on 
the formation of individuated and mutually reciprocal relationships serves as a 
counterpoint to sadomasochistic pseudo-love and allows for instances of sexual, 
non-sexual, interpersonal, and group sadomasochism to be conceptualized 
under one integrated, theoretical premise: the inability to face existential 
aloneness and successfully resolve the need for relatedness with others.  While 
there is clearly no perfect or universal theory of sadomasochism, I will argue that 
Fromm’s conceptualization of love and pseudo-love demonstrates Ockham’s 
notion of integrity of premise and elaboration and is an effective theoretical 
framework of sadomasochism. 
     In order to set the groundwork for the claims I make in this study, it is 
necessary, as was indicated earlier, to consider how theories of sadomasochism 
became “dominated” by sexual themes.  Therefore, this dissertation is presented 
in two parts.  In Part 1, which includes chapters 1 through 3, I will be examining 
the emergence of the modern scientific theories of sadomasochism with an 
analysis of each theorist’s assumptions regarding sexuality and human behavior.  
 14
In Part 2, which covers the last two chapters; I will examine the contributions of 
those existential theorists who de-centered sexuality as the primary impulse 
behind sadomasochism.      
     In chapter 1, I examine Krafft-Ebing’s formulations of sadism and masochism 
which reveal a succession of important biases that became etched in the minds of 
the sexologists that followed him.  One of Krafft-Ebing’s biases was his conflation 
of male biology with sadistic aggression and female biology with masochistic 
passivity.  Another misleading association was his notion that the level of male 
sexual potency, judged by the male’s ability to perform heterosexual intercourse, is 
equivalent to male sadistic behavior.  Conversely, Krafft-Ebing viewed male sexual 
impotence (i.e. the inability to perform heterosexual intercourse) as a predisposing 
factor in masochism (Krafft-Ebing, 1886/1965, p. 87), which he explained as a 
characterological defect based on the “natural” subordinating tendencies inherent 
to female physiology (p. 141).  In both cases, he presented these misleading 
associations as if they were the fruits of disinterested observation rather than the 
re-inscription of long-established prescriptive norms.      
     In chapter 2, I will examine Freud’s theories of sadomasochism.  Alongside of 
his reputation as the most famous pioneer in the modern scientific approach 
towards sexuality (Lewin 1931/1999, p. 52), Freud is also regarded as the most 
prolific theorist on sadomasochism during his era.  His theories can be divided into 
three phases.  In the first phase, Freud assumed that sadism was primary and 
masochism secondary.  In his second phase, Freud explained sadomasochism as 
being mediated by the Oedipal complex.  In his third and final phase, which was 
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largely a reversal of the first phase, Freud asserted masochism to be the primary 
drive instead of sadism.  Among Freud’s papers on sadomasochism that are 
examined in this dissertation, there are two where he considers sadomasochism 
from a non-sexual perspective, which is crucial to my thesis.  The first is “Mourning 
and Melancholia” (Freud, 1919/1962, pp.175-204), written during Freud’s Oedipal-
oriented phase and the second, “The Economic Problem of Masochism” (Freud, 
1924/1962e, pp. 157-170), which signaled the beginning of Freud’s final stage of 
theorizing on sadomasochism.  I will argue that both of these papers open the door 
for a theory of sadomasochism that privileges the idea of human love and loving 
relationships to be the primary issue of concern regarding sadomasochistic 
behaviors rather than sexuality, aggression, or a death instinct.  Nevertheless, 
despite these and other findings by Freud, he stayed with a theory that privileged 
the intra-psychic themes of sex, death, and aggression whenever explaining 
sadomasochism.   
     Whatever Freud’s reasons were for proposing the death instinct in his last 
phase of theorizing on sadomasochism, it caused a stir in the psychoanalytic 
community.  Although most analysts continued to follow the earlier Freud and 
maintained a natural scientific attitude towards sadomasochism, there were some 
notable exceptions.  For instance, Karen Horney (1937) argued that female 
masochism was not biologically inevitable but, rather, was a social construction 
(Chancer, 1992, p. 114); Harry S. Sullivan (1953) used an interpersonal theory of 
anxiety to explain sadomasochism.  The theories of Horney, Sullivan, and other 
post-Freudians will be explored in chapter 3.   
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     In Part 2, I’ll begin in chapter 4 with an examination of the influences on 
Fromm that led him to call for a theory of love and an analysis of the ways people 
avoid the given condition of existential aloneness.  Instead of exploring the libido 
theory as the origin of sadomasochism, Fromm’s (1939, 1941) concentrated on 
the patterns of “loving” relationships that individuals choose when overcoming 
feelings of separateness from one another as the mediating factor that explains 
sadomasochistic behavior.  The turning point that led Fromm to call for a new 
vision of sadomasochism and a call for a theory of love anchored on his 
existential critique of Freud’s primary masochism theory and the death instinct, 
which will be examined in Chapter 4.  At the same time, Jean-Paul Sartre was 
examining sadomasochism from an existential-phenomenological perspective as 
will be noted in Chapter 4 as well. 
     In section A of chapter 5, I examine the existential foundations behind 
Fromm’s theory of love and the mechanisms of escape which established a new 
way of conceptualizing sadomasochism.  In section B, I examine Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s (1943/1956) existential-phenomenological understanding of human 
relationships found in Being and Nothingness (Part III, chap. 1) which rests on 
the idea that sadomasochism is embedded in all human relationships.  Sartre’s 
ontological7 view is easy to overlook as a contribution to the understanding of the 
psychology of sadomasochism.  This is followed in section C with a review of the 
contributions of various post-Sartrean analysts and thinkers who furthered the 
understanding of sadomasochism to different social and clinical contexts during 
                                                 
7Ontology refers to the description of being itself, “the conditions by which ‘there is’ a world, 
human reality, etc.” (Sartre, 1943/1956, pp. 804-805)    
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the 20th century.  Chapter 5 ends with a comparative analysis of Fromm’s and 
Sartre’s theories of sadomasochism that includes each existentialist’s notion of 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity.   
     In the conclusion, I will argue that based on a comparison of Fromm’s 
conceptualization of love with that of Freud’s and Sartre’s views, Fromm’s theory 
of love and his analysis of sadomasochistic pseudo-love offers a grounded and 
economical conceptual framework of sadomasochism that has been overlooked 
by current theorists of sadomasochism.  Furthermore, I will contend, that based 
on current perspectives by sadomasochism theorists, without a theory of love 
that stresses strong salutary relationships as offered by Fromm, the 
understanding of sadomasochism will remain incomplete and open to the 
continued mistaken perception that sexuality is its pre-eminent cause.  Reasons 
why Fromm’s writings and theories continue to be overlooked in psychoanalytic 
and post-modern theories of sadomasochism will be explored and I will close by 
offering reasons why Fromm should be viewed as a major contributor to the 
history of sadomasochism theory.      
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          PART ONE 
                                          CHAPTER 1 
                THE BIRTH OF THE SADOMASOCHISTIC COMPLEX 
 
  Section A: Richard von Krafft-Ebing’s Publication of Psychopathia Sexualis  
     As mentioned in the introduction, the concepts of sadism and masochism 
were first introduced by the Austrian neuropsychiatrist, Richard von Krafft-Ebing, 
in his landmark textbook on sexually deviant behaviors called Psychopathia 
Sexualis (1886/1965).  Krafft-Ebing lists sadism and masochism as two distinct 
sexual perversions and named them after two famous authors.  Sadism was “so 
named from the notorious Marquis De Sade, whose obscene novels . . . of lust 
and cruelty” (p. 417) detailed the complex interconnections between sex and 
power.  Masochism, which Krafft-Ebing called “the opposite of sadism,” was 
named after Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, whose fiction described masochism as 
a “sexual anomaly . . . . which up to his time was quite unknown in the scientific 
world as such” (pp. 86, 87).   
     Psychopathia Sexualis (1886/1965) was a popular success for Krafft-Ebing.  
The first publication of sexology research to reach a wider audience beyond the 
usual medical circles of late nineteenth-century Europe, it was published nearly 
two decades before Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality 
(1905/1957) and 11 years before Havelock Ellis’s first volume of his Studies in 
the Psychology of Sex (1897/1936).  Krafft-Ebing’s Psychopathia Sexualis has 
been compared to Kinsey’s Sexual Behavior and the Human Male (as cited in 
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Robinson, 1976) for its scope and comprehensiveness; the difference between 
these two texts was that Krafft-Ebing intended Psychopathia Sexualis as a 
compendium for the diagnostic classification of sexual disorders, while Kinsey 
was interested in the acquisition of normal sexual behavior (Robinson, 1976, 
chap. 2).        
     Psychopathia Sexualis (1886/1965) provoked a considerable amount of 
professional interest and was a catalyst for a number of studies in the emerging 
field of sexology (Ellenberger, 1970).  Nevertheless, Krafft-Ebing was spurned by 
his peers, for he financially profited from the sale of his textbook to the general 
public.  Consequently, the popularity of this text called the professional 
seriousness of his work into question.  The commercial success of Psychopathia 
Sexualis both reflected and fed into the growing popular interest in sexuality and 
its perversions.  As Henri Ellenberger writes (1970): 
It was . . .  the time when popular books on sexual matters began to 
appear everywhere…The complaint against Krafft-Ebing was not in 
publishing his book, but that he had not prevented it from being sold 
indiscriminately.  Benedikt [a Viennese physician] noticed that “today the 
students of higher schools for girls were more knowledgeable on the 
theme of sexual perversions than we were as young physicians”. . .  
Obviously, the dividing line between scientific vulgarization and 
pornography was difficult to determine from the very beginning. (pp. 298-
299)  
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This trend threatened the Victorian medical hierarchy, which viewed the 
proliferation of sexual knowledge among the general public as dangerous 
because such knowledge was sure to lead to a diminishing of their 
authoritative influence.  The received view today in the United Sates is that 
Victorian Europe was sexually repressed and prudish.  While a veneer of 
prudery characterizes that sociocultural moment, especially in the Anglo-
Saxon orbit, it was not the same in continental Europe (Burston, 2005, 
personal communication).  Sexual repression was less of a problem there 
than was the suppression of new findings concerning certain sexual practices 
by a medical establishment fearful of losing its authoritative power.  
Foucault’s (1978/1990) sociohistorical analysis of Victorianism suggests that 
the “deployments of power and knowledge of truth and pleasures” were more 
prominent than the practice of sexual repression, which “is not in any case 
fundamental or overriding” (p. 73).  Foucault’s analysis implies that the impact 
of a work like Krafft-Ebing’s Psychopathia Sexualis helped to shape a new 
epistemological attitude towards “legitimate” sexual knowledge that would 
have served to legitimize the enjoyment of “proper” sexual relations.   
     One could argue that the multiple sets of conflicts which surrounded the surge 
of published material about sexual behavior in late nineteenth-century Europe 
would have heightened interest in sadism and masochism because it rendered 
alternate sexual practices more visible to public awareness than ever before.  
Sexology, at that time, frequently blurred the boundaries between, on the one 
hand, popular and literary discourses (e.g., novels and popular literature) and, on 
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the other hand, scientific discourse.8  In this light, the professional panic in the 
medical community over the popularization of sexology is understandable, as it 
threatened to undermine the credibility of the physician as the “sex expert” in 
popular consciousness.   
     Krafft-Ebing did not intend for his text to become public information (Blain, 
1965, p. xvii).  In fact, he had hoped it would become a reference for physicians 
and lawyers, and with each edition, he attempted to make the text more and 
more obscure to the public.   Rather than directly appeal to the popular interest in 
sex, Krafft-Ebing (1886/1965) was mainly concerned with identifying the 
organizing principles behind sexual perversions.  He wrote: 
It is not intended to build up in this book a system of the psychology of 
sexual life, [sic] still from the close study of psychopathology there arise 
most important psychological facts which it behooves the scientist to 
notice. 
   The object of this treatise is merely to record the various psycho-
pathological manifestations of sexual life in and to reduce them to their 
lawful conditions. (pp. xxi-xxii)    
Regardless of the author’s intentions, Psychopathia Sexualis ultimately 
contributed to the breakdown of boundaries between the public and the 
                                                 
8Comparing a passage from Masoch’s Venus in Furs (1870/1971) with one of Krafft-Ebing’s 
case reports demonstrates how blurred these boundaries were.  For example, Krafft-Ebing’s 
(1886/1965) description of “pageism” (p. 89) is depicted graphically and is hard to distinguish 
from the dialogue and behavioral descriptions that take place between Severin and Wanda in 
Masoch’s Venus in furs (1870/1971, pp. 180-184).     
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Victorian medical professionals, with the result that Krafft-Ebing suffered a fall 
from grace among his peers. 9
          
 Section B: The Contributions and Limitations of Krafft-Ebing’s Theories  
          Degeneration Theory and Male Heterosexism  
     Krafft-Ebing has been duly recognized as a pioneer in the field of sexual 
perversions (Blain, 1965, p. x).  He raised significant questions about the nature 
of the sexual perversions while advancing the diagnostic classification of sexual 
disorders.  At the same time, he seems to have recognized the broader 
implications of his work and urged restraint and scientific caution concerning his 
findings.  In evaluating himself and his efforts to uncover the “lawful conditions” 
(Krafft-Ebing, 1886/1965, p. xxii) of the sexual perversions he wrote that “the 
author is well aware of the fact that, despite his…far reaching experience in 
psychiatry and criminal medicine, he is yet unable to offer anything but an 
imperfected system” (p. xxii).   
     Krafft-Ebing’s approach to theory emanated from the 19th century movement 
in psychiatry known as degeneration theory, 10 which meant that he “was inclined 
to attribute most severe sexual perversions to a constitutional origin.…[even 
though] the notion that psychological causes can be the origin of sexual 
perversions [had] gained ground” (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 299).  It was a much 
                                                 
9 Krafft-Ebing went into professional hibernation shortly after the first edition of Psychopathia 
Sexualis was released, resigned his professorship at Strasbourg, and opened a sanitarium in 
Graz, Austria.  For the next decade, he waited until the controversy abated and lived in relative 
peaceful seclusion while ministering to the insane.  Eventually, he was re-instated as a 
university professor at Strasbourg and enjoyed a brief resurgence of credibility before his death 
in 1902 (Klaf, 1965, p. vi).   
10 Degeneration theory is attributed to Benedikt Morel’s theory of heredity which posits that 
mental illness is a symptom of a decaying central nervous system.     
 
 23
debated question during Krafft-Ebing’s time as to whether sexual perversions 
were inborn or acquired, and psychological reasoning was very crude.  In the 
following passage, one can detect a sense of moralism embedded in Krafft-
Ebing’s (1886/1965) explanation of the sexual perversions which was typical 
during his era:    
Anomalies of the sexual functions are met with especially in civilized 
races.  This fact is explained in part by the frequent abuse of the sexual 
organs and in part by the circumstance that such functional anomalies are 
chiefly the signs of an inherited disease condition of the central nervous 
system (“functional signs of degeneration”).  (p. 32)  
The consequences of Krafft-Ebing’s conventional moralism was that at the 
same time that he was advancing scientific inquiry of the sexual perversions 
beyond morbid curiosity, Krafft-Ebing was also engaging in some mystifying 
speculations about the origin of sexual perversions that led to confusion rather 
than clarity.  The tendency to skew empirical findings in sexology according to 
conventional moralism was emblematic of Krafft-Ebing’s era and it went along 
with questionable professional claims and judgments.   
     A good example of conventional moralism in Krafft-Ebing’s writings can be 
seen in how he causally linked homosexual acts 11 with childhood masturbation 
(p. 188).  Krafft-Ebing considered the general practice of masturbation as a 
“defect [which] influences the morals, the character, fancy, feeling and instinct 
                                                 
11 Krafft-Ebing (1886/1965) distinguished between learned homosexual behavior as a 
perversity he called a “vice” (p. 53) and homosexuality as a perversion, or a parasthesia, which 
he linked with a cerebral neuroses that was indicative of a diseased central nervous system 
(chap. IV).  
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of the youthful masturbator, male or female, in an unfavorable manner, even 
causing…the desire for the opposite sex to sink to nil ” (p. 189).  Based on his 
explanation for homosexuality and masturbation, one can surmise that for 
Krafft-Ebing, degeneration theory did more than uncover the “important 
psychological facts” (p. xxi) of sexual anomalies.  It perpetuated, under the 
guise of scientific reasoning, the prescriptive notion that only heterosexual 
intercourse performed for the purposes of procreation is “normal,” while any 
sexual behavior which varies from this standard is to be suspiciously viewed 
and considered deviant in pathological terms.  To be sure, this was a 
heteronormative ideal that was scientifically rationalized as a “lawful condition” 
(p. xxii) and it suffused Krafft-Ebing’s entire text, including his explanations of 
homosexuality and masturbation just as it did for his explanations of sadism 
and masochism. 12    
Krafft-Ebing’s Definition of Sadism: A Moralistic Biologism 
     Krafft-Ebing’s (1886/1965) first definition for sadism was stated as “the 
association of lust with cruelty, which is indicated in the physiological 
consciousness.  [It] becomes strongly marked on a psychically degenerated basis, 
and . . . this lustful impulse coupled with presentations of cruelty rises to the height 
of powerful affects” (p. 34).  He followed this statement with the added qualifier that 
the level of sadistic cruelty is correlated with sexual potency of the “tainted 
individual” (p. 34).  According to Krafft-Ebing, the intention of the sadist --who is 
                                                 
12 Havelock Ellis (1897) advanced a congenital theory of homosexuality which was non-
pathological and embraced compassionate tolerance (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 778).  This is 
correlated with Ellis’ compassionate and non-pathological stance on sadism and masochism as 
well (see section D of this chapter).       
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unmistakably assumed to be a male in all of his examples -- derives from 
enactments of sexual cruelty that are assumed to be a direct consequence of 
sexual urges that are unable to be satiated through the act of heterosexual 
intercourse.  As he explained:  
If potent, the impulse of the sadist is directed to coitus, coupled with 
preparatory, concomitant or consecutive maltreatment, even murder of the 
consort (“Lust Murder”), the latter occurring chiefly because sensual lust 
has not been satisfied with the consummated coitus.  (pp. 34-35) 
One might raise a question about Krafft-Ebing’s implied assumption in the 
above passage that establishes the heterosexual male sex drive as the only 
moderating variable behind lust murders.  Nevertheless, it is exactly what 
Krafft-Ebing assumed:  all acts of violence which precede and follow the act 
of heterosexual intercourse are the exclusive function of the (male) sadist’s 
sex drive.  Moreover, he equated psychic expressions of sadism with 
physiological impairment as seen in the following passage:    
If the sadist is psychically or spinally impotent, as an equivalent of coitus, 
there will be noticed strangling, stabbing, flagellating (of women), or under 
circumstances ridiculously silly and mean, acts of violence on the other 
person (symbolic sadism), or also for want of something better on any 
living and feeling object (whipping of school children, recruits, apprentices, 
cruel acts on animals, etc.). (p. 35)  
The previous two passages suggest that Krafft-Ebing posited the idea that male 
sexual potency is equivalent with sadistic behavior.  As part of this conflation, he 
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further implies that the male sex drive is a quantifiable entity which can be 
measured and correlated with acts of violence and cruelty.  From an empirical 
scientific standpoint, there has never been any evidence to suggest that what 
Krafft-Ebing claimed about the male sex drive was accurate.  Yet, the conflation 
between sexual potency and aggression was presented as a value free fact that 
became a law in the early days of psychopathology (see Canguilhem, 1989, pp. 
56-57).   
     The quantification model of the sexual libido as espoused by Krafft-Ebing 
conveys the conventional hetero-normative values emblematic of Krafft-Ebing’s 
time.  The converse of the male potency/sadism conflation is the impotent 
male/masochist idea which Krafft-Ebing also unwisely advocated.  It is a 
distinctive feature of late 19th century theories of psychopathology that the ideas 
of “normal” and “pathological” were imbued with semi-quantitative concepts, and 
that these concepts tended to justify preconceived notions about what is “right 
and wrong” rather than merely describe behavior.13 At the root of both claims 
was the idea that heterosexual intercourse enacted for the purpose of procreation 
is the golden standard that determines healthy sexual behavior.  In hindsight, 
Krafft-Ebing, and other early sexologists were far more prescriptive than 
descriptive in their conclusions about sexual perversions in general and sadism 
and masochism in particular.  In effect, Krafft-Ebing was implying that it was a 
“sin” to express intense sexual desire because it leads to evil acts of sadism.  
                                                 
13 Canguilhem (1989) points out that the same scientific dogma which governed the idea of the 
normal and the pathological in the fields of biology and medicine during the late 19th century 
found its way into psychology and psychopathology as well (p. 42).  This dogma was based on 
the twofold premise that the “normal” could be defined in purely objective terms and that it 
could be expressed quantitatively (p. 57).  
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Conversely, male masochism is an evil derived from a diminished sexual libido 
that is due to a “hereditarily tainted individuality” (Krafft-Ebing, 1886/1965, p. 87) 
that is characteristic of the biological constitution of women (p. 141).  Besides the 
moralism embedded in Krafft-Ebing’s claim that male sexual potency was the 
“lawful condition” (p. xiv) governing sadism and masochism, there was also a 
lack of economical clarity in his theoretical framework that could explain the 
presence of sadism and masochism in the same individual. 14  Because he 
privileged heterosexual intercourse as the only standard to contrast sadism and 
masochism as perversions, there were many instances of sadomasochism that 
Krafft-Ebing was forced to leave unexplained for those who followed him.     
     Consequences of Biologism for Theories of Sadism and Masochism 
     It is a curious irony that Krafft-Ebing (1886/1965) was the first to call 
attention to the psychology involved in sadism and masochism, given that he 
claimed to have no interest in a psychological exploration of the “sexual life” 
(p. xxi).  He remained convinced that sadism derived from an innate source of 
male sexual aggression that “can by no manner of means be attributable to 
external impressions, much less to sexual temper” (p. 54).  According to 
Krafft-Ebing, sadism and masochism are pathological extensions of “normal” 
sexual teasing and “horseplay” between lovers (presumed to be 
heterosexual).  He invoked the laws of physiology to back up his claim that it 
is normal for the male to be sadistic in sexual behavior.  In addition, he 
advanced the idea that the most destructive acts of sadistic cruelty can be 
                                                 
14 As mentioned earlier, Krafft-Ebing (1886/1965) admitted that the instances of sadism and 
masochism which occur simultaneously in the same person presented “some difficulties of 
explanation (p. 142).  
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traced back to “the sphere of physiological sexuality” (p. 53) which is part of 
the natural biological constitution of the male.  Moreover, Krafft-Ebing 
declared that male sadistic aggression is actually nurtured by passive female 
compliance.15  It’s now apparent that if one is to take Krafft-Ebing’s argument 
seriously, then the most morbid and destructive forms of sadistic behavior are 
separated by incrementally increasing amounts of sexual passion.  Simple 
reflection would seem to suggest otherwise however, as there is a world of 
difference between the intention to humiliate, subjugate and/or destroy 
another human being and being sexually passionate towards a lover or a 
stranger.   
     While one may object to Krafft-Ebing’s quantification of sexual aggression, 
perhaps the bigger problem was how male heteronormativity skewed his 
observations.  For example, how far did anyone really have to go to observe 
that aggressive acts of biting and scratching were not specific only to the 
male in human sex play?   Yet, Krafft-Ebing asserted that biting and 
scratching were exclusively male behaviors. Leaving European socio-sexual 
practices aside for the moment, anthropologists in the late nineteenth century 
had already noted tendencies of female human aggression and physical 
dexterity in the courtship rituals of New Zealanders, Eskimos, and other non-
Western cultures (Ellis, 1903/1936, pp. 75-76).  These extant findings suggest 
that Krafft-Ebing may have been unaware of studies from other fields that did 
                                                 
15 Krafft-Ebing (1886/1965) wrote that “it seems probable that this sadistic force is developed by 
the natural shyness and modesty of woman towards the aggressive manners of the male, 
especially during the earlier periods of married life and particularly where the husband is 
hypersexual” (pp. 53-54). 
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not support his thesis or, perhaps less likely, he ignored them. 16  The male 
Eurocentric attitude embedded in Krafft-Ebing’s theorizations on 
sadomasochism has come to be referred to as “the patriarchal perversion” 
(Thompson, 1994, p. 20).17   
     It becomes evident that Krafft-Ebing’s gendered and binaristic equation of 
sadism with male sexual aggression and masochism with female passivity was 
inconsistent with his own espoused ideal of value-free, empirical scientific 
inquiry.  Moreover, as suggested earlier, his theorizations on sadism and 
masochism cannot be viewed as economical because they left too many 
instances of sadistic and masochistic behavior unexplainable.  Added to these 
criticisms is that fact that Krafft-Ebing declared that he was uncovering the 
“psychological facts” of male aggression being intrinsic to sadism and female 
passivity as inborn to masochism while simultaneously disavowing any 
intention on his part to present a “system of the psychology of the sexual life” 
(Krafft-Ebing, 1886/1965, p. xxi).  Krafft-Ebing precluded any representation of 
male and female sexuality beyond the obligatory stereotypes of male 
aggression and female passivity as if they were a fixed reality.  Unfortunately, 
these themes became attached as the prominent feature of the discourse of 
                                                 
16 Fifteen years after Krafft-Ebing concluded the male/female biological dichotomy for sadism 
and masochism, Havelock Ellis pointed out the flaw in Krafft-Ebing’s theories for both.  Ellis 
wrote that “Krafft-Ebing’s methods are open to some objection.  His mind is not of a severely 
critical order”(Blain, 1965, p. x). Ellis’ arguments will be explored in more detail in the next 
section 
17 A similar patriarchal bias is also evident in Freud’s approach to sadomasochism as chapter 2 
will show.   
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sadomasochism theory as most Victorian sexologists embraced Krafft-Ebing’s 
theorizations about sadism and masochism. 18
                         From Simple Algolagnia to Intentional Cruelty 
     It is a profitable irony for psychology that despite Krafft-Ebing’s (1886/1965) 
dislike for psychological inquiry, he was the first to identify the psychology of 
domination and submission as the core themes propelling the sadomasochistic 
impulse.  After establishing sadism as “the experience of sexual pleasurable 
experiences…produced by acts of cruelty…afflicted by one’s own person or 
witnessed in others, be they animals or human beings” (p. 53), Krafft-Ebing 
added the following groundbreaking statement:  “It may also consist of an innate 
desire to humiliate, hurt, wound, or even destroy others in order to thereby to 
create sexual pleasure in one’s self” (p. 53).  Prior to this statement by Krafft-
Ebing, “active algolagnia,” was the only term used to associate the infliction of 
pain with sexual arousal (p. 417).  Krafft-Ebing’s notation of the intention of 
cruelty and the desire to exercise domination over another human being marks 
the beginning of the history of the psychology of sadomasochism. Freud, too, 
recognized the importance of Krafft-Ebing’s findings regarding intentional cruelty 
and the need to humiliate another person, and extended credit to Krafft-Ebing for 
doing so.  Freud (1905/1957d) wrote:  
The most common and the most significant of all the perversions — the 
desire to inflict pain upon the sexual object, and its reverse — received 
                                                 
18 Among the sexologists, Freud was primarily responsible for keeping alive Krafft-Ebing’s 
heterosexual binarization ideal of sadomasochism by incorporating it into his Oedipal theory of 
psychosexual development.  Freud’s theories for sadomasochism will be examined in the next 
chapter.     
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from Krafft-Ebing the names of ‘sadism’ and ‘masochism’ for its active and 
passive forms respectively . . . This emphasizes the pleasure in pain, the 
cruelty; whereas the names chosen by Krafft-Ebing bring into prominence 
the pleasure in any form of humiliation or subjection. (p.157) 19
   
                     Section C: Krafft-Ebing’s Definition of Masochism 
      Krafft-Ebing did not hesitate in choosing the Marquis de Sade as the source 
and symbol for the term “sadism.”  Sade had been dead for more than a half-
century and was well known as the “notorious Marquis de Sade, after whom this 
combination of lust and cruelty has been named, [and who] was such a monster” 
(Krafft-Ebing, 1886/1965, p. 69).  Consequently, labeling sexual cruelty as 
sadism seemed logical to Krafft-Ebing.  When he named masochism in memory 
of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, however, Krafft-Ebing seemed to felt obligated to 
justify his choice and defend his reasons for doing so.     
     Leopold von Sacher-Masoch was a popular German author during Krafft-
Ebing’s time that was celebrated as a political essayist and is even considered 
to be an early feminist (Lotringer, 1989, p. vi). His most discussed novel, Venus 
in Furs (Sacher-Masoch, 1870/1971), is now accepted as the original literary 
reference for masochism. 20  It is the story of a highly dramatic and proscribed 
                                                 
19Although he acknowledged his debt to Krafft-Ebing, Freud preferred a more unified 
theoretical stance that treated sadism and masochism as two faces of the same perversion 
(Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973, pp. 401-402). These and other differences between Freud 
and Krafft-Ebing will be discussed in chapter 2.    
20The events in the novel supposedly took place in real life between Masoch and Fanny Pistor, 
an aspiring writer who expressed an interest to be a protégé to Masoch.  Eventually, Masoch 
convinced Pistor to meet with him and persuaded her to sign a written agreement to engage in 
a kind of  “Pygmalion project wherein the woman is trained to become Masoch’s fantasy 
mistress while believing that she’s acting according to only her own desires” (Lotringer, 1989, p. 
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relationship between Serverin von Kusiemski (Masoch’s alter ego) Wanda von 
Dunajew (Pistor). (Masoch changed the characters names to protect the 
anonymity of the couple.)  The novel, which is replete with scenes of torture 
and sexual debasement, was about a man who could only find pleasure by 
being tyrannized by a stronger superwoman figure (Lotringer, 1989, p. vii).   
Krafft-Ebing found Masoch’s relationship with Pistor to be the perfect 
embodiment of sexual masochism.  
     Never before had a popular novel and its author been directly referenced in 
the psychiatric literature as Venus in furs and Masoch were by Krafft-Ebing.  
This signaled a new form of “scientific discovery,” which Nick Mansfield (1997) 
refers to as “the modernity of masochism” (p. 2).  Krafft-Ebing’s reference to 
Masoch and Venus in furs in the naming of masochism as a clinical syndrome 
calls attention to the inherently porous nature of the boundaries between 
clinical psychiatry and creative fiction. 21
     Krafft-Ebing’s naming of masochism is a pivotal historical event because “the 
condition [masochism] and the literature came into existence at the same 
moment” (Mansfield, 1997, p. 13).  But, he was merely scratching the surface of 
a much broader pathological phenomenon.  Masoch’s literature was an ideal 
backdrop to Krafft-Ebing’s investigation of the sexual perversions, and it fed the 
                                                                                                                                              
ix).  With Pistor’s consent, Masoch carefully orchestrated the destruction of the boundaries 
between his real life and his “art” through acts of sexual slavery which he directed.   
21 If more proof is needed on the similarities between scientific literature and the 19th century 
novel, the reader is urged to sample almost any passage between Severin and Wanda from 
Venus in furs and compare it with Freud’s (1895/2000) case history of “Fräulein Anna O.”(pp. 
21-47) written about fifteen years later.  There is a very thin line between the narrative “clinical” 
style of Freud and Masoch’s novelistic narrative style.  While these texts have different 
intentions and are pressed in the service of very different agendas, without a framing of their 
contexts, each text might be easily confused with the other.  Determining that one is fiction 
hile the other is non-fiction is not always as easy as it might seem.   w  
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cultural obsession with sex that galvanized further studies in sexology among 
Victorian medical experts.  But while drawing attention to the master/slave 
dialectics of power in sexual relationships, at least implicitly, Krafft-Ebing was 
dismissive of any philosophical explanation of human passions such as the 
desire for power over others that could be a primary force behind 
sadomasochistic behavior.  As stated earlier, Krafft-Ebing subordinated all drives 
to sex (see Krafft-Ebing, 1886/1965, p. xxi). 
      The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Classification of Masochism 
     Krafft-Ebing’s definition of masochism does not associate physical pain 
with sexual stimulation, as is often imagined (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 298).  He 
understood that it is the wish to suffer pain that is central to the masochistic 
syndrome.  Perhaps, an even greater contribution to the understanding of 
masochistic phenomena was Krafft-Ebing’s emphasis on the intention to be 
subjected to the human will of another person that is at the core of 
masochism.  As he said, “the will of the ruling individual dominates that of the 
person in subjection, just as the master’s does that of the bondsmen”(Krafft-
Ebing, 1886/1965, p. 134).  One finds in this description by Krafft-Ebing an 
absence of the conventional cultural bias that suffused his other descriptions 
of masochism and sadism.  The use of the master-bondsman analogy   
enhances the understanding of sexual bondage.22   
                                                 
22 It should be noted that Krafft-Ebing chose the term “ruling individual” and “person in 
subjection” over the favored expressions of “slave” and “master” in masochism because he 
wanted to differentiate sexual bondage from other aspects of masochism (see Krafft-Ebing, 
1886/1965, p. 421).  
 
 34
     Despite his claim that masochism was associated with a female biological 
constitution, Krafft-Ebing had to admit that men “almost exclusively [made] up 
the series of observed cases” (p. 134) which added confusion to his theory.  
His confusion stemmed from his attachment to the idea that masochism was 
somehow a function of male sexual potency and/or impotency.  In those 
cases where the male masochist was able to perform intercourse, Krafft-
Ebing suggested that a pathologically high sex drive (hyperaesthesia) was its 
cause.  In other cases, where intercourse was not involved, he claimed that 
the lack of sexual potency was due to an inherited biological flaw (p. 87).  
One can see from these differing explanations that Krafft-Ebing employed the 
behavioral standard of heterosexual intercourse as the norm from which 
masochism was designated as a perversion.   
     Krafft-Ebing’s theory of masochism and sadism emerged during an era of 
dramatic change in prevailing conventional attitudes towards sex and 
morality, but one recognizes bias and limitations which were surprisingly 
resistant to change at the same time.  To make their theory “work” Krafft-
Ebing (and other sexologists) ignored anthropological studies and clinical 
case material which refuted the “unthinking identification between masochistic 
passivity and the feminine” (Mansfield, 1997, p. xi).  As a result, Krafft-Ebing’s 
lasting contributions to the understanding of sadism and masochism came 
from those observations that were least clouded by the cultural predilection 
towards heteronormative ideals.  
  
 
 35
Krafft-Ebing’s Attempt to Connect Sadism with Masochism 
     As mentioned previously, Krafft-Ebing viewed sadism and masochism as 
opposite pathologies and admitted to being confused whenever he observed 
cases of sexual sadism and sexual masochism in the same individual.  He 
never used the term “sadomasochism,” which suggests that he never 
conceived sadism and masochism as a unitary phenomenon.  At the same 
time, he did note that “the idea of subjection…both passively and actively, 
forms the nucleus of the desires” (p. 142), but he always insisted that one of the 
two perversions (sadism or masochism) was more dominant whenever such an 
instance occurred.     
     The influence of Aristotelian logic was employed by many Victorian 
sexologists and it is a factor that could help explain Krafft-Ebing’s thinking on 
masochism and sadism (see Fromm, 1956, chap. 2). 23 Aristotelian logic, or the 
logic of contradiction, states that “A” (i.e., sadism) cannot be “A” and “non-A” 
(masochism) at the same time.  Therefore, the possibility for sadism and 
masochism to be conceived as an inter-connected whole is precluded in 
Aristotelian logic.  For Krafft-Ebing, whose scientific thought is based on the 
tradition of Aristotelian logic, masochism and sadism occurring simultaneously 
in the same person would have appeared illogical, if not impossible.  The 
inability to conceptualize sadomasochism as a single phenomenon promoted 
the bifurcation of sadism and masochism into gendered opposites which 
                                                 
23 Benjamin, (1988) uses the term Hegelian logic to depict the same thought processes in her 
criticism of Freud’s theory of sadomasochism.  Simply put, the Hegelian approach takes the 
position that  “[o]pposites can no longer be integrated; one side is devalued, [and] the other 
idealized” (p. 50).   
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established a purely symbolic (rather than strictly empirical) equation between 
masculinity/aggression/sadism on the one hand and femininity/passiveness/ 
masochism on the other.  This bifurcation remains active to the present day in 
the popular imagination.  Thus, Krafft-Ebing’s text set the tone for a social 
construction of sadomasochism which precludes any further social, 
philosophical, and psychological speculation about sadism and masochism 
beyond and outside the sexual realm. 24   
 
              Section D: Havelock Ellis and the Modernist Perspective 
     Many historians of psychology continue to overlook Henry Havelock Ellis, the 
first major sexologist to follow Krafft-Ebing. 25  Ellis “contributed the most 
searching comments on Krafft-Ebing” (Blain, 1965, p. xviii) and championed the 
cause of the Victorian individual struggling with sexual problems in “an age too 
enlightened to believe in Christianity” (Calder-Marshall, 1959, p. 173).  Ellis 
infused tolerance and a more liberal perspective towards sadomasochistic sexual 
practices while attempting to construct a systematic sexology of sadism and 
masochism (Robinson, 1976, p. 22).   
     Ellis viewed sex as the central problem of life and sought to dispel myths, 
puncture widely held prejudices, and provide as many answers as he possibly 
could to questions about sex.  The most discernible themes and sentiments in his 
                                                 
24 Freud continued the tradition of Krafft-Ebing by espousing a psychoanalytic theory of 
sadomasochism based on similar polarities which will be discussed in chapter 2.   
25 Ellis is historically situated as the first sexologist who focused on sadomasochism following 
Krafft-Ebing.  He began writing on sexual issues in the early 1890’s and was already in 
dialogue with Krafft-Ebing and other sexologists at that time (see Robinson, 1976; Grosskurth, 
1980).  Ellis’ first works on sadomasochism preceded Freud’s first writings on the same topic by 
about two years.     
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work were compassion and a “normalizing” attitude towards the sexual 
perversions which stressed the fundamental humanness rather than the oddness 
or depravity of his subjects.  In addition to championing many individuals who 
were marginalized for their sexual tendencies during the Victorian era, Ellis was a 
tirelessly inquisitive empirical scientist with a high level of personal integrity.  He 
was known as a sex counselor, who often refused payment for his services 
because he felt it was unethical to charge for helping others.  Ellis was hailed in 
the English-speaking world as a sage on matters of sex and called “a healer 
possessed of rare powers” (Calder-Marshall, 1959, p. 173). Although untrained in 
psychiatry, he was a physician with a generalist background that included studies 
in theology, zoology and ethnography.  “Ellis was the supreme type of Victorian 
amateur polymath trying to follow in the tradition of Darwin, Spencer, and Frazer, 
who confidently assumed that they could take all knowledge as their domain” 
(Grosskurth, 1980, p. 217).  He was a true child of the Enlightenment, with a 
supreme faith in rationality, and viewed himself as a knowledgeable critic of 
science, literature, and the arts.  Ellis believed that by studying what had already 
been done by others and then applying his own critical powers of rational 
thought, he could solve most of the mysteries of sex (Grosskurth, 1980, p. xvi).  
     Ellis wrote seven volumes called Studies in the Psychology of Sex between 
the years of 1897 and 1928 and aspired to develop a comprehensive theoretical 
system of sexual perversions.  He completed the first six volumes by 1910 and 
waited nearly twenty years to complete his seventh and final volume, “Eonism 
and Other Supplementary Studies” (1928).  His work is fragmentary and 
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sprawling however, as Ellis was more inquisitive than systematic.  He did not 
actually build a theory that can be elaborated upon.  Whereas Freud committed 
himself tenaciously to theory building, Ellis lacked theoretical focus and depth.  
His inquiries sometimes drifted into apologetics for the sexual perversions that he 
studied.  Nevertheless, Ellis’s examinations of others theories and his own 
formulations warrant serious attention.    
     An outstanding feature of Ellis’s work was his refusal to endorse most of the 
Victorian era’s restrictive norms regarding gender.  Ellis conveyed a high regard 
for the dignity of those individuals labeled as “sexual perverts.”  An excellent 
example of Ellis’s regard for his clients is found in “The History of Florrie and the 
Mechanism of Sexual Deviation” (Ellis, 1928, pp. 121-212) which is about a 
young woman with masochistic tendencies.  Whenever possible, Ellis avoided 
the use of pathological language and terms.  He believed that much of what was 
deemed “perverse behavior” had existed throughout all of human history and, for 
the most part, had few negative consequences for civilization. This was 
especially true of his view of homosexuality, which Ellis argued is more common 
among cultivated members of civilization than among those labeled as 
“degenerates.”  
                   Ellis’s Progressive Views of Sexuality 26  
     Havelock Ellis forged a progressive sensibility that led to a greater tolerance 
of human sexuality in many realms.  In “The Sexual Impulse in Women” (Ellis,     
1903/1936, v.1, part 2), Ellis explored the female orgasm in both its psychological 
                                                 
26 This section is presented in order to provide a background for Ellis’s liberal views on 
sadomasochism during the era of Victorianism. 
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and physiological dimensions, asserting that female sexuality was a much more 
complex topic than his Victorian medical peers acknowledged.  He investigated 
the importance of foreplay, cunnilinguis and fellatio (which Krafft-Ebing 
(1886/1965) condemned as an act associated with sexual impotence (p. 337), 
and coitus reservatus, the practice of the male holding back orgasm to stimulate 
repeated orgasms by the female (Ellis, 1936, p. 238).   
     While critical of Victorian hypocrisy concerning the sexual repression of 
women, Ellis did not completely abandon convention.  He clung to the 
conventional idea that the male is the “natural” aggressor in sexual relations, 
though he did not depict sadistic aggression as a pathology that is restricted to 
the male.  In fact, Ellis (1903/1936) noted that contrary to conventional notions, 
“normal sadism. . . occurs throughout a large part of nature [and] it is nearly 
always the male who is the victim to the female” (p. 128).27  What was most fresh 
about Ellis’s writings during this era was how he was able to discuss the 
biological and cultural aspects of sex practices together (pp. 66-103).  
     On the topic of homosexuality, Ellis was particularly prescient. He was the first 
sexologist in the Victorian era to treat homosexuality “as neither a disease nor a 
crime” (Grosskurth, 1980, p.185).  He was critical of exaggerated psychoanalytic 
claims to “cure” homosexuality through resolution of the Oedipus complex 
(Robinson, 1976, p. 5).  On the basis of animal studies and his own 33 case 
studies of human “sexual inverts,” Ellis (1897/1936) argued that homosexuality 
has always existed throughout history and has advantages for civilization in the 
                                                 
27 Ellis’s impressions of sadomasochism as it relates to women will be discussed later in this 
chapter.  
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areas of art and culture.  He believed homosexuality to be congenital in nature 
but shunned Krafft-Ebing’s characterization of the orientation as “degenerate” or 
“pathological.”  Ellis (1897/1936) also rejected Krafft-Ebing’s notion that 
homosexual behavior was “a form of behavior willfully indulged out of boredom or 
sheer perversity” (Robinson, 1976, p. 5).  Rather, he compared it to the medical 
condition of color-blindness and de-pathologized it as a psychiatric or 
psychological disorder.   
     Looking at Ellis’s treatment of female sexuality and homosexuality, one is 
struck by his tolerance and a distinctive lack of judgmentalism that contrasts 
widely with the prescriptive approach of Krafft-Ebing and the ostensibly detached 
“neutrality” of Freud’s psychoanalytic method.   
                                Ellis’s Differences from Krafft-Ebing 
      While Ellis (1903/1936) had a more liberal stance than Krafft-Ebing, he stayed 
within a biological framework and believed that both sadism and masochism are 
integral features of human sexual behavior.  What distinguished Ellis’s approach 
was that he believed sadism and masochism are better understood through 
illuminating the relationship between love (i.e., pleasure) and pain.  His 
investigations of the mating behavior of animals and of primitive cultures were 
used to support his claims and build his theory.  Ellis (1903/1936) wrote: 
Among mammals the male wins the female very largely by the display of 
force.  The infliction of pain must inevitably be a frequent indirect result of 
the exertion of power.  It is even more than this; the infliction of pain by the 
male on the female may itself be a gratification of the impulse to exert 
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force. . . .  Yet, the more carefully we study the essential elements of 
courtship, the clearer it becomes that, playful as these manifestations may 
seem on the surface, in every direction they are verging on pain.  It is so 
among animals generally; it is so in man among savages.  “It is precisely 
the alliance of pleasure and pain,” wrote the physiologist Burdach, “which 
constitutes the voluptuous emotion.” (p. 67) 
As one can ascertain from the above passage, Ellis viewed the rituals of 
courtship and mating in animals to be similar to that of human beings.  There is 
little hint of pathological foreboding in Ellis’s analysis which contrasted sharply 
with Krafft-Ebing’s focus on pathology with respect to sadistic and masochistic 
tendencies.  Ellis (1903/1936) viewed human courtship behavior as a “refined 
and delicate form of combat” (p. 67) that brought along the experiences of love 
and pain.  He declared that this process of “marriage by capture… is yet found in 
all but the highest and most artificial stages of human society” (p. 71).  While one 
part of Ellis’s conclusions about courtship seemed to bring him into agreement 
with Krafft-Ebing -- the contention that sadistic behavior is part of the normal 
sexual play of adults – Ellis was nonetheless in disagreement with Krafft-Ebing’s 
morbid pathological perspective and gendered equation that associated sadism 
solely with male sexual aggression. As far as Ellis (1903/1936) could see, there 
were plenty of instances of sadism in female sexual behavior.  He wrote:   
The female also in courtship delights to arouse to the highest degree in the 
male the desire for her favors and to withhold those favors from him, thus 
finding on her part also the enjoyment of power in cruelty.  “One’s cruelty is 
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one’s power,” Millament says in Congreve’s Way of the World, “and when 
one parts with one’s cruelty, one parts with one’s power. (pp. 67-68) 
These observations by Ellis directly refuted Krafft-Ebing’s theory on sadism, 
which associated sadism with male sexual aggression.  As noted in the above 
remarks by Ellis, the incidence of female sadism was actually higher than that 
of male sadism in courtship practices.  According to Ellis’s observations and his 
reading of other’s research, it was quite common for a female to enjoy cruelty 
and punishment meted out by male suitors towards rival males. 28  
     When Ellis turned his attention to the literature of Sade, again one finds a 
different interpretation of sadism from Krafft-Ebing’s standard reading of Sade 
that he interpreted as male biological aggression.  Ellis (1903/1936) wrote: 
It [sadism] is not, as we might infer, both from the definition usually given 
and from its probable biological heredity from primitive times, a perversion 
due to excessive masculinity.  The strong man is more apt to be tender than 
cruel, or at all events knows how to restrain within bounds any impulse to 
cruelty; the most extreme and elaborate forms of sadism (putting aside such 
as are associated with a considerable degree of imbecility) are more apt to 
be allied with a somewhat feminine organization. . . .  I have noted some of 
the feminine traits in De Sade’s temperament and appearance.  The same 
may often be noted in sadists whose crimes were very much more serious 
and brutal than those of De Sade.  (p. 109)      
                                                 
28  In order to illustrate how female sadism was just as typical as male sadism, Ellis (1936/1903 
pointed out that “one of the most widespread of the occasional and non-essential 
manifestations of strong sexual emotion, especially in women, [is] the tendency to bite” (pp. 84-
85).  
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One senses from the preceding passage how original Ellis’s views of sadism and 
masochism were in his day.  Ellis did not subscribe to the typical gendered 
opposites to configure sadomasochism.  He viewed sadism and masochism as 
fluid and interchangeable within the same person.  From the above passage, it is 
arguable that Ellis may have perpetuated some anti-conventional stereotypes 
that he justifies with observations of nature, animals, and cultural studies.  Ellis 
seems to replace Krafft-Ebing’s stereotype of the sexually aggressive male with 
his own stereotype of feminine cruelty for sadism that could be argued is 
demonizing the role of women.  On the other hand, Ellis’s connection in the 
above passage between male sexual confidence (“the strong man”) and the 
quality of tenderness was a refreshing switch concerning the depiction of healthy 
male sexual behavior during the Victorian era.  Ellis reversed Krafft-Ebing’s 
male/sadist and female/masochist model for a female/sadist and male/masochist 
model.  In hindsight, neither Ellis’s nor Krafft-Ebing’s gendered depiction of 
sadomasochism enjoyed unequivocal support from an empirical-clinical 
perspective.  In hindsight, both Ellis and Krafft-Ebing remained locked in a 
gendered interpretation of sadomasochism, though Ellis’s interpretation was far 
less restrictive and univocal.   
     It is fascinating how Ellis waged his own private campaign against patriarchal 
stereotypes throughout his investigations of sadism and masochism.  Ellis 
maintained an independent perspective and was the first to challenge some of 
Krafft-Ebing’s clouded thinking on gender roles in sadomasochism.  Another 
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example of how Ellis (1903/1936) shook up conventional thinking on masochism 
is seen below:  
Masochism is commonly regarded as a peculiarly feminine sexual 
perversion, in women, indeed, as normal in some degree, and in man as a 
sort of inversion of the normal masculine emotional attitude, but this view is 
not altogether justified, for definite and pronounced masochism seems to be 
much rarer in women than sadism. (p. 111) 
Again, we see how Ellis challenged the popular sexual stereotyping that was 
initiated by Krafft-Ebing.  Krafft-Ebing pathologized masochism as a peculiarly 
feminine perversion, while Ellis argued that male servitude, including the 
subjection of the male will to the female, is a common trait in many men that 
can be seen throughout history (p. 111).  Ellis de-pathologized masochism and 
sadism by asserting the universality of both inclinations in the psyche of men 
and women alike.  Consequently, Ellis helped to counteract the growing 
tendency among sexologists to conflate male sexuality with sadism and female 
sexuality with masochism.  He did this during a time when the rest of the 
Victorian patriarchal establishment was giving little thought to the implications 
that the inaccuracy of gendered binarisms would have on the future 
understanding of sadomasochism.   
             Ellis’s Significance in the History of Sadomasochism Theories   
     Ellis was an original thinker on sadomasochism and he helped to shape the 
direction of its theoretical discourse.  His notion that sadism and masochism 
are two faces of a single entity was picked up by Freud in Three Essays on The 
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Theory of Sexuality (Freud, 1905/1957d, pp. 159-160).  The difference was that 
Ellis viewed the interdependence of sadism and masochism as healthy 
expressions of love and pain, whereas for Freud, sadism and masochism were 
two faces of a single perversion (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973, p. 402).     
      One of Ellis’s strengths was that he paid attention to research outside of 
clinical psychopathology to form his ideas of sadomasochism.  Ellis’s 
investigation of different cultures, races, and the sexual behavior of animals 
helped to off-set some of Krafft-Ebing’s dogmatic assertions that came 
exclusively from observing cases of incarcerated sex offenders and selected 
“abnormal” individuals.  Ellis’s conclusions about sadomasochistic behavior, 
which were often insightful, well-reasoned and supported by extant research, 
were applied to ordinary people.  He used case methods that were empirical 
and open-ended.  He allowed individuals afflicted with sexual problems like 
sadomasochism to speak for themselves and he did not pre-empt their self-
descriptions for his own interpretations (see Ellis, “The history of Florrie and the 
mechanism of sexual deviation,” 1928, pp. 121-212; Grosskurth, 1980, pp. 232-
233).   
     Although devoid of the gendered stereotypes that distorted the theories of 
Krafft-Ebing and Freud, Ellis’s theory of sadomasochism remained focused 
primarily on sexual themes. 29  Ellis claimed to supplant sexual potency with 
emotional potency as the primary cause for sadomasochism, but his real focus 
                                                 
29 Ellis wound up developing a biological theory of the emotions to explain sadism and 
masochism, which converted fear and anger into sexual excitement. This was an inversion of 
Freud’s sexual sublimation theory to explain sadomasochism which emphasized a reverse 
movement (see Robinson, 1976, p. 24).   
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remained with sexuality.  Throughout Ellis’s oeuvre, he focused on sex as the 
primary passion and this was the only context from which he explored 
sadomasochism.  Furthermore, his biological theory of the emotions utterly 
failed to address the non-sexual manifestations of sadomasochism.  Ellis also 
left out socio-economic influences and other situational contexts that could 
have been brought to bear on these issues.  
     Nevertheless, there is a noticeable and admirable absence of the usual 
Victorian moralistic pretensions masked behind a scientific veil in Ellis’s work.  
He was able to steer clear of many conventional biases such as the privileging 
of a male patriarchal view of the sex drive to account for sadomasochism and 
the separation of sadomasochism into two separate perversions.  Unlike other 
sexologists, who embraced Krafft-Ebing’s bias on sadomasochism, Ellis 
remained steadfast in his views and did not capitulate to patriarchal attitudes, 
bringing humanistic understanding and civility to the public discourse on 
sadomasochism.  He exposed hypocrisy and medical moralisms that were 
implicit in the early theories of sadomasochism, and which were cloaked under 
the “value free” neutrality of scientific detachment during his time.  Ellis did not 
view sadomasochism as a perversion in need of a correction as most orthodox 
19th century pathologists did.  He defended the right of an individual’s sexual 
expression and he fostered the ideals of fairness, understanding, and 
compassion towards persons labeled as a sexual perverts.   
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                   CHAPTER 2 
      
                              Freud’s Theories of Sadomasochism 
 
 
Introduction: An Overview of Freud’s Approach to Sadomasochism 
               
     An aporia refers to “a doubtful matter” or “an expression of doubt.”30  This term 
describes Freud’s struggle to explain sadomasochism.  For three decades, Freud 
revised his position on sadomasochism intermittently and kept trying to clarify his 
views.  In this chapter, I show that Freud’s continued reliance on heteronormative 
polarities and his adherence to two or three intrapsychic drives to explain 
sadomasochism left too many issues unresolved to be viable.31  Among 
contemporary psychoanalysts, Freud’s primary masochism theory (based on the 
death instinct) is appreciated for its originality, but not its therapeutic utility (see 
Chancer, 1992, chap. 3; DeMasi, 2003, chap. 5).  At the same time, Freud’s 
insights on “moral masochism” in “The Economic Problem of Masochism” (Freud, 
1924/1962e, pp. 157-170) and his consideration of the sadistic and masochistic 
dynamics of melancholia (Freud, 1917/1962h, pp. 243-258) focused on non-sexual 
expressions on sadomasochism, paving the way for future developments. 
     The chapter begins in section A with an examination of Freud’s first theoretical 
assertions on sadism and masochism that followed in the steps of Krafft-Ebing and 
Ellis.  Section B investigates the second phase of Freud’s theorizations which were 
based on the Oedipus complex.  Following the presentation of Freud’s second 
                                                 
30The term “aporia” comes from Greek Literature.  It describes a controversial issue which 
provokes opposing and incompatible points of view (Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary, 1993, p. 101)  
31This thesis takes the position that the existential-humanist perspective was the first perspective 
to reconfigure sexual sadomasochism without an explicit reliance on heteronormative standards 
established by Krafft-Ebing and then perpetuated by Freud.  
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phase, I pause briefly to examine some criticisms of Freud’s first two phases.  In 
the last part of section B, I will examine Freud’s final phase of sadomasochism 
theory referred to as primary masochism and follow this with a critique of that last 
phase.  
 
              Section A: The Influences of Krafft-Ebing and Ellis on Freud 
     As discussed previously, Krafft-Ebing (1886/1965) did not believe that sadism 
and masochism were complementary perversions that were typically found in the 
same person (p. 142).  Ellis countered by suggesting that sadism and masochism 
are indeed present within each individual and are interchangeable parts of the 
same entity.  In The Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (Freud, 1905/1957d, 
pp. 125-245), Freud’s first musings on sadomasochism, we find him attempting to 
synthesize both Krafft-Ebing’s and Ellis’s positions under the umbrella of a new, 
emerging theory of infantile psychosexual development (De Masi, 2003, p. 29).  As 
a neuropathologist, Freud’s views on psychopathology were closer to those of 
Krafft-Ebing than to those of Ellis, because Ellis was not a pathologist.  
Nonetheless, Freud incorporated Ellis’s “normalizing” view of sadomasochism, by 
stating that a moderate amount of sadomasochism was intrinsic to the ordinary 
psychosexual development of most people, which begins during the early (pre-
genital) stages of childhood (Freud, 1905/1957d, section II, part 6).  In other words, 
according to Freud, sadistic and masochistic tendencies were belated expressions 
of earlier psychosexual stages, and part of being a “normal” heterosexual adult.  In 
his first remarks on sadism and masochism, he wrote that “sadism and masochism 
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occupy a special position among the perversions since the contrast between 
activity and passivity which lies behind them is among the universal characteristics 
of sexual life” (Freud, 1905/1957d, p. 159).  Freud then continued:  
The active and passive forms [of sadomasochism] are habitually found to occur 
together in the same individual.  A person who feels pleasure in producing pain 
in someone else in a sexual relationship is also capable of enjoying as pleasure 
any pain, which he may himself derive from sexual relations.  A sadist is always 
at the same time a masochist, although the active or the passive aspect of the 
perversion may be the more strongly developed in him and may represent his 
predominant sexual activity. (p. 159) 32   
Despite this important point of convergence with Ellis, Freud’s first views of 
sadism and masochism were closer to Krafft-Ebing’s theorizations in two major 
ways.  First, Freud (1905/1957d) believed, as Krafft-Ebing did, that 
sadomasochism was primarily driven by a sexually aggressive libidinal instinct 
(pp. 157-158) rather than by the manifest emotions of love and pain. 33  The 
second key point of convergence with Krafft-Ebing was that Freud supported the 
same gendered stereotypes (i.e., sadism/masochism and masculinity/femininity) 
to configure sadomasochism (De Masi, 2003, p. 10).  The influence of Freud’s 
infantile psychosexual theory and its accompanying explanation of sado-
                                                 
32 Freud (1905/1957d) acknowledged Ellis’s investigations of sadism and masochism in a 
footnote to this passage, and borrowed Ellis’s idea of interchangeability between sadism and 
masochism (pp. 159-160).    
33 Freud’s reading of sadism and masochism at that time was closer to the tradition of the 
degeneration theory of Morel and Magnan, two of Krafft-Ebing’s mentors, who posited all mental 
illness as a symptom of a decayed nervous system although Freud theorized that the personal 
unconscious rather than the nervous system is the source of all psychic disturbances. 
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masochism eventually overshadowed the theories of Krafft-Ebing and Ellis, both 
of whom had difficulty accepting Freud’s views. 34
 
                      Section B:  Freud’s Theories of Sadomasochism 
     The best way to examine Freud’s theories on sadomasochism is to separate 
them into three distinct phases.  The first phase can be referred to as the “sadism 
as primary phase.”  The second phase will be referred to as Freud’s 
“Oedipalization phase,” and Freud’s final stage will be referred to as his 
“masochism as primary phase.”  It is important to call attention to the fact that 
throughout each of his different phases, Freud always conceptualized the 
connection between sadism and masochism to be so close that one could never 
be studied apart from the other (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973, p. 402).  The other 
important point is that Freud considered sadomasochism to be among the 
universal characteristics of sexual life (p. 402).  In the first two phases, we find him 
privileging sadism based on the primary instincts of sex and aggression.  In his 
third and final phase, we find Freud privileging masochism as the primary process 
based on a death instinct.35   
                         Freud’s First Phase: Sadism as a Primary Process 
     In his “sadism as primary” phase, Freud’s speculations on sadomasochism 
coincided with his broader ideas of psychoanalytic theory in general.  As Franco de 
                                                 
34As mentioned in chapter 1 (p. 29, FN 17), Krafft-Ebing, who was an advocate of Freud’s 
disagreed with his theory of hysteria, but he did have an interest in childhood sexuality theories.  
Ellis called the Oedipal theory “a pernicious doctrine” and was a more vocal critic of Freud’s and 
his follower’s methods though he admired Freud, personally (see Grosskurth, 1980, p. 233-235).  
35We will see later how this reversal demonstrated Freud’s espousal of the death instinct as the 
primary drive to all psychic life.   
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Masi (2003), a psychoanalytic historian and theorist of sadomasochism summed it 
up, “For Freud . . .the entities of ‘sadism’ and ‘masochism’ flow together into the 
larger crucible of psychosexuality, of the formation of sexual identity in its final 
forms (masculine/feminine, active/passive), variants (homosexuality) and 
pathology (sadomasochistic perversion)” (p. 29).  Near the end of the first phase, 
Freud’s presented a topographical outline of the sadomasochistic drive in “Instincts 
and Their Vicissitudes” (Freud, 1915/1962g, pp. 117-140).  It was the first 
schematic outline of sadomasochism.  Freud followed his schematic outline with an 
object-relational discussion of sadomasochistic dynamics involved in loss and grief 
in “Mourning and Melancholia” (Freud, 1917/1962h, pp. 243-258). 
     It was also during this time that Freud took the position that sadism was primary 
to masochism.36  Years later, with the benefit of hindsight, Freud (1929/1962a) 
wrote about his first period of theorizing about sadomasochism:  
The sadistic instinct stood out from the rest, it is true, in that its aim was so 
very far from being loving.  Moreover, it was obviously in some respects 
attached to the ego instincts:  it could not hide its close affinity with 
instincts of mastery which have no libidinal purpose.  But these 
discrepancies were gotten over; after all sadism was clearly a part of the 
sexual life, in the activities of which could be replaced by cruelty. (pp. 117-
118)    
                                                 
36 The amount of revisions in Freud’s conceptualization of the connection between sadism and 
masochism can be seen in the number footnotes he added to the section called “sadism and 
masochism” (Freud, 1905/1957d, pp. 157-159) where Freud first posited sadism as the primary 
process.   
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Furthermore, Freud maintained from the beginning that all perversions, including 
sadism and masochism have both normal and pathological intensities and modes 
of expression.  Freud (1905/1957d) wrote: 
It is natural that medical men, who first studied perversions in outstanding 
examples and under special conditions, should have been inclined to regard 
them . . . as indications of degeneracy or disease. . . Everyday experience 
has shown that most of these extensions, or at any rate the less severe of 
them, are constituents which are rarely absent from the sexual life of healthy 
people. (p. 160) 37
Despite the boldness and originality of this approach, one detects ambivalence 
in Freud as to whether to privilege male sexual aggression or a non-sexual 
conceptualization of aggression to explain sadism.  At one point, one finds 
Freud advocating a gendered notion of masculinity, equating it with sadism, 
and a corresponding association of femininity with masochism (De Masi, 2003, 
p. 10).  At another point, Freud posits a non-gendered concept of active and 
passive forces to explain the sadomasochistic drive.  For example, after 
crediting Krafft-Ebing for being the first to associate the desire to humiliate and 
subjugate another person with the concept of sadism (Freud, 1905/1957d, p. 
157) we find him linking the notions of masculinity with aggression and sadism.  
Freud stated:  
                                                 
37 Freud also indicated in this essay that he thought homosexuality (inversion) should not be 
included in his normalizing view of the perversions (see Freud, 1905/1957d, p. 160). In his later 
works, such as “The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Women” (1920/1962m) and 
in a letter to a despairing mother of a gay child (as cited in Jones, 1957, p. 195), Freud clearly 
expresses tolerance of homosexuality and states that he did not classify it as an illness.    
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The sexuality of most male human beings contains an element of 
aggressiveness ― a desire to subjugate; the biological significance of it seems 
to lie in the need for overcoming the resistance of the sexual object by means 
other than the process of wooing. (p.157)  
As the above remarks suggest, Freud viewed male sexuality to be inherently 
aggressive.  Less than two pages later however, we find him declaring that 
aggression alone cannot account for sadism or masochism.  Curiously, he next 
posited a theory of innate bisexuality to help explain sadism and masochism.  In 
his own words: 
It is, moreover, a suggestive fact that the existence of the pair of opposites 
formed by sadism and masochism cannot be attributed merely to the 
element of aggressiveness.  We should rather be inclined to connect the 
simultaneous presence of these opposites with the opposing masculinity 
and femininity which are combined in bisexuality ─ a contrast which often 
has to be replaced in psycho-analysis by that between activity and passivity. 
(Freud, 1905/1957d, p.160)   
The final statement at the end of the previous passage declares that 
psychoanalysis replaces the contrast between masculinity and femininity with 
a more neutral contrast between active and passive forces.  It is an 
alternative to the first theory, rather than a re-statement of the theory in 
slightly different terms.  This is one illustration of how Freud deferred the 
resolution of old theories to newer models and terms while leaving his original 
theoretical problems unexplained.  The use of binary opposites that are 
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continually being reconstituted in slightly different terms is characteristic of all 
of Freud’s theorizing on sadomasochism. 38     
       In a second essay, “Infantile Sexuality,” from Three essays on the theory 
of sexuality (Freud, 1905/1957d, pp. 173-206), we find Freud changing his 
formula yet again.  This time he took a more “neutral” position claiming that 
the active and passive forces of normal sadomasochism appears prior to the 
sexualization of sadomasochistic tendencies instead of vice-versa as 
previously suggested.  Later in the essay, Freud discussed the origin of the 
active/passive tendencies found in the second pre-genital stage of 
psychosexual development, which he refers to as “the sadistic-anal stage.”  
Freud wrote:    
Here the opposition of two currents, which runs through all sexual life, is 
already developed:  they cannot yet, however, be described as ‘masculine’ 
and ‘feminine,’ but only as ‘active’ and ‘passive.’  The activity is put into 
operation by the instinct for mastery through the agency of the somatic 
musculature; the organ which, more than any other, represents the passive 
sexual aim is the erotogenic mucous membrane of the anus. . . .In this 
phase, therefore, sexual polarity and an extraneous object are already 
observable.  But organization and subordination to the reproductive function 
are still absent. (Freud, 1905/1957d, p. 198) 
                                                 
38 Robert Holt (1989), a critic of psychoanalysis, has noted that many of Freud’s early assertions 
about psychoanalytic concepts display a strong theoretical ambivalence that accompanies “an 
unusual tolerance of inconsistency” (p. 46). Kurt Lewin (1937/1999), writing closer to Freud’s own 
time period noted that Freud used an exploratory technique to establish “laws” of human behavior 
that was less than conceptual when contrasted with other theories in psychology (pp. 67-68).   
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It is difficult to determine whether Freud is privileging the libido, primary bisexuality, 
or a “neutral” conceptualization of active and passive forces in his theorization of 
sadomasochism when reviewing the above passage.  As evidence of his 
uncertainty on the relationship between aggression and sex, Freud admitted in 
“Analysis of a Phobia in a Five Year-Old Boy” (Freud, 1909/1957a, pp. 3-148) that, 
“I cannot bring myself to assume the existence of a special aggressive instinct 
alongside of the familiar instincts of self-preservation and of sex, and on an equal 
footing with them” (p. 140).  One can see from his various theoretical assertions, 
revisions,39 and tendency to leave previous ideas unclarified that Freud was not 
comfortable with the idea of more than one or two drives to explain sado-
masochistic behavior. 40  At the end of his first phase, Freud accepted the ideas of 
a sexual libido, aggression, and the instinct for self-preservation as the major 
drives to explain sadomasochism, but remained unable to articulate a clear, 
consistent theory that linked them together.  
     As already mentioned, the end of Freud’s first phase saw his presentation of 
the first schematic outline of sadomasochism in “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” 
(Freud, 1915/1962g, pp. 117-140).  In the following passage, Freud describes 
sadomasochism in non-gendered terms: as a result of the synthesis of 
antagonistic instincts:  
                                                 
39 Holt (1989) has noted that Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905/1957d) 
“went through…six editions…each spanning two or more major periods in the development of 
Freud’s thought, including a far reaching change in his metapsychology….There was never any 
fundamental reconsideration of these works…of earlier and later theories (p.47)].
40 Freud’s tendency to refer to one or two drives in his drive theory was described by Erich 
Fromm (1969/1970) as derived from a “concept of scarcity” (p. 46) as opposed to a concept of 
abundance that includes multiple drives.      
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Sexual and ego-instincts can readily develop an antithesis which repeats 
that of love and hate. When the ego-instincts dominate the sexual 
function, as is the case at the stage of the sadistic-anal organization, they 
impart the qualities of hate to the instinctual aim as well. (p. 139)   
In the above schema, love is fused with the sexual libido,41 while hate is 
interpreted as an infantile expression of the instinct of ego self-preservation. The 
concepts of love and hate appeared as central issues in another discussion of 
sadomasochism that Freud published two years later. “Mourning and 
Melancholia” (Freud, 1917/1962h, pp. 243-258) is an important paper because it 
is where we find Freud first noting sadomasochistic dynamics that stem from the 
loss of a loved person, or, what he referred to as “a strong fixation to a love-
object” (p. 249).  In the following depiction of sadomasochism, which is 
associated with the processes of grief and melancholia, Freud does not involve 
sexuality to be a direct or explicit motive.  Instead, we find sadomasochistic 
pleasure depicted as being neurotic compensation for the loss of a highly 
regarded or loved person that is colored by a desire for revenge.  Freud noted 
that in grief, sadomasochistic tendencies can be overcome through the 
restoration of a “good-object” 42 associated with the lost loved one.  Freud (1917, 
1962k) wrote: 
                                                 
41 Besides attaching the concept of love to the sexual libido in “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes,” 
(Freud, 1915/1962g, p. 139), Freud also equated the idea of love with narcissism (p. 138; also, 
see “On Narcissism” (Freud, 1914/1962k, pp. 67-102)  
42 ”Mourning and Melancholia” (Freud, 1917/1962k, pp. 243-258) is also the first place where one 
can spot the hint of an object-relational approach to sadomasochism theory based on the concept 
of projective identification.  Melanie Klein’s object-relational approach to sadomasochism theory will 
be examined in chapter 3.  
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The self-tormenting in melancholia, which is without doubt enjoyable, 
signifies. . .a satisfaction of trends of sadism and hate which relate to an 
object, and which have been turned round upon the subject’s own self. . . . 
The patients usually. . .succeed. . .in taking revenge on the original object and 
in tormenting their loved one through their illness. (p. 251)   
In reviewing the above passage, it bears repeating that throughout “Mourning and 
Melancholia” (Freud, 1917/1962k, pp. 248-253) there is a notable absence of 
references to sexuality.  He uses the terms “love,” “self-love,” “object-love,” and 
“transference-love” frequently in that paper along with references of self-hatred and 
hatred towards others whenever explaining sadomasochistic processes.  At the 
same time, his discovery that the loss of a loved one could trigger a 
“sadomasochistic” desire for self-punishment (as a substitute for revenge) did not 
change his espousal of a theory that privileged sex and aggression as the original 
causes of the phenomenon.   
     By the end of his first phase of theorizing about the sadomasochistic complex, 
Freud endorsed three basic ideas:  First, the sexual libido and ego aggression, 
which are in conflict with each other are the principle drives behind 
sadomasochism; second, sadistic drives precede masochistic ones; and third, 
Freud viewed sadomasochism as part of the normal psychosexual development of 
healthy adults as much as he associated it with abnormal sexuality.43  As the 
second decade of the 20th century came to a close, Freud set aside his previous 
mechanistic and psycho-physiological schemas of sadomasochism and turned to 
                                                 
43 According to Freud (1905/1957d), normal sadomasochism is expressed through neurotic 
symptoms, whereas sadomasochism as a perversion is expressed in fantasies and/or actions 
without diversionary symptoms (p. 165).  
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his clinical work.  Using the clinical observations from his own work with 
analysands, Freud focused on elaborating the concept of the Oedipal complex as 
the linchpin to explain the difference between the developments of normal 
sadomasochism from the development of sadomasochism as a perversion.  As we 
shall see, this phase would be very short-lived.  It was followed by Freud’s 
proposal of a dual-instinct theory based on a new psycho-biological principle which 
he referred to as ‘a death instinct” (Freud, 1920/1962b, p. 54).   
Freud’s Second Phase: The Oedipalization of Sadomasochism 
     Freud’s theory of primary sadism articulated in “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” 
(Freud, 1915/1962g, pp. 109-140) left him unsatisfied.  He shifted his attention 
away from a purely theoretical conceptualization of sadomasochism and turned to 
its occurrence in the lives of his clients, which he believed was a common 
experience for everyone based on fantasies and dreams recalled in analysis.   
     Freud was particularly drawn to six of his analysands’ sadomasochistic 
beating-fantasies, which he found to be surprisingly common in “A Child is Being 
Beaten: A Contribution to the Study of the Origin of Sexual Perversions” (Freud, 
1919/1962c, pp. 175-204).  He concentrated on the analysis of the four female 
cases in that study to support a two-fold conclusion: first, the Oedipal complex is 
the nucleus of sadomasochism as a normal infantile perversion of childhood; and 
second, masochism is a derivative of sadism.  As for the two male cases, who 
did not follow the guidelines of an Oedipal interpretation that would explain a 
normal sadomasochistic infantile perversion, Freud claimed that they were “true 
masochists in the sense of being sexual perverts” (p. 196).  At the same time, he 
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was perpetuating Krafft-Ebing’s original and questionable association between 
feminine characteristics and male masochism.  Freud claimed that each of the 
male masochists “invariably transfer themselves into the part of a woman [in the 
fantasy], that is to say, their masochistic attitude coincides with a feminine one” 
(p. 197).  At the same time, Freud admitted his confusion about the fact that in all 
cases of male masochism it was a woman who administered the beatings.  In 
fact, he questioned whether or not “a feminine attitude” (p. 197) wasn’t a 
universal feature of all infantile beating fantasies.   In a later footnote, Freud 
deferred a fuller explanation of what he meant by “this feminine attitude” (p. 197) 
to a later discussion of feminine masochism in the essay called “The Economic 
Problem of Masochism” (Freud, 1924/1962e, pp. 157-170).  It should be pointed 
out that feminine masochism has never received any empirical support as a real 
clinical phenomenon.    
     Another problem in “A Child is Being Beaten” (Freud, 1919/1962c, pp. 175-
204) was that not one of Freud’s cases was actually diagnosed with a sexual 
perversion.  In spite of these discrepancies and others, including the fact that the 
sixth case was none other than Freud’s own daughter, Anna, with whom Freud 
was conducting an analysis during the time he wrote his clinical study (Young-
Bruehl, 1988, pp.103-139), “A Child Is Being Beaten” (Freud, 1919/1962c, pp. 
175-204) is nonetheless a curious exploration of the sadomasochistic dynamics 
of childhood fantasies.  
     According to Freud, each of his six analysand’s beating-fantasies followed three 
distinct stages that could be grouped according to different aspects of the 
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sadomasochistic theme.  In stage one, the sadistic phase of the fantasy, Freud 
noted that each child fantasized another child being beaten by an unidentified third 
party, who is transformed into the father of the child having the fantasy.  In phase 
two, which is an unconscious masochistic stage, the child (subject) who observes 
the beating suddenly imagines herself/himself as the child who is being beaten by 
her or his own father.  In the final stage of the fantasy, the second stage becomes 
projected onto others in a repressed manner as the father who was beating the 
child becomes an unidentified authority figure (i.e., a teacher) who is beating a 
group of anonymous children.  Freud also noted that the last stage of the fantasy 
“has strong and unambiguous sexual excitement attached to it” (p. 184).    
     Freud explained the sexual excitement attached in the fantasy in the following 
way:  the first stage of the beating fantasy, which is sadistic, is transformed into 
masochism in stage 2 due to feelings of unconscious guilt about sadistic feelings.  
But there is also guilt associated with the masochistic genital stimulation attached 
to the parental-object in the second stage (p. 194).  So, repression takes over and 
the fantasy is converted to a projection of others being beaten in the final phase of 
the fantasy by an anonymous authority figure, which is still erotically charged.   
According to Freud, the core of Oedipal guilt in the sadomasochistic fantasy is not 
uncovered by his analysis but by an essential kind of masochism that “afterwards 
persists...[and] seems to correspond to a scar-like formation…similar to the sense 
of inferiority” (p. 194).   
     It should be pointed out that the father is the only erotically charged object for 
the girl’s sadomasochistic fantasy and therefore, the only source of conflict leading 
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to the outcome of essential masochism.  If however, Freud had acknowledged that 
“the role of the pre-oedipal mother in the origins of sadomasochism and the 
beating fantasy” (Novick and Novick, 1997, p. 40) are just as significant as the role 
of the father, he might not have constructed “essential masochism” as the only kind 
of normal sadomasochism (i.e., a normal neurosis), nor might he have depicted it 
as “feminine.”  As for the two male cases, Freud noted the parallels are not quite 
symmetrical because while the mother is claimed as the erotically charged object 
for the boy in the 2 cases studied, Freud noted that neither one of the male 
analysand’s repressed the sexual attachment to the mother in phase 2 in the same 
way that the girls repressed the sexual attachment to the father-object.  Moreover, 
neither male analysand substituted the figure of themselves as the sole recipient of 
the beating for a group of others as expected in stage 3.  This is what led Freud 
(1919/1962c) to conclude that his male subjects were “true masochists in the 
sense of being sexual perverts” (p. 196) rather than concede that the Oedipal 
theory might be problematic.  Freud remained steadfast in his conclusion that the 
Oedipal complex was the linchpin for “normal” sadomasochism.  Before going on 
to his next phase of theorizing about sadomasochism, I will pause to take a closer 
look at some criticisms of Freud’s first two stages of sadomasochism theory. 
        An Appraisal of Freud’s First Two Phases of Sadomasochism Theories  
 Sexual Polarities   
     Whether he was conceiving sadism as an innate part of the male sex drive as 
in his first stage of theorizing about sadomasochism, or trying to stretch the 
Oedipal theory as a cause of normal sadomasochism, Freud continued to cling to 
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the misguided notion that male sexuality corresponds with the idea of sadistic 
aggression and that female sexuality is coterminous with passivity and 
masochism.  By clinging to this aspect of his Oedipal theory, Freud maintained a 
prescriptive bias which guided his investigation of the beating fantasies of his six 
analysands in “A Child is Being Beaten” (Freud, 1919/1962c, pp. 175-204). It is 
interesting that Freud suggested that his own motivation to inquire into the nature 
of the sadomasochistic fantasies of his analysands was driven by his strivings as 
a theoretician than as a psychoanalyst concerned with the therapeutic outcome 
of his analysands when he wrote that, “theoretical knowledge is still far more 
important to all of us than therapeutic success” (p. 181).  At the same time, it 
would be misleading to represent Freud’s efforts in “A Child is Being Beaten” 
(Freud, 1919/1962c, pp. 175-204) to be a “value free” scientific approach to the 
understanding of sadomasochism.  Perhaps, it is more accurate to appropriate 
Freud’s approach as a “teleological44 perspective of [hetero-normative] sexuality” 
(Bersani, 1986, p. 31), or as an anthropomorphic approach (Lewin, 1937/1999, p. 
67).  Had Freud remained open to the idea that more than one ultimate 
explanation could have accounted for his analysands’ sadomasochistic beating 
fantasies in “A Child is Being Beaten,” it is reasonable to speculate that he would 
not have proposed the “rather fixed general rules, formulae, and sequences . . . 
for the causation of perversion” (Shengold, 1997, p. 89), which are now 
recognized by most analysts.  For example, pre-Oedipal dynamics are likely to 
play as much of a role in sadomasochistic fantasies as Oedipal dynamics.  
                                                 
44 A teleology is a doctrine that proposes the final causes of things.  It is an interpretation that has 
an end and a purpose. 
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Another triggering source for sadomasochistic tendencies could have been 
socio-economic factors.  Nevertheless, despite realizing that his findings were 
problematic, Freud refused to consider “tracing out their dependence on other 
factors, as…[he did] not consider that the material for observation to be 
exhaustive” (Freud, 1919/1962, p. 200).  If one takes a step back to characterize 
Freud’s theoretical style during his second phase, there are two characteristics 
that stand out:  first, there was Freud’s tendency to cling to rigid rules for 
psychosexual development; and second, Freud had an unmistakable penchant 
for employing dualistic themes of conflict whenever explaining sadomasochistic 
dynamics.  Both of these ideas can be traced back directly to Krafft-Ebing.  
Oedipalization and the Pathology of Normalcy   
      As mentioned earlier, a problem with Freud’s first two phases of 
sadomasochism theory was that he utilized a strict hetero-normative standard of 
healthy sexual behavior.  In “A Child is Being Beaten” (Freud, 1919/1962c, pp. 
175-205), Freud normalized the sexual aims of female masochism in the beating 
fantasies of his analysands, while pathologizing male masochism.45  In this way, 
Freud perpetuated the same conflation of masculinity with normal sadistic 
aggression and femininity with normal masochism that suffused Krafft-Ebing’s 
theory of sadism and masochism.  In Freud’s post-Galilean methods however, 
the normalization of these misguided notions were subsumed under the 
                                                 
45 The psychoanalyst Leonard Shengold (1997) proposes that Freud could have been taken more 
seriously in “A Child is Being Beaten” (Freud, 1919/1962c, pp. 175-204) if he had entertained the 
idea that “in relation to sex we all basically want to be and have everything ─ mother and father, 
girls and boys, women and men” (p. 89).   
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“scientific” concept of serialization.46  Serialization allows for female masochism 
to be viewed as an acceptable perversion while male masochism is declared as 
a morally transgressive act involving sexual pleasure.  Moreover, by emphasizing 
the subjective perception that male masochism is a “transgressive action out of 
which pleasure arises” (p. 16) Freud alluded to its connection with a “feminine 
attitude” and homosexuality (Freud, 1919/1962c, p. 199).  Conscious or not, 
serialization conveys the notions of goodness and evil embedded in the concepts 
of normal and pathological.  The idea of the “acceptable perversion” implied by 
serialization hinged on the explanation of the Oedipal conflict, which was its 
cause.  As Freud stated:    
The perversion is no longer an isolated fact in the child’s sexual life, but falls 
into place among the typical, not to say normal, processes of development 
which are familiar to us.  It is brought into relation with the child’s incestuous 
love-object, with its Oedipus complex.  (p. 192) 
It can be gleaned from the above passage that Freud was declaring the “normal 
perversion” to be an inevitable part of ordinary psychosexual development if the 
Oedipal conflict is resolved.  At the same time, Freud also spoke of perversion as 
an “abnormal sexual constitution…which consumes the subject’s whole sexual 
life” (p. 192) if the Oedipal conflict is not resolved (p. 196).  What was not realized 
at the time was that the Oedipal conflict is a cultural artifact.  Today, we 
understand how social ideology can proscribe a theory such as the Oedipal 
complex that can make explanations for human growth and development of the 
                                                 
46 Serialization was first defined in the introduction on page 6.  It will be discussed again in 
chapter 5 
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personality to seem transhistorical.  Though Freud was troubled by the lack of 
clear support for his Oedipal explanation of sadomasochistic fantasies for both 
his male and female analysands, as we will see next, he refused to consider 
alternate explanations.  
Rejecting Alternate Hypotheses   
     As already mentioned, Freud (1919/1962c) admitted that his findings on the 
differences between male and female beating fantasies were inconclusive, but he 
refused to abandon the Oedipal theory.  Consequently, he dismissed alternate 
theories of the sadomasochistic beating fantasies proposed by Jung and Adler.  
First, he dismissed a theory “based on the fact of the bisexual constitution of 
human beings” (p. 200), which he mentioned earlier in his first phase of theorizing 
on sadomasochism (see Freud, 1905/1957d, p. 160). Freud also rejected Adler’s 
“masculine protest” theory of repression to explain the sadomasochistic fantasy, 
which he declared “looks for support to sociological rather than biological sources” 
and is “responsible for the whole formation both of character and of neuroses” 
(Freud, 1919/1962c, p. 201).  Regarding Adler’s latter alternative, Freud briefly 
considered the idea that cultural pressures may come to bear on the expression of 
sadomasochism, but then he dismissed Adler’s theory by “firmly [holding] to the 
view that the motive forces of repression must not be sexualized” (p. 204).  What 
Freud seemed to ignore in Adler’s theory was that the impact of culture, social 
institutions, and the nuclear family are powerful forces that can contribute to 
sadomasochistic tendencies.  While he did not agree with any of the alternative 
theories presented at the time he wrote “A Child is Being Beaten” (Freud, 
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1919/1962c, pp. 175-204), he continued to be dissatisfied with his Oedipal  
explanation of sadomasochism also.  Consequently, Freud moved into his final 
phase of theorizing on sadomasochism grounded on a new psychobiological 
premise.      
                 Freud’s Final Phase: Masochism as a Primary Process 
     A year after the publication of “A Child is Being Beaten” (Freud, 1919/1962c, 
pp. 175-204), Freud returned once again to a conceptualization of sado-
masochism based on instinct theory, but this time he called it a “death instinct.”  As 
mentioned previously, Freud introduced the death instinct in “Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle” (Freud, 1920/1962b, pp. 3-64).  He speculated that underneath sadism 
there was a “displaced” death instinct which took aim at the ego and “under the 
influence of the narcissistic libido, [the death instinct] has been forced away from 
the ego and emerged in relation to an [external] object” (p. 54).  Previously, Freud 
viewed masochism as a secondary regressive movement which opposed the 
primary sadistic drive.  In his final theorization of sadomasochism however, we find 
him conceding that “there ‘might’ be such a thing as primary masochism─ a 
possibility which [he] had contested” (p. 54).  At the same time he was shifting from 
primary sadism to primary masochism, Freud did not abandon the idea that sexual 
aggression is intrinsic to sadomasochism.  In his new theory of primary 
masochism, the death instinct (Thanatos) co-mingled with the sexual libido (Eros) 
after being turned away from the ego (narcissistic libido) to form sadistic 
aggression.  Based on these new set of psychobiological premises to explain 
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sadomasochism as emanating from a primary process of masochism, Freud turned 
his attention towards the classification of three new types of clinical masochism.     
     In “The Economic Problem of Masochism” (Freud, 1924/1962e, pp. 157-170), 
Freud proposed three new forms of masochism that were all based on his theory 
of a primary masochism founded on the death instinct.  The first of the three he 
referred to as “erotogenic” masochism.  Freud defined erotogenic masochism as 
“a condition under which sexual excitation may be aroused” (p. 161).  One gets a 
sense that Freud was being somewhat elusive when describing erotogenic 
masochism as he wrote “its basis must be sought along biological and 
constitutional lines and it remains incomprehensible unless one decides to make 
certain assumptions about such matters that are extremely obscure” (p. 161).  
The second form, which Freud referred to as “feminine” masochism,” was 
described as “the form most accessible to observation, least mysterious, and is 
comprehensible in all its relations” (p. 62).  What is interesting is that despite 
Freud’s claim that feminine masochism is the most accessible form of 
masochism, it has never been clinically validated as a form of masochism to this 
day (Novick and Novick, 1997, p. 40).  Nonetheless, Freud claimed that feminine 
masochism is rooted in “a characteristically female situation . . . with being 
castrated, or being copulated with, or giving birth to a baby” (p. 162).  One is 
reminded of Krafft-Ebing’s (1886/1965) description of masochism as “a 
pathological degeneration of the distinctive psychical peculiarities of woman” (p. 
133) when encountering Freud’s description of feminine masochism according to 
the biological characteristics of females.  
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     The third form of masochism, “moral” masochism, according to Freud, is a 
manifestation of a non-erotic form of self-inflicted suffering connected “to an 
unconscious sense of guilt. . .[or a] ‘need for punishment’”(Jones, 1957, p. 
259).  Moral masochism did not fall in line with the conventional thinking of 
sadomasochism as a pure sexual perversion.  Freud admitted that he had to 
loosen the idea of “what we recognize as sexuality” (Freud, 1924/1962e, p. 
165) in order to explain moral masochism.  In the same manner that he 
noticed a non-sexual foundation for sadomasochistic behavior in “Mourning 
and Melancholia” (Freud, 1917/1962h, pp. 243-258) and continued to use 
libido theory to explain moral masochism, Freud continued with a dual instinct 
theory that privileged a death instinct intertwined with the sexual libido to 
explain sadomasochism.  Consequently, though Freud himself discovered an 
opening in his theory of sadomasochism that could have de-centered the role 
of the sexual instincts as a cause, sex remained the privileged view even for 
forms of sadomasochism that were expressed non-sexually.  As sociologist 
Lynn Chancer (1992) writes: 
The introduction of moral masochism was the first sign in the Freudian 
opus that a sadomasochistic character needed to be explored in other 
than its explicitly sexual or instinctual incarnations.  Until this juncture, 
Freud’s explanation of sadomasochism reinforced the commonsensical 
association of sadomasochism with sex and the behavior of individuals.  
However, the moral masochistic type. . . points beyond sexual 
manifestations to a wider meaning of sadomasochism. (p. 87) 
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There is little question that Freud’s examination of moral masochism in “The 
Economic Problem of Masochism” (Freud, 1924/1962e, pp. 157-170) exposed the 
cracks in his own earlier theories of sadomasochism as a strictly sexual 
phenomenon.  Freud himself acknowledged that moral masochism led him to 
believe that sexuality may not be directly involved (p. 164).  As we shall see later in 
chapter 4, Erich Fromm would be the first psychoanalyst to develop a theory of 
sadomasochism that did loosen the bonds of sexuality from sadomasochistic 
behavior as Freud suggested in the case of moral masochism.  However, as much 
as it would have appeared to open the door to other causal theories of 
sadomasochism, Freud’s investigation of moral masochism did not inspire much 
speculation beyond the sexual instincts as the primary cause for sadomasochism, 
as pointed out by Chancer (1992) in the above passage.  Some psychoanalytic 
theorists of sadomasochism, like Wilhelm Reich (1932/1961; 1933/1970) however, 
began looking at historical and social factors as will be seen in chapter 3. 
               Evaluating Freud’s Final Phase of Sadomasochism Theory  
Freud’s Use of Dualisms 
     If one looks past the male/female polarity which was intermittently implied 
throughout all phases of his theorizing on sadomasochism, one finds Freud 
constructing sadomasochistic processes as a set of opposing psychic motivations 
pitted against one another in other ways.  Starting with his first two phases of 
theorizations, one finds three major polarities that Freud typically deployed 
whenever explaining sadomasochism that he explicitly listed in “Instincts and Their 
Vicissitudes” (Freud, 1915/1962g, pp. 109-140).  These were: “that of 
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activity─passivity [or] the biological, that of ego─external world…[or] the real, and 
finally that of pleasure-unpleasure” (p. 140).  In “The Economic Problem of 
Masochism” (Freud, 1924/1962e, pp. 157-170), one finds the major sets of 
polarities that Freud deployed in his final stage of theorizing on sadomasochism.  
These were:  the opposition between life (Eros) and death (Thanatos); the tension 
between pleasure (the law of constancy) and un-pleasure (the nirvana principle); 
and the antithesis of reason versus intuition.47   
     Freud’s deployment of binary dualisms, which can be traced throughout each 
stage of his different theories of sadomasochism reflect the natural scientific 
attitude grounded on the Western tradition of Aristotelian logic (Fromm, 1956, p. 
68), which is useful in the production of knowledge, but can also be counter to the 
production of insight (Burston, 2003, p. 168).  Jessica Benjamin (1988), a current 
psychoanalytic theorist of sadomasochism, who refers to Freud’s use of dualisms 
as a “dialectic of control” (p. 53) suggests that sadomasochism theorists like Freud 
and Hegel, who are steeped in Aristotelian logic tended to presume human nature 
to be intrinsically aggressive and requiring either/or choices (Chancer, 1992, p. 
71).   
     It is arguable that Freud’s excessive use of binary dualisms, which are 
detectable throughout his theories of sadomasochism led to very little insight about 
the nature of sadomasochism when compared to his observations.  For instance, 
in his second phase of theorizing, Freud published “Mourning and Melancholia” 
(Freud, 1917/1962h, pp. 243-258), which provided some of his best insights on 
                                                 
47This last pair included the law of constancy and the nirvana principle, which are analogous with 
the antithetical contrast between the rational (or, the real) and the mystical (or the intuitive). 
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sadomasochistic processes that are responses to loss.  His use of the binary pair 
of the ego (self) and external world object makes sense only when grounded in the 
observation of loss.  At other points, Freud’s deployment of the dualisms of 
masculine/ feminine and active/ passive do not appear grounded on observation.  
In his discussion of feminine masochism for example, one sees Freud’s use of the 
male/female and active/passive dichotomy (Freud, 1924/1962e, p. 159) leading to 
unfortunate misconceptions such as the conflation of male masochism with 
heterosexual impotency, effeminacy, and homosexuality (p. 160) that is 
reminiscent of Krafft-Ebing.48     
       Another explanation of Freud’s use of polarities is that he may have had a need 
(perhaps an egoistic one) to have psychoanalysis stand apart from rival theories, 
especially those from Jung and Adler.  In the passage quoted below from “Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle” (Freud, 1920/1962b, pp. 3-63) for example, Freud makes an 
effort to differentiate his psychoanalytic approach from Jung’s.  Freud wrote:  
Our views have from the very first been dualistic, and to-day they are even 
more definitely dualistic than before─now that we describe the opposition 
as being, not between ego instincts and sexual instincts but between life 
instincts and death instincts.  Jung’s libido theory is on the contrary 
monistic. (p. 53) 
                                                 
48 One gets a sense of Freud’s disinterest and irritation with cases of male masochism in “The 
Economic problem of Masochism” (Freud, 1924/1962e, pp. 157-170).  For example, Freud wrote, 
“The masochist wants to be treated like a little, helpless, dependent child, but especially like a 
naughty child.  It is unnecessary to adduce case-material in this connection for it is all so much 
alike and is accessible to any observer, even to non-analysts…one easily discovers in them 
…characteristic[s] of womanhood” (p. 160). 
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As the above passage makes clear, Freud grew stronger in his advocacy of the 
use of dualisms to conceptualize sadomasochism, which reduced 
sadomasochism to one or two needs that were in perpetual conflict with each 
other.  One can see a kind of morality play taking place in the above passage 
where the forces of evil (Thanatos) are at war with the forces of good (Eros) in an 
intra-psychic battle for supremacy.  Just as the first two phases of Freud’s theory 
of sadomasochism may be best read as teleological narratives of hetero-
normative sexuality, it may be more helpful to interpret Freud’s last phase of 
theorizing on sadomasochism as a teleology of the eternal conflict between life 
and death forces.  One may argue that Freud’s use of dualisms, which reached 
their zenith in his final phase of theorizing interfered with a fuller understanding of 
sadomasochism since they were really a rhetorical strategy being presented as a 
scientific fact.   
The Scientism in Freud’s Theory of Sadomasochism 
    It is noteworthy that many of Freud’s post Galilean theorizations of 
sadomasochism deployed concepts based on biological and physiological principles 
that were speculative from an empirical standpoint while conveying a value-free 
attitude of scientific detachment.  Many of Freud’s intuitive findings were embedded 
in scientistic language, such as his privileging of sexual libido drive and his later 
insistence on a death instinct, which tended to leave certain of his ideas unexplained 
and which only a few psychoanalysts questioned.  Moreover, Freud’s privileging of 
hetero-normative standards in his theories of sadomasochism were justified 
scientifically, though he clearly challenged conventional norms when he introduced 
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the notion of sadomasochism as an ordinary constituent of psychic development.  If 
one considers Freud’s observations regarding non-erotic attachments in loss and 
grief, (see Freud, 1917/1962h, pp. 243; also, see De Masi, 2003, chap. 4), it can be 
argued that his theoretical reliance on the intra-psychic themes of sex, aggression, 
and death to explain sadomasochism interfered with a fuller appreciation of other 
human needs that are also involved in sadomasochistic outcomes.  The same can 
be said for moral masochism, where Freud first embraced the idea that something 
other than a strict view of sexuality was needed as a causal theory of 
sadomasochism.  In the passage cited below from Freud’s discussion of moral 
masochism, there is a notable absence of scientific dualisms and hypothetical claims 
that comes across in his observation of the importance of strong loving relationships.  
Freud stated: 
Masochism, the moral type, is chiefly remarkable for having loosened its 
connection with what we recognize to be sexuality.  To all other masochistic 
sufferings there still clings the condition that it should be administered by the 
loved person; it is endured at his command; in the moral type of masochism this 
limitation has been dropped.  It is the suffering itself that matters; whether the 
sentence is cast by a loved one or by an indifferent person is of no importance. 
(Freud, 1924/1962e, p. 164) 
The above passage could be said to reveal a more human disturbance that is non-
dependent on biological theories or gendered hypothetical notions of sexuality.  
Freud’s reading of moral masochism as seen above contrasts sharply with his 
scientistic dualistic formations of sadomasochism in other places.  In the tradition 
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of Krafft-Ebing, Freud never stopped assuming the presence of an intra-psychic 
instinctive mechanism to be at the core of his theory of sadomasochism as a 
sexual perversion, despite his findings which suggested that other reasons for 
sadomasochism might be possible.          
        Concluding Remarks on the Freudian Era of Sadomasochism Theory      
     Following his explication of three different forms of masochism based on the 
death instinct, the age of strictly sexual and morbidly unconscious drive theories to 
explain sadomasochism began sharing the spotlight with other types of 
psychoanalytic approaches.  Freud’s intra-psychic theory of sadomasochism began 
to give way to some other approaches that incorporated social and other extrinsic 
sources as explanatory factors of sadomasochism.  In the next chapter, we will 
begin looking at some post-Freudian thinkers who suggested theories of 
sadomasochism that went beyond individual psychic causes. 
      It can be said that the turning point for a new era in sadomasochism theory 
followed Freud’s investigation of moral masochism, which suggested that a 
loosening of the idea of sexuality as a primary cause may be advisable.  Though 
Freud was clearly the most prolific theorist of sadomasochism during this time, 
the intellectual heritage of his approach to sadomasochism—particularly with 
respect to its gendered binarisms – is indebted to Krafft-Ebing, who is the source 
of most of Freud’s psychoanalytic formulations on sadomasochism theory.49   
     Following Freud, a shift in focus of sadomasochism theory began which 
addressed pre-oedipal dynamics, interpersonal factors, and a new awareness of 
                                                 
49 It tends to be forgotten how much of Krafft-Ebing’s basic outline of sadomasochism was kept 
alive by Freud (see De Masi, 2003, chap. 2)  
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the role that society and culture played in sadomasochistic outcomes.  Marxist 
ideology and new philosophical approaches began intersecting with 
psychoanalytic theory, psychology, and sociology leading to new 
sadomasochism theories.  In the next chapter, we will look at some of the first 
post-Freudian psychoanalytic theories that incorporate social and cultural 
theories into the discourse of sadomasochism theory while holding onto some 
orthodox psychoanalytic assumptions.  Some psychoanalytic theorists began 
addressing social and political factors that contributed to new conceptualizations 
of sadomasochism.  At the same time, other intra-psychic psychoanalytic 
theorists took a pre-oedipal approach to explain sadomasochism in the 
personality.  During this post-Freudian phase of psychoanalytic theorizing on 
sadomasochism, Erich Fromm (1929/1984) began studying what he referred to 
as the “authoritarian-character” and was a keen critic of Freudian and post-
Freudian theories (Fromm, 1932/1970).  These and other aspects of Fromm’s 
influences will be explored in chapter 4 when Fromm’s path to his theory of 
sadomasochism is examined.           
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CHAPTER 3 
 
                          Orthodox and Revisionist Psychoanalytic  
                                     Theories on Sadomasochism 
 
                                                   Introduction 
                                
    As indicated at the end of chapter 2, Freud’s investigation of moral masochism 
in “The Economic Problem of Masochism” (Freud, 1924/1962e, pp. 159-170) 
clearly loosened the concept of sadomasochism in his mind away from a strict 
sexual foundation.  Yet, Freud’s call for an expanded view of sexuality did 
surprisingly little to encourage other theories that displaced the importance of 
sexuality.  Freud’s death instinct drew criticism as “the crucial metapsychological 
basis for masochism” (Glick and Meyers, 1988, p. 8).  Some theorists, like Wilhelm 
Reich considered historical and social factors as a legitimate basis for a new 
theory of sadomasochism from a psychoanalytic perspective.  Other 
psychoanalytic thinkers, like Melanie Klein stayed with an intra-psychic theory of 
sadomasochism that stressed psychobiological drives during the pre-Oedipal 
phase of development.   In this chapter, I will be taking a look at the post-Freudian 
views of Reich and Klein along with other cultural and interpersonal theorists of 
sadomasochism.  We will also be taking a look at the unique psychobiological 
theory of Ian Suttie (The Origins of Love and Hate, 1935) who used the concept of 
love along with the insights of Freudian psychology to explain healthy personality 
development and perversions of character. 
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              Section A:  Cultural and Interpersonal Theories 
          The Influence of Socio-Cultural Change on Sadomasochism Theories   
     During the 1920s, Europe was in the midst of a new international conflict that 
was heading towards another world war.  The stock market crashed at the end of 
the decade, sending global economic conditions into a tailspin.  Phillip Cushman 
(1995) explains:  
World War I called into serious question the belief structure of Victorian 
bourgeois society, a process culminating in the emergence of what is now 
called the post-modern era.  It ended an unquestioned, total acceptance of 
the value of personal restraint; the exercise of logic and reason; the natural 
efficiency of the upper classes to rule the nations; the commitment to hard 
work, gainful employment, and delay of gratification as ends in themselves; 
the “gentlemanly” patriarchal virtues of sportsmanship, fair play, and silent 
suffering; the particular types of constraints, deprivations and oppressions 
visited upon women. . . .  All of these values and many more were shaken—
perhaps even obliterated—by the senseless horror, waste and devastation 
of the war. (p.164)    
As Cushman’s description of the unsettling mood that was spreading across 
Europe between two world wars was creating a new era of cultural angst, theorists 
were left with many questions; some turned to psychoanalysis for answers to these 
questions.  Psychoanalytic principles and frameworks were increasingly applied to 
all forms of human endeavor, including childhood development, market research, 
vocational assessment, diagnostic testing, political psychology, and more.  Shifts in 
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psychoanalytic theories of sadomasochism and other psychopathologies reflected 
these changes as well.  Theorists like Wilhelm Reich, Harry Stack Sullivan, and 
Karen Horney helped to shed light on the influence of social and interpersonal 
factors on the psychology of human behavior in general and in sadomasochistic 
tendencies in particular.  
                                              Wilhelm Reich 
     As one of the second generation of Freudian psychoanalysts, Wilhelm Reich 
became one of the most controversial figures in the early history of 
psychoanalysis.  He was a political activist who attempted to create a bridge 
between psychoanalysis and Marxism.  Reich was one of the first to address the 
negative cultural impact that the rise of fascism in Europe during the 1920s and 
1930s had on individual psychopathology.  Reich gained notoriety for vigorously 
challenging Freud’s theory of the death instinct and his model of primary 
masochism, which led to a break with Freud and the psychoanalytic movement in 
1934 (Robinson, 1970, p. 38).  Reich’s theory of sadomasochism emphasized 
the influence of cultural institutions, political ideology, and the structure of the 
family on individual pathology and was a radical departure for theories of 
sadomasochism in the field of psychoanalysis.   
Reich’s Early Days 
     Before Reich became known as a political activist and theorist he was known 
for his vitality and brilliance as a psychoanalyst and as an early follower of Freud 
(Robinson, 1970, p. 52; Sharaf, 1983, p. 59).  Reich joined the Vienna 
psychoanalytic circle in 1919 and was esteemed for his skill in treating 
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challenging and difficult clients.  Reich was effective in recognizing and dealing 
with what was referred to as “negative transference” in the more aggressive and 
sadistic personalities.  His work on negative transference was praised by Freud 
(Sharaf, 1983, p. 85; Liebert, 1988, p. 32).   
     Reich conducted one of the first studies on sadomasochism in a clinical 
setting titled “Two Narcissistic Types” (Reich, 1922/1975, pp. 133-142).  His 
study looked at sadomasochistic traits as a component of personality 
organization.  In that study, Reich examined two forms of narcissism that 
exhibited sadomasochistic dynamics (p. 140).  In the first type of narcissism, 
Reich referred to a “simple-symptom” neurosis depicted as a “latent sadism, 
[with] manifest masochism” (p. 140).50  The second type of narcissism Reich 
explored was referred to as a neurotic character formation that exhibited a more 
serious and pervasive kind of sadomasochistic defense structure with strong 
sadistic qualities.  As Reich stated, “contrary to the manifest masochistic 
disposition of the first type, the latter often shows sadistic traits”(p. 139).51  
Reich’s investigations of narcissism constitute the first psychoanalytic attempt to 
make a significant “transition to a broader study of the [sadomasochistic] 
personality" (Sharaf, 1983, p. 67) that extended beyond the individual.  In a 
second study, “The Impulsive Character: A Psychoanalytic Study of Ego 
Pathology” (1925/1974), Reich also made further distinctions between neurotic 
                                                 
50 Reich’s simple-symptom neurosis was very similar to the neurotic type of sadomasochism that 
Freud identified as a normal character perversion produced by the Oedipal complex in “A Child is 
Being Beaten” (Freud, 1919/1962c, pp. 179-204).     
51 Reich’s early investigations of the narcissistic personality structure pre-figures Otto Kernberg’s 
(1991,1992) more recent explorations of mild sadomasochistic personality dynamics and severe 
sadomasochistic characterological disorders (see Kernberg,1992, p.151).   
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types and severe characterological pathologies based on sadomasochistic 
dynamics.   
     Reich considered socio-economic class and the types of family structure (i.e. 
patriarchal and matriarchal) to be primary influences in the formation of individual 
sadomasochistic personality expressions.  Reich’s examination of socio-
economic and family dynamics were later woven into a broader cultural critique 
of Nazi Germany in The mass psychology of fascism (Reich, 1933/1970).  
Although his work on the sadomasochistic personality and its neurotic forms 
represented an important blending of psychoanalytic thought and Marxist social 
theory that was unlike any theory of sadomasochism before him (Coen, 1988, p. 
53), Reich was nonetheless rejected by psychoanalysts and Marxists alike.  
Today, Reich’s work on sadomasochism is generally ignored by 
psychoanalysts.52  Reich’s work on “character armor” for masochism was the first 
psychoanalytic examination of sadomasochistic dynamics to incorporate a 
dialectical perspective of the individual and culture and it warrants recognition.  
Reich’s Rejection of the Death Instinct and Primary Masochism  
     Reich’s rejection of the death instinct in Character-analysis (Reich, 1933/1948) 
offered what he called a “sex-economic clarification to the problem of masochism,” 
as an alternative to Freud’s theory (p.209).  As Reich saw it, the true source of 
                                                 
52 Reich’s contributions to sadomasochism theory continue to be ignored in contemporary 
psychoanalytic theory on sadomasochism. Benjamin (1988), a contemporary feminist-
psychoanalytic-theorist of sadomasochism does cite Reich’s work on social authority and 
repression.  De Masi, (2003) a more current clinically minded psychoanalytic theorist of 
sadomasochism completely ignores Reich in his review of psychoanalytic theories of 
sadomasochism.     
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masochism is the frustration of the genital sex drive combined with the fear of 
punishment from a “sex-negating” culture.  Reich (1933/1948) wrote: 
The suffering [of masochism] is …a mechanism of protection against genital 
castration; [its] self-damaging acts are the anticipation of milder 
punishments as a protection against the punishment, which is really 
feared… The original …neurosis develops from a conflict between [the 
genital] sexual drive and fear of actual punishment at the hands of an 
authoritarian society. (p. 290) 
One can see from Reich’s above description of a genital sex drive that he held 
onto a version of Freud’s early conceptualization of a primary sexual libido to 
explain sadomasochism.  At the same time, Reich was the first to shift the 
focus away from a purely intra-psychic theory to explain sadomasochism and 
take a dialectical approach that stressed the relationship between the individual 
psyche and the culture.  Reich made the connection “between sexual 
repression and the authoritarian social order” (Robinson, 1970, p. 50) thereby 
calling attention to the idea that inner moral conflict and suffering can be a 
function of repressive pressure imposed by the social environment.  Reich 
rejected the idea implied by Freud’s death instinct that the individual is 
constitutionally self-destructive. 53   
Reich’s Contribution to Sadomasochism Theory   
     Reich’s theory of masochism in Character-Analysis (1933/1948) can be 
viewed as a socio-political psychoanalytic theory for sadomasochism.  In 
                                                 
53 Credit is due to Reich for advocating a positive view of the human subject at a time when 
sadomasochism theory under the sovereignty of the death instinct depicted the human subject 
as passive and without any sense of agency.   
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crafting his own theory of sadomasochism, Reich rejected Freud’s emphasis on 
the centrality of the Oedipus complex and the death instinct.  Perhaps, his most 
important contribution came from his dissatisfaction with Freud’s concept of 
genital potency.  Freud did not explore genital potency beyond the point of the 
male being able to perform the sexual act of intercourse successfully.  Reich 
raised the notion of quality with respect to genital sexuality and took it to the 
level of the symbolic (Fromm, 1970/1992, p. 88).  According to Reich, the 
genital body is more than sexual organs that are instruments to produce 
children.  He viewed the body as a vehicle that can experience ecstatic joy and 
provide freedom in the world.  Reich’s concept of genital potency “exploded 
[Freud’s concept]… of the unpleasure-pleasure principle and entailed instead 
the response of the non-repressed, non-defensive personality, of the total life-
affirming and life-enjoying, free human being” (Fromm, 1970/1992b, p. 88).  
Reich’s re-working of Freud’s concept of genital potency is significant for the 
history of sadomasochism because it opened up the theory of sadomasochism 
to a dialectical notion between the organic pleasure seeking of the individual 
and the repressive features of culture that can interfere with individual 
satisfaction in life.       
      Reich’s critique of authoritarian social structures and its sadistic impulses were 
a turning point in psychoanalytic theories of sadomasochism.  Reich raised a 
needed awareness on the importance of negative (authoritarian) cultural influences 
and their impact on the sadomasochistic pathology of the individual.  In The mass 
psychology of fascism (Reich, 1933/1970), Reich identified instances of sadistic 
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practices in the “sex-negating culture” of youth movements in Nazi Germany.  He 
indicted fascist culture for interfering -- in the name of “comradeship,” “honor,” and 
“voluntary discipline” (p.192) -- with the healthy genital sexual expression of its 
citizens; but really, Reich was aiming his critique beyond the immediate social ills 
of Nazism.  
     Reich’s radical psychoanalytic-Marxist vision held that the sadomasochistic 
impact of a sex-negating culture could be transformed through the deconstruction 
of all authoritarian family structures (Robinson, 1970, p. 49).  He referred to 
patriarchal family structures as “a factory for authoritarian ideologies and 
conservative structures”(Reich, 1930/1945, p. 72), which inevitably leads to 
sadomasochistic practices of exploitation and domination on a broader social 
scale.  Reich buttressed his attack on patriarchal societies with an anthropological 
argument, part of which is quoted below fromThe mass psychology of fascism 
(Reich, 1933/1970).  Reich wrote:      
The patriarchal authoritarian sexual order that resulted from the 
revolutionary process of latter-day matriarchy . . . becomes the primary 
basis of authoritarian ideology by depriving the women, children and 
adolescents of their sexual freedom, making a commodity of sex and 
placing sexual interests in the service of economic subjugation.  From now 
on, sexuality is indeed distorted; it becomes diabolical and demonic and has 
to be curbed.  In terms of patriarchal demands, the innocent sensuousness 
of matriarchy appears as the lascivious unchaining of dark powers. (p. 88) 
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One gets a sense of Reich’s social from the above passage.  He viewed all 
patriarchal authoritarian structures as inherently oppressive, claiming that using 
“economic exploitation and political domination to create the submissive character 
structures that supported…[those] institutions” (p. 51).  Moreover, only matriarchal 
familial organizations are seen as “nurturing cultures” where the “sexual misery of 
youth is unknown” (Robinson, 1970, p. 51). 54  In essence, Reich was asserting 
that patriarchal culture is the original source of sadistic aggression that leads to 
masochistic and sadomasochistic pathology for the individual.  In addition, he 
further proposed matriarchal culture as a cultural therapeutic solution for that 
condition.  Reich’s transformation of the sadomasochistic complex into a cultural 
analytic tool, in contrast to Freud’s intra-psychic drive theory of sadomasochism, 
suggested that: 
Human suffering was not due to an unalterable “biological will to suffer,” to a 
“death instinct,” but to the disastrous effect of social conditions on the 
biopsychic apparatus [sic]. This entailed the necessity of criticizing the 
social conditions which created the neuroses─ a necessity which the 
hypothesis of a biological will to suffer had circumvented. (Wolfe, 
1933/1970, pp. 209-210) 
Reich inspired a new generation of cultural critics who looked at the pathological 
elements of society from the perspective of its impact on human character.  The 
theories of Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Norman O. Brown, and R.D. Laing are 
                                                 
54 Reich cited the theories of L.H. Morgan, Frederick Engels, and Bronislaw Malinowski to support 
his claims.  Also, Reich (1933/1970) believed that the new communist Soviet Union was the best 
example of a sex-affirming matriarchal system that was “a society without state and without class” 
(p. 51).  Later, as Stalin assumed dictatorial power, he recanted this claim (p. 297).   
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all indebted to Reich’s break with orthodox psychoanalytic theories of 
sadomasochism that ignored the impact of culture.  Erich Fromm (1941) in 
particular owes much of his critique in Escape from freedom to Reich:  “The 
parallels are simply too striking to be fortuitous. Like Fromm, Reich described the 
psychological foundations of Nazism as an ambiguous relationship to authority 
characteristic of the German lower middle classes”(Robinson, 1969, pp. 46-47).  
The Limitations of Reich’s Approach 
     Although Reich’s conceptualization of sadomasochism was dynamic in that 
it served as a useful analytic tool to assess the subjugating features of a 
repressive culture on the individual psyche, his notion of the genital libido 
theory can be described as scientistic, privileging sexuality (albeit a more 
expanded notion of genital sexuality) as the root individual disturbance that was 
involved in sadomasochistic conflict.  In this sense, Reich’s genital libido theory 
was even more restrictive than Freud’s sexually aggressive libido and his dual 
instinct theory.55   Moreover, as a cultural historian, Reich’s critique is often flat 
and lacks complexity.  His tendency was to dichotomize matriarchal and 
patriarchal cultures into good and evil systems respectively.  In the passage 
below, the psychoanalytic historian Paul Robinson (1970) discusses the flaws 
in Reich’s analysis of culture: 
Instead of pursuing a careful historical analysis of different family structures 
and child-rearing practices, Reich simply reduced all history to two basic 
                                                 
55 As time went on, Reich tragically lost himself in a fantastical bio-physical theory about the 
“Orgon” to explain his genital notion of sexuality for which he was dismissed by his 
contemporaries. As a result, Reich’s earlier humanistic sentiments which are part of his theories  
have been dismissed if not forgotten (see Fromm, 1970/1992b, pp. 87-89)     
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family types: permissive matriarchy and authoritarian patriarchy.  There was 
only one important watershed in human history, that of separating the age of 
matriarchy from the age of patriarchy (circa 4000 B.C.). . . .Likewise, there 
were only two character structures of historical importance: the genital 
character of matriarchal society, capable of genuine self-determination, and 
the neurotic character of patriarchal society, whose basic political posture 
was submissiveness. (p. 49) 
As Robinson explains, Reich’s analysis was one-sided.  He viewed culture as 
the only entity that engenders sadomasochistic behavior.  Reich’s depiction of 
the subject as a helpless victim caught in the throes of sadistic cultural forces 
who passively internalizes masochistic tendencies can be viewed as 
incomplete and overly simplistic.   Instead of developing an informative analytic 
tool that could been used to illuminate cultural oppression and enlist others to 
engage in constructive therapeutic measures, Reich’s moralistic and shallow 
cultural assessment called for social reform in an incendiary and polemical way 
that was rejected by Marxists and psychoanalysts alike.  Though he raised 
important questions and pointed out real sources of cultural oppression, over 
time, Reich’s call for social change appears naïve, irresponsible, and 
ineffective.   
     Reich’s contribution towards the advancement of sadomasochism theory was 
that he was the first psychoanalytic theorist to call attention to the dialectical 
relationship between individual and culture.  At a time when theories of 
sadomasochism were headed in the direction of maintaining sadomasochism as 
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an individualized clinical pathology without any connection to broader social 
issues, Reich and a handful of left-minded psychoanalytic thinkers forged a new 
path for sadomasochism theory.  Reich was instrumental in raising the 
consciousness of theorists to the importance of cultural factors and he examined 
the implications of sadomasochism in a broader human context than had been 
considered previously.     
                                             Harry Stack Sullivan 
     Sullivan was not a psychoanalyst.  His text, Interpersonal psychiatry (Sullivan, 
1953) focused on the interpersonal needs other than sex which motivate human 
behavior and interaction.  Sullivan’s interpersonal model was an alternative to 
Freudian psychoanalysis (Cushman, 1995, p.174) and it addressed 
sadomasochistic dynamics from a people-to-people perspective which is 
considered the primary location for all human behavior.  Rather than stress intra-
psychic theories of masochism that privileged sexual motives, Sullivan (1953) 
concentrated on the interpersonal exchanges of power and submission that 
characterized masochistic behavior between people on an everyday basis.  In his 
own words: 
There is a large number of people who appear to go to rather extraordinary 
lengths to get themselves imposed on, abused, humiliated, and what not, 
but as you get further data, you discover that this quite often pays—in other 
words, they get things they want.  And the things that everybody wants are 
satisfaction and security from anxiety.  Thus these people who get 
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themselves abused and so on are indirectly getting other people involved in 
doing something useful in exchange. (p.353) 
As shown above, Sullivan focused on security needs as opposed to sexuality to 
explain sadomasochistic behavior.  
     Sullivan understood sadomasochistic dynamics as direct and indirect modes of 
exploitation.  As problematic modes of human interaction intensify, there is a 
release of pent-up anxiety, a fostering of low self-esteem, and an increase in   
further conflicts between persons (Cushman, 1995, p. 160).  Sullivan (1953) 
created his own "hermeneutics of suspicion" 56 regarding interpersonal oppression. 
He believed that hatred (which can be expressed in sadistic terms) are derivatives 
of anxiety which are “channeled in interpersonal relations, in a number of ways 
which are not perfectly obvious” (p. 351).  Below is a sample of his depiction of the 
complexities of dominating and submissive tactics:  
What happens is that a person who has a low opinion of himself develops a 
relatively suave way of manifesting, if not inferiority to significant people, at 
least such blatant hints of inferiority that he becomes more or less an object 
of philanthropic concern on the part of the other person. . . .  [These] 
situations are apt to be somewhat unpleasant and complex for the other 
people involved—particularly if the other people are prone to find 
                                                 
56 Ricoeur (1970) defines hermeneutics as “the theory of the rules that preside over the 
interpretation of a particular text” (p. 8). Marx, Nietzche, and Freud are considered the first 
hermeneuticists of suspicion because of their “common opposition to a phenomenology of the 
sacred…within a single method of demystification” (p. 32).  Sullivan followed in the tradition of 
Freud but used a method based on the notion of interpersonal anxiety (as opposed to the libido) 
to demystify human oppression (or sadomasochism).    
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themselves in relationships in which domineering and vassalizing their 
fellows is the source of their security. (p. 352) 
As can be seen, Sullivan looked at the implications of the dynamics of domination 
and submission from both sides of an interpersonal exchange and did not privilege 
sexuality as a motive for any of these traits.  Moreover, unlike Freud who located 
all psychic ills within the individual psyche, Sullivan believed social ills were socio-
historically determined and develop from external restraints in the interpersonal 
environment.  Sullivan was not a theorist of sadomasochism in the same way that 
other psychoanalysts were.  He did not generally make direct references to 
sadomasochism.  Nonetheless, his concept of the exploitative attitudes (pp. 351-
353) is relevant as a “holistic” approach to understanding sadomasochism because 
it focuses on the themes of dominance and submission in interpersonal relations 
that are not sexually driven. 57  
                                              Karen Horney 
     Karen Horney belongs in the same group as Sullivan and Fromm in that all 
three rejected key Freudian concepts such as the primacy of sexuality as the 
impetus behind sadomasochistic behavior.  Horney’s concepts are consistent with 
“those of individual psychology while keeping psychoanalytic terminology” 
(Ellenberger, 1970, p. 638).  Her theories focused on anxiety and the neurotic 
aspects of behavior but in contrast with Freud, she did not see anxiety as 
inevitable and emphasized social and cultural factors rather than biological causes.  
She also was one of the first “to oppose Freud and speak directly to the issue of 
                                                 
57 Sullivan was an important influence on Erich Fromm’s (1941) thinking about love and 
sadomasochistic relationships as will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 5.  
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feminine psychology” (Engler, 2003, chap. 5).  “Horney called Freud to task not 
only for his association of women with masochism but also for his theory of penis 
envy, both of which she convincingly argued stem from social conditions rather 
than biological inevitability” (Chancer, 1992, p. 127).  The conflict created by her 
differences with Freud caused Horney to fall into great disfavor within 
psychoanalytic circles (Cushman, 1995, p. 176). 
     Horney (1937) talked about the "strategic value of suffering" and the addictive 
qualities of the masochistic experience (p. 265).58  Her pithy and insightful 
exploration of the “domineering” neurotic type is a practical and lucid 
characterization of sadomasochistic dynamics that avoids the dogma of a 
sexualized libido or a bio-scientistic theorization.  Horney took an approach to 
sadomasochism that allowed for an understanding of its everyday dynamics and 
“appear[s] surprisingly contemporary, almost commonsensical today” (Cushman, 
1995, p. 176).  To illustrate, Horney (1937) states:  
The domineering characteristic of the neurotic striving for power…may be 
disguised in socially valuable or humanistic forms … the other persons…will 
feel it and react with either submissiveness or with opposition.  The neurotic 
…maintains his belief that he is essentially a gentle soul who is annoyed 
only because people are so ill advised to oppose him.   
   A further peculiarity resulting from the compulsion to domineer is the 
person’s incapacity to have any fifty-fifty relationships.  He either has to lead 
                                                 
58 Meltzer (as cited in DeMasi, 2003, pp. 66-67) is a current post-analytic 
sadomasochism/perversion theorist theory who uses a model of addiction and narcissistic 
personality organization that can be traced back to Horney’s meditations on the addictive aspects of 
suffering.  
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or feels entirely lost, dependent and helpless.  He is so autocratic that 
everything falling short of complete domination is felt as subjugation.  
(pp. 174-175)  
As described above, Horney’s “domineering” neurotic type shows how the 
sadomasochistic idea was finding its way outside a classic psychoanalytic libidinal 
theoretical framework.  Horney’s portrayal of complex intrapsychic, interpersonal, 
and social factors was rendered practical and intelligible for her readers.  She 
depicted everyday sadomasochism without reference to pathological models or 
based on the “rules” of physics and/or biology.  Horney’s emphasis on culture and 
personality avoided the idea of biological inevitability (Engler, 2003, p. 139; 
Chancer, 1992, p. 127).  She held an optimistic view of human nature that stands 
apart from other sadomasochism theorists.59
     The cultural theorists of sadomasochism like Reich, Sullivan, and Horney can 
all be considered neo-psychoanalytic theorists of sadomasochism (see 
Ellenberger, 1970, p. 638).  Their theories were in opposition to the orthodox 
zeitgeist of the years between the two world wars when notions of consumerism 
and individual pathologies reigned hegemenous in psychoanalytic thought 
(Cushman, 1995, p. 209).  As will be explored next, the two other key neo-
psychoanalytic theories of sadomasochism remained within an intrapsychic 
framework.   
 
                                                 
59 Erich Fromm (1941) incorporated Horney’s observations of the “masochistic strivings in the 
neurotic personality” and her depiction of sadomasochistic dynamics that lead to dependency on 
others (p. 149). 
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              Section B: Neo-Psychoanalytic Sadomasochism Theories  
                                                     Theodor Reik      
     Theodor Reik (1941) was a first generation Freudian psychoanalyst who 
enjoyed recognition as a novelist and was interested in “the phenomenological 
world of masochism” (p. 39).  Reik’s exploration of the dimensions of masochism is 
generally disregarded in the history of sadomasochism theories.60 Yet, his focus 
on the centrality of the imagination at the core of masochism and his 
phenomenolog-ical rule of description 61 is reminiscent of Krafft-Ebing’s original 
findings on masochism that were taken from Sacher-Masoch.  As the libido theory 
gained ground in sadomasochism theory, the key role of imagination began to fade 
in importance.  However, as Reik (1941) stated in Masochism in modern man: 
The importance of the phantasy as the very essence of masochism has not 
yet been appreciated in analytical theories, that its indispensibility has not 
yet been recognized.  Imagination, thus neglected, has taken its revenge 
nevertheless.  It penetrated the theories of some analysts and made them 
so fanciful. (p. 58)   
Reik’s observations showed that the imaginative core of masochism has an 
intentionally sadistic origin.  As he stated, “The masochist uses all possible means 
at his disposal to induce his partner to create for him that discomfort which he 
needs for attaining his pleasure” (p. 84).  He emphasized the subjective and 
aggressive nature of imagination at the core of sexual masochism and for non-
                                                 
60 Reik is overlooked in Franco De Masi’s (2003) contemporary psychoanalytic review of 
sadomasochism theories. 
61 The phenomenological method of observation was discussed in chapter 1 
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sexual (characterological) masochism as well. An example of Reik’s descriptive 
approach is excerpted below in his depiction of social masochism.  He wrote: 
In most cases it has the character of a performance and frequently it does not 
dispense with a certain theatrical flavor. This demonstrative note is not 
restricted to masochistic individuals.  It can be rediscovered in the attitude of 
groups or peoples to whom fate has ordained an afflicted past and present.  In 
the lives of these peoples the connection between the ideas of being loved and 
of being punished reappears on a higher, frequently on a religious, level 
However genuine the penitence, however voluntary the suffering, it can’t do 
without a public.  “God loves him whom he chastens.” (pp. 78-79)     
In this passage, Reik seems to have captured an important intentional “folie à 
deux” quality to social masochism that implies dependence on another person (or 
persons) to achieve its aim.  Reik’s description of social masochism as shown 
above expands the boundaries of social masochism as an individually sexually 
motivated act.  It is revealed as a universal experience which is applicable in 
multiple contexts and involves a shared imagination (“folie à millions”).62  
Unfortunately, Reik showed little theoretical imagination elsewhere when 
discussing masochism.  He clung to a murky version of Freud’s libido theory 
though he did reject the death instinct.   
 
 
 
                                                 
62 Reik’s early descriptions of group social masochism may offer some insights into the 
contemporary mindset of those who commit sadistic acts of terror and order to avoid the wrath of 
a stern and vengeful God.    
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               Melanie Klein’s Object-Relations Theory of Sadomasochism 
     Melanie Klein’s formidable impact on sadomasochism theory is not well 
known within psychoanalytic circles in the United States (DeMasi, 2003, ch. 8).63   
Klein was however, one of the first to challenge Freud’s structural theory of 
character development, developing her own theory of personality based on the 
prevalence of pre-Oedipal unconscious fantasies.  Klein (1946/1975) proposed 
two fundamental personality orientations: the “paranoid-schizoid position” and 
“the depressive position” (p. 14) which she described as “anxieties, mechanisms 
and defenses which are characteristic of the first few months of life” (p. 14).  She 
argued that incestuous fantasies of union (i.e., the Oedipal complex) and 
terrifying forms of self-punishment (i.e., the superego) “are present from a very 
young age, although in more ‘primitive,’ frightening forms,” and specifically 
targeted “pre-genital stage oedipal conflicts” (Mitchell and Black, 1995, p. 87).  
Klein highlighted intense primitive forms of sadistic rage during the pre-Oedipal 
stage “that . . .  [are] chiefly impulses of hate, which initiate the Oedipus conflict 
and the formation of the super-ego and which govern the earliest and most 
decisive stages of both” (Klein, 1932/1975, p. 135).  She bolstered her claim 
regarding the primacy of pre-Oedipal hatred and aggression by quoting Freud’s 
own statements on the subject.  In “Instinct and Their Vicissitudes” (Freud, 
1915/1962g, pp. 109-140), Freud wrote that “hate as a relation to objects, is older 
than love” (p. 139).  Klein maintained that terror, hate, and rage are discernible in 
                                                 
63 Stephen Mitchell (1995) considers Melanie Klein to have had the greatest impact on 
contemporary psychoanalytic thought since Freud (p. 85). At the same time, it is only recently that 
her ideas have begun to find an audience in the United States, as they were  virtually ignored for 
years “on the grounds that her descriptions of the early mental life of the infant were too ‘fanciful’ ” 
(Fine, 1979, p. 281).   
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the child’s earliest fantasies and can be interpreted psychoanalytically.  The 
prototypical example is the childhood masturbation fantasy, which Klein recorded 
in The psycho-analysis of children (1932/1975) and depicted the fantasy in 
sadomasochistic terms.   
     As can be seen below, Klein (1932/1975) developed a topographical outline of 
the paranoid-schizoid position and the depressive position which provide the 
structure for interpreting sadomasochistic rage in the masturbation fantasies of a 
child:   
According to my observation, the child’s masturbation phantasies have as 
their nucleus early sadistic phantasies centered upon its parents’ copulation.  
It is those destructive impulses, fused with libidinal ones, which cause the 
super-ego to put up defenses against masturbation phantasies and, 
incidentally, against masturbation itself. . . .  If this is so, then not only would 
it be the incestuous trends which give rise in the first instance to a sense of 
guilt, but horror of incest itself would ultimately be derived from the 
destructive impulses which are bound up permanently in the child’s earliest 
incestuous desires. (p.134)  
In this instinctual drama of sex and aggression, the child is caught in a whirlwind 
of sadistic rage mixed with a horrific terror at the sight of copulation of the 
parents. In the first half of this fantasy, which describes the paranoid-schizoid 
position, primitive destructive impulses are bound to incestuous desires.  The 
subsequent guilt and horror stage -- leading to super-ego restraint and 
suppression of masturbatory behavior -- can further lead to withdrawal and 
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despondency, which Klein refers to as the depressive position.  Both the 
paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions are universal psychobiological 
entities (Liebert, 1988, p. 33).  The child goes through a process of 
externalization (projection of sadistic rage onto parental objects) and a re-
internalization (i.e., integration) of those objects with attached affects as a part of 
normal growth and emotional development.  Sadomasochism in adulthood refers 
to the unachieved re-internalization by the infant of the two basic psychic 
positions in relation to the mother-object during this crucial pre-Oedipal time.  
According to Klein, if the process leading to re-internalization is disrupted, then 
psychical chaos emerges because the ego is not solidified and pathology 
develops.64  
     Klein contended that the primitive sadistic rage found in the fantasies of 
children are analogous to adult criminal and psychotic forms of sadistic rage. In A 
contribution to the psychogenesis of manic-depressive states (1935/1948), she 
explained: 
In the very first months of the baby’s existence it has sadistic impulses 
directed, not only against its mother’s breast, but also against the inside of 
her body: scooping it out, devouring the contents, destroying it by every 
means which sadism can suggest … But it is because the baby projects its 
own aggression onto these objects that it feels them to be “bad” and not 
only because they frustrate its desires; the child conceives them as actually 
                                                 
64 Klein’s theory is used to explain the contemporary addictive model of sadomasochism.  
Pleasure commingles with destructive rage in the adult when the intense affects attached to 
parental objects are not successfully re-internalized during childhood (see Demasi, 2003, pp.66-
67). 
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dangerous. . . . (and react to them with defence-mechanisms), the content 
of which is comparable to that of the psychoses of adults. (p. 282)   
Although Klein never investigated the implications of her theory beyond asserting 
its relevance to criminality and psychotic behavior as she mentions in the above 
passage, she did inspire others to carry her work further (DeMasi, 2003, p. 66).  W. 
Bion (1957) is perhaps the most notable post-Kleinian to conduct studies on the 
personality development of adult psychotic criminals using the object-relational 
paradigm for sadomasochistic rage (p. 269).   
     Klein’s theory follows the same pattern set by Freud as it pertains to the 
development of the sadomasochistic character.  It presents “two drives [which] are 
opposed to each other and the development of the mind centers on the innate 
conflict between destructiveness and libido” (De Masi, 2003, p. 66).  Klein depicts 
the sadomasochistic child as a “perverse patient…split into two non-
communicating parts struggling to dominate the personality: the perverse part, 
interested in domination and sadism, tends to prevail over the healthy part” (p. 66). 
Like Freud, Klein’s penchant for polarities and conflict is central to her theory of 
sadomasochism.  However, Instead of situating the sadomasochistic fantasy and 
its resolution in the idea of father-dominated Oedipal dynamics, she took the point 
of view that “the form of the resolution of two fundamental psychic positions is in 
relation to the mother” (Liebert, 1988, p. 33).  Klein also did not change the 
essential binaristic notion of the conflict between a repressive ego and innate 
sexual aggression; she merely inserted the intrapsychic “dialectic of control” 
(Benajamin, 1988, p. 53) into an earlier time on the continuum of psychosexual 
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development.  Moreover, Klein did not deviate from the idea that all 
sadomasochism is a function of innate tendencies that are activated through the 
sexualized child-parent dynamics.65   Klein’s psycho-biological assumptions about 
destruction and the primitive aggression of childhood drives were a radical 
departure from Freud’s Oedipal explanation of sadomasochism as a neurotic 
normal perversion of childhood (Freud, 1919/1962c, pp. 179-204).  Klein’s model 
was more discursive on the psychotic features of normal and abnormal 
sadomasochistic sexuality.  Like Freud, Klein hypothesized her theory from clinical 
observations with a method that is more intuitive than empirical.  Her theory of 
sadomasochism however, can be viewed as the more radical one because of its 
psycho-biological assumptions about open and dramatic expressions of 
destruction and aggression at an earlier age in development.   
     One can criticize Klein’s psychobiological “theories of an inborn death and of an 
inborn sexual knowledge. . .[as] incorrect” (Fine, 1979, p. 281).  Even within a 
psychoanalytic framework, her excessive focus on primitive conflicts and 
mechanisms (i.e., positions) pre-empts other considerations, such as character 
development and defense mechanisms, in favor of deeper interpretations of 
symbolic unconscious fantasies (p. 282).  Klein seems to assume an “innate 
badness of the child” (p. 282).  In fact, her pessimistic view of the unconscious can 
                                                 
65 The British object-relational school that followed Klein does “not inquire into the nature of 
sexuality in itself, but focuses on the object relationship and the constructive or destructive 
orientation of the personality and its internal objects” (DeMasi, 2003, p. 48).   
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be extended to “the adult as…[the unconscious] remains always unstable, fluid, 
constantly fending off anxieties” (Mitchell and Black, 1995, p. 87). 66  
     Klein’s theory of childhood sadomasochistic aggression goes back to Freud’s 
earliest polemical outline of love and hate, which can be found in “Instincts and 
their Vicissitudes” (Freud, 1915/1962g, p. 139).   Klein seems to have used Freud’s 
first teleological narrative of the antithesis between love and hate as a psycho-
biological law of the unconscious upon which to ground her whole theory of mental 
development (Grosskurth, 1986, p. 175). 67  
     Klein also claimed to have relied upon Freud’s and Karl Abraham’s psycho-
sexual stage theories to develop her own theory (see Abraham, 1916/1966b, pp. 
35-66).  Yet, from her definition of anxiety “as originating from the presence and 
danger of the death instinct within the self,” it is clear that Klein struck out on her 
own with instinct theory (Grosskurth, 1986, p. 191).  Despite all her use of Freudian 
concepts, and the fact that she applied Freudian dynamics to early pre-Oedipal 
stages, it would be a mistake to interpret Klein as merely extending Freud’s view.  
Klein paid little real attention to biology (though she made biological claims) and 
she did not use hypothetical deductive reasoning to assert her claims as Freud did.  
Her theory of anxiety and sadomasochism was anchored on the death instinct but 
relied on her own intuition and clinical observation.   
                                                 
66There are mixed reviews about Klein’s pessimism.  Phyllis Grosskurth,(1986), one of Klein’s 
biographers, describes Klein’s theories as “always governed by her preoccupation with the origins 
of anxiety and guilt” (p. 338).  Others have praised Klein for disposing of “the determinism and 
fatalism implicit in some aspects of Freud’s speculation, [while] confront[ing] the vicissitudes of 
the destructive drive in the field of primitive development” (DeMasi, 2003, pp. 65-66).  
67 It is worth recalling that Freud was preoccupied with the idea of love (and hate) and had a 
tendency to continually revise himself on this matter. (see Chapter 2, Sect. B, pp. 61-62)  
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     Although the Kleinian model of sadomasochism makes some striking 
correlations between abnormal pre-Oedipal conflicts from childhood and the 
processes of criminality and psychotic behavior in adults (Klein, 1946/1975; Bion, 
1957) which are useful, Klein presents a dark and frightening portrayal of human 
sexuality and parent-child dynamics that are horrific and pathological.  Klein 
developed her theories from working with “children, many of [whom 
were]…extremely disturbed and terrified” (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 87) and this 
is exactly what is reflected in her theories.  One has to wonder however, if Klein’s 
fantasy-drama of pre-Oedipal (sadistic) rage dynamics presents a balanced 
picture of psychosexual development.   Her theory of sadomasochism goes 
beyond even the typical hermeneutics of suspicion approach that is reflected in 
most psychoanalytic theories during her era.  Her emphasis was strictly on the 
instability and overwhelming aspects of psychic life to explain the formation of 
sadomasochism while ignoring the more life affirming uses of defense 
mechanisms to protect ego-integration.   As we will see next, there was an 
alternative to Klein’s hermeneutics of suspicion approach to depict 
sadomasochism that stands in contrast to most psychoanalytic theories of 
sadomasochism during the early post-Freudian analytic phase.   
                                  Ian Suttie’s Theory of Love 
     Ian Suttie’s (1935) theory of love offered a more sanguine view of pre-genital 
mother-child object relational dynamics than seen by either Klein or Freud.  In “A 
Scientific Conception of Love, Hate and Interest” (Suttie, 1935, chap. 2), Suttie 
presents a well-reasoned and empirically conscious biological thesis for the idea 
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that the love of the mother is the primal need of the infant.  Hate, according to 
Suttie, is a consequence that occurs when love is threatened or interfered with  
(p. 31).  Furthermore, Suttie viewed sexual gratification as a secondary need to 
the primary need for protection which goes along with the need of love and 
safety.  The starting point of psychopathology according to Suttie is any 
interference with the organic development of love and security which are innate 
to the infant.  An original thinker, Suttie cited and credited many of Freud’s 
theories while pointing out some of the discrepancies and growing differences 
among the burgeoning schools of psychoanalytic thought, specifically on the 
development of children (see Suttie, 1935, p. 11).  Suttie also noted that many of 
Freud’s earlier concepts were abandoned by his later followers, such as the 
primacy of the Oedipal conflict to explain neurosis (p. 11).68  Using the language 
of psychoanalysis very adroitly, Suttie devised a developmental theory on the 
origin of love for the infant that incorporated many Freudian insights and steered 
clear of the orthodox psychoanalytic tendency towards suspicion and 
reductionism.  Suttie wrote that “the love of others comes into being 
simultaneously with the recognition of their existence, or, in Freudian language, 
the perceptions which are integrated as the first recognition of mother are 
“cathected” with love from the very beginning (p. 31).  This quote suggests that 
the child’s ability to affirm the mother’s “existence” is the ground for the child’s 
own sense of self-awareness; that is, according to Suttie, self-awareness 
                                                 
68 As mentioned in chapter 2, Freud often left theories and concepts unexplained as he moved on 
to newer theories. Suttie’s comments suggest that many analysts went along with Freud and left 
many of his earlier concepts behind as well.   
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appears indivisible from awareness of the other. 69  What is particularly 
noteworthy in Suttie’s perspective is how the language of psychoanalysis and 
biology is used to communicate the idea of reciprocity between mother and child 
in an almost intersubjective way.70  Suttie’s view of psychopathology (i.e., 
sadomasochism) was that it is a consequence of any interference with the 
development of love.  Suttie’s work is remarkable given that the zeitgeist of 
personality theory during his era was dominated by Freudian psychosexual 
theory which stressed erogenous zone fixation and destructive instincts as the 
primary factors that explain psychic problems. Suttie clearly rejected Freud’s 
death instinct theory (p. 30) and the Kleinian premise that hate and envy 
preceded love as the primary emotional instincts. According to Suttie:   
Love of mother is primal in so far as it is the first formed and directed 
emotional relationship.  Hate, I regard not as a primal independent instinct… 
but as a development or intensification of separation-anxiety which in turn is 
roused by a threat against love. …Its purpose is not death-seeking or death-
dealing, but the preservation of the self from the isolation which is death, 
and the restoration of a love relationship. (p. 31) 
As explicated above, Suttie constructed hate as a defensive reaction to the loss 
of love which contrasted with Klein’s position that hate as a primary instinct is 
responsible for rage.  While the theories of Suttie and Klein did converge on the 
centrality of pre-oedipal object-relational dynamics between the indfant and child, 
                                                 
69 The notion of self/other mutuality and its central role that it plays in human love will become a 
key principle in Erich Fromm’s theoretical approach to sadomasochism that will be explored in 
chapter 5  
70 Today, the intersubjective model has been integrated with psychoanalysis (i.e., Benjamin (1988 
and Mitchell & Black, 1995) 
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their aims were quite different.  For Suttie, the core loving relationship between 
mother and child eventually differentiates into curiosity and tenderness, which 
later unites itself with sex.  For Klein, the mother─ child relationship is sexualized 
from the very beginning.  Suttie also differentiated his biological notion of love 
from Freudian instinct theory which defined love as “sexual desire degenitalized  
(‘goal-inhibited’) by repression as Freud would have it” (Suttie, 1935, p. 31).  As 
for the death instinct, Suttie considered it a “systematic error on Freud’s part 
traceable to definite bias” (p. 31). 
     As shown below in Suttie’s (1935) examination of Freud’s explanation of love, 
Suttie believed that Freud did not adequately explain the formation of love based 
on a concept of narcissism.  Suttie claimed that while based on deductive 
reasoning, Freud’s explanation is derived from "inferior clinical work" (p. 37).  
Suttie wrote:  
So far as the term narcissism describes a form of behaviour or state of 
feeling it is very well chosen; but I do not consider that it represents an 
actual phase in the development of love.  It seems to me that Freud has 
confused two things.  Partly he has not thought out the implications of …the 
appearance of self-love (though, even here, I hold that the rudiment of 
“other” -love is present). 
What I find so unique about Suttie’s perspective that can be seen in his 
analysis of Freud’s work, is that Suttie maintains an inter-relational focus 
throughout all of discussion of mother-child dynamics.  Instead of preferring 
individual pathological interpretations of self-awareness such as the narcissistic 
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pre-occupation with the body (see Freud, 1914/1962k, p. 73), Suttie 
consistently stressed the relational aspects of self awareness in child 
development and included the mother as an active “other” instrumental to the 
child’s growing body awareness .   As Suttie continues below, we find him 
continuing to make the point that the center of a child’s self-love cannot be 
conceptualized in isolation (e.g., narcissism) as Freud would have it: 71
Partly he [Freud] has mistaken the interest the baby develops in its own 
body and immediate concerns under the attentions of the loved mother for 
an actual love-of-self.  .   
To begin with this state of affairs can hardly be distinguished from love itself 
(reciprocal absorption), but it acts as the nucleus and starting point of future 
interest -development or sublimation. 
     I thus regard the states of feeling and modes of behaviour which Freud 
conceives as Narcissism, not as an intermediary phase in the development 
of love as he thinks, but as an off-shoot of it. (p. 37) 
If one follows Suttie’s argument in this passage, one is led to see the solipsism in 
Freud’s argument of primary narcissism.  Suttie stayed clear of this problem  by 
never losing sight of the maternal figure in pre-Oedipal dynamics, which Freud 
clearly minimized throughout his theory of psychosexual development. Perversion 
(i.e., sadomasochism) in Suttie’s framework was viewed as a consequence of 
interruption to the development of human love and the mother-infant bond.  Suttie’s 
theory presented a significant departure from conventional sadomasochism theory 
                                                 
71Freud (1914/1962k) described the child’s narcissistic pre-occupation with the body on the level 
with the “significance of a perversion” (p. 73)  
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which stressed the primacy of sexual and/or death and destructive instincts to 
explain sadomasochistic outcomes.  With Suttie, the conceptualization of love as a 
mutual reciprocal process served as the ideal norm from which to understand 
sadomasochism from.72   
 
Section C:  Concluding Remarks on the Orthodox and Revisionist Era of  
                                      Sadomasochism Theories  
     The socio-cultural perspective on sadomasochism theory temporarily gained 
ascendancy in psychoanalysis during the cultural rise of fascism and Nazi 
Germany but this quickly faded after World War II.  Since then, the cultural 
zeitgeist within the psychoanalytic movement has continued to favor intra-psychic 
theories to explain sadomasochism, particularly in the United States.73  One can 
find a few current theorists of sadomasochism from the psychoanalytic perspective 
who currently resonate with the social world views of Reich and Fromm (see 
Benjamin, 1988), but for the most part, the socio-cultural perspective on 
sadomasochism theory holds little weight among current psychoanalytic thinkers 
on the sadomasochistic perversion (see Demasi, 2003; Glick and Meyers, 1988).   
     Another psychoanalytic approach that emerged during this time was the ego 
psychoanalytic school which emerged at around the same time as Klein’s object-
relational psychoanalytic school.  This approach continued to extend Freud’s 
notion of normal sadomasochism based on his infantile psychosexual theory but 
                                                 
72Erich Fromm (1956) would develop a similar foundation as a theory to explain sadomasochism 
as we will see later in Part II  
73Exceptions to this can be found in the developing field of Community Psychology  where the 
cultural analysis of different forms of oppression is the main focus (see Prillentensky & Nelson, 
2005)  
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stressed his later work on the ego found in “The Ego and the Id” (Freud, 
1923/1962f, pp. 19-27).74  These theories emphasize the ego defense 
mechanisms as adaptive means to protect the integrity of the ego and thereby 
stress the defensive uses of sexuality to protect ego integrity as well. When 
compared with earlier psychoanalytic approaches and Klein’s object-relational 
theory of sadomasochism, the ego psychoanalytic approach is more positive or 
benign because the focus is not on the unconscious forces of the id (Fine, 1979, p. 
293).  Sadomasochism is looked at as a defensive reaction that protects ego or 
narcissistic injury.75  All of the ego psychoanalytic theories of sadomasochism 
were intrapsychic theories during the 1930’s.  Later they developed into more 
relational psychoanalytic theories that stress identity as the core to the 
sadomasochistic perversion (DeMasi, 2003, p. 47).  
     There was one psychoanalyst during this era who began integrating a 
perspective on sadomasochism from a wide range of theories and insights from 
sociology, psychology, and his own clinical work that led to a new theoretical 
approach that began to take shape by the end of the 1930’s.  Erich Fromm began 
the 1930’s with a series of original and sensitive critiques of Freudian 
psychoanalytic theory that eventually led him to call for a new theory of love 
(Fromm, 1939) to explain sadomasochism. In Part II of this dissertation, I will be 
following Fromm’s intellectual path and the theorists that influenced him most 
                                                 
74The other article by Freud which was the forerunner to the ego psychoanalytic approach to 
sadomasochism is “On Narcissism” (Freud, 1914/1962k, pp. 73-102) (Fine, 1979, p. 293)  
75 The ego psychoanalytic school was the forerunner to the relational paradigm of psychoanalytic 
theories of sadomasochism (DeMasi, 2003, chap. 8).  Most of the theorists from the second 
paradigm were prominent later in the twentieth century (i.e., Winnicott, 1945; Kohut, 1971; 
Mahler, 1975)   
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significantly in crafting a radically different social-psychological theoretical outlook  
that opened up the sadomasochistic discourse to a socially broader and more 
human platform.  As the 1930’s came to a close Erich Fromm called for a theory of 
love that provided a whole new foundation from which to understand  
sadomasochism as a pervasive and everyday kind of destructive pleasure that is 
much more typical than was previously realized.  Fromm would bring 
sadomasochism into the conversation of everyday life in a way that could have 
hardly been imagined by Krafft-Ebing and was not envisioned by even Freud.  In 
Chapter 4, I will begin an examination of Erich Fromm’s background interests and 
theoretical preoccupations that led him to call for a theory of love and an analysis 
of sadomasochistic pseudo-love which was the first step towards developing an 
alternate theory of sadomasochism that did not privilege sexuality. 
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           PART TWO 
 
                       CHAPTER 4 
     
          Setting the Stage for Erich Fromm’s Theory of Sadomasochism  
 
           Introduction: Fromm’s Background and Early Frankfurt Years 
 
     This chapter is a turning point in the history of sadomasochism away from 
psychoanalytic theories.  Erich Fromm was a social-psychoanalytic thinker who 
began to critically examine some of Freud’s key theories, especially Freud’s 
emphasis on the primacy of sexual needs to explain human character 
development.  Fromm’s disagreements with Freud in the early 1930’s were crucial 
in leading him to call for a theory of love and an analysis of sadomasochistic 
pseudo-love by the end of the decade.  It was also during this time that Fromm 
became interested in the sadomasochistic personality type which he later termed 
the “authoritarian character” (Fromm, 1941, chap. V). In this chapter, after a brief 
review of Fromm’s background and his first examination of the authoritarian 
character, I will be laying the groundwork for Fromm’s existential-psychology that 
led to an original theoretical framework of sadomasochism.   
     Fromm’s intellectual roots come from the nineteenth century tradition of 
Geisteswissenschaften, an approach to the study of culture and society “based on 
the broadest possible knowledge of life’s manifestations…[that included the study 
of]… psychology, history, economics, philology, literary criticism, comparative 
religion, and jurisprudence” (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1967, p. 405).  Fromm 
(1932/1970) devised an original social-psychoanalytic method that combined 
Freudian techniques with the ideas of Marx.  He started with the premise that 
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“Freud never assumed isolated man, devoid of all social ties, to be the object of 
psychology” (p. 143); Fromm interpreted individual behavior in reference to the 
patient’s social context.  For Fromm, the psychic life of the individual was 
indivisible from the social context of family, government institutions, and socio-
economic cultural conditions (p. 143).  His unique social-psychoanalytic 
perspective blended humanism and existential thought to address the complex 
questions of what motivates human behavior.  As will be shown throughout this 
chapter, Fromm was able to accomplish a remarkable integration of socio-
philosophical thought with various individual psychological perspectives.  
     In 1927, Fromm joined the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research where he 
conducted a ground-breaking study on the relationship between individual 
character and the political views of German workers.  It was published under the 
title “The Working Class in Weimar Germany: a Psychological and Sociological 
Study” (Fromm, 1929/1984).  This work was important because Fromm found 
strong sadomasochistic tendencies among the majority of German workers prior to 
Hitler’s rise in power.  One might have predicted, as many of Fromm’s Marxist 
peers did, that the liberal German worker would have not been so compliant with 
Nazi authority, but this was not the case according to Fromm’s findings.  Based on 
his findings, Fromm predicted Hitler’s rise to power (Burston, 1991, pp. 109-110).  
Fromm’s Marxist colleagues in the Frankfurt School objected and deplored the 
study because of its finding that the left-wing of the German socialist party was as 
likely to support the political demagoguery of Hitler as the conservative right-wing.  
Fromm left the Frankfurt group in 1938.  His essay, “The Working Class in Weimar 
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Germany: a Psychological and Sociological Study” (Fromm, 1929/1984) was never 
published during his lifetime.  The significant feature of this study in the history of 
theories on sadomasochism is the fact that Fromm developed a sadomasochistic 
personality profile called the “authoritarian-masochistic” character.  His 
conceptualization presaged his later notion of the “authoritarian character” found in 
Escape from freedom (Fromm, 1941).76
     In Section A, Fromm’s major differences with Freud on the primacy of the 
sexual libido and his shift to a different kind of psychoanalytically-informed theory 
of the sadomasochistic character will be explored.  In Section B, the contribution of 
other theorists on Fromm’s thinking will be examined.  I will be pointing out where 
Fromm’s independence as a thinker shines forth and where he seems to integrate 
the ideas of others into his own social-psychological vision.  Section C 
concentrates on Fromm’s disagreements with Reich on the death instinct and its 
implications for differences on Fromm’s theory of sadomasochism.  Finally, in 
section E, Fromm’s call for a theory of love and his existential analysis of Freud’s 
notion of destructiveness will be examined.  The chapter ends with noting the 
arrival of Sartre’s Being and nothingness (1943/1956), which marks the beginning 
of a new era of existential-phenomenological thought on sadomasochism.                    
 
 
 
                                                 
76 Fromm’s study of working class Germans foreshadowed his original approach to character 
development which he later developed in Man for himself (Fromm, 1947).  Fromm’s 
understanding of character is key to being able understanding Fromm’s approach to 
sadomasochism theory. 
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                         Section A: Fromm’s Differences with Freud  
                           Fromm’s  De-centering of the Sexual Libido 
     Despite Fromm’s personal admiration for Freud and his use of psychoanalysis 
as a method, he questioned several fundamental Freudian concepts regarding the 
unconscious.  One concept he challenged was the primacy of the sexual libido in 
psychic life.  Whereas Freud privileged the sexual libido as the ultimate source of 
motivation in the psyche (specifically in his first two theories for sadomasochism), 
Fromm stressed that the self-preservation instincts were primary and less 
malleable than the sexual libido.  Fromm explains this clearly in “The Method and 
Function of an Analytic Social Psychology” (Fromm, 1932/1970, pp. 138-162): 
In order to make as clear as possible that sex instincts can be modified and 
adapted to reality, we must point out certain characteristics which clearly 
distinguish them from the instincts for self-preservation.  For example, unlike 
the instincts for self-preservation, the sex instincts are postponable… 
  …Furthermore, the drives toward self-preservation must be satisfied by real, 
concrete means, while the sex drives can often be satisfied by pure fantasies.  
A man’s hunger can only be satisfied by food; his desire to be loved, 
however, can be satisfied by fantasies about a good and loving God, and his 
sadistic tendencies can be satisfied by sadistic spectacles and phantasies. (p. 
140)  
It is interesting to see in the above passage how Fromm is using his concept of 
the “desire to be loved” as interchangeable with Freud’s idea of the sex drive.  In 
fact, Fromm admitted that he did use an “instinctivist” framework during his early 
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critiques of Freud’s libido theory, which he later recanted (see footnote p. 139).  
Nonetheless, it is evident from this initial critique that Fromm never privileged the 
idea of a pure sexual libido in the unconscious like Freud and other analysts did.  
As the critique shows, not only did Fromm minimize sexuality as the central drive 
for psychic life, he differentiated among the various components of sexuality.  
These include the desire to be loved and the sadistic urges, which are often 
attached to the sexual drive.  Fromm seems to have broken down the concept of 
sexuality into more components and re-configured it as a malleable and 
“postponable” need secondary to the core life-sustaining needs within a broader 
context.  As the passage shows, Fromm seems to have recognized the 
complexity and importance of sexuality without totalizing it as an abstract entity.  
Moreover, Fromm avoids overstating its need for gratification in comparison to 
other human needs: 
Summing up, it can be said that the sexual instincts, which can be postponed, 
repressed, sublimated, and interchanged, are more elastic and flexible than 
the instincts for self-preservation.  The former lean on the latter and follow 
their lead.  The greater flexibility and changeability of the sex instincts does 
not mean that they can be left unsatisfied permanently; there is not only a 
physical but also a psychic minimal existence, and the sex instincts must be 
satisfied to some minimal extent. (p. 141) 
Even before his existential revision of the human needs, Fromm advocated a de-
centering of sex within a natural scientific framework.  He did not take the 
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hierarchical view of Krafft-Ebing, Freud, and other sexologists. 77  Fromm was in 
actuality closer to the philosophy of Schopenhauer and E. von Hartmann 
conceiving the relationship between the sexual passions and the instincts of 
hunger and love, which Krafft-Ebing (1886/1965) opposed (p. xxi).  Fromm was 
not a philosopher and he had yet to develop a concept of love that he would later 
develop into a complete theory.  Nevertheless, his refusal to privilege the sexual 
libido above the survival instincts during a time when it was not politically 
expedient to do so separated him from most of psychoanalytic contemporaries 
(Cushman, 1994, p. 159).   
                 Examining the Philosophical Foundations of Freud’s Theory   
     Although he did not identify himself as a philosopher, Fromm was explicitly 
attuned to the philosophical assumptions behind the psychological ideas that he 
appropriated.   He specifically pointed to the philosophical premises underlying 
Freud’s concept of the unconscious.  While Fromm advocated Freud’s dynamic 
approach to the interpretation of the unconscious, he was critical of Freud’s 
scientistic explanations that emanate from a materialist philosophical underpinning   
implicit in Freud’s drive theory and metapsychology.  In Fromm’s (1970) words:  
Freud was a student of von Brücke, a physiologist who was one of the most 
distinguished representatives of mechanistic materialism, especially in its 
German form.  This type of materialism was based on the principle that all 
psychic phenomena have their roots in certain physiological processes and 
that they can be sufficiently explained and understood if one knows these 
                                                 
77 For a definition of the natural scientific view and Krafft-Ebing’s hierarchical view of the passions 
see page 3 of the Introduction. 
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roots.  Freud, in search of the roots of psychic disturbances, had to look for a 
physiological substrate for the drives; to find this in sexuality was an ideal 
solution, since it corresponded both to the requirements of mechanistic-
materialistic thought and to certain clinical findings in patients of his time and 
class.  It remains, of course, uncertain whether those findings would have 
impressed Freud so deeply if he had not thought within the framework of his 
philosophy; but it can hardly be doubted that his philosophy was an important 
determinant of his theory of drives.  This means that someone with a different 
philosophy will approach his findings with a certain skepticism. (p. 45) 
By underscoring the philosophical foundations embedded in Freud’s theories, 
Fromm demonstrated that Freud’s conclusions were based on historically 
situated concepts that were not transhistorical biological facts.   
     As Roazen (2001) has noted, “Freud… got off on an unfortunate footing when 
he tried to divorce his work from philosophy itself… and […] was repeatedly 
tempted to argue that he had unearthed facts, so called discoveries, which were 
provable” (p. 83).  Freud’s ambition to legitimize psychoanalysis on the basis of 
scientific concepts tended to obscure his use of intuition and philosophical 
speculation.78  At the same time, Fromm (1932/1970) appreciated Freud’s 
importance.  He had great admiration for the founder of psychoanalysis, but he 
also understood Freud’s limitations in regards to his insistence on intrapsychic 
models to explain complex social-psychological phenomena.  This explains why 
Fromm continually pointed to Freud’s use of philosophical speculation whenever  
                                                 
78 Lewin (1937/1999) suggests it is more helpful to read Freud’s method as an anthropological 
approach to human behavior that is successful in advancing the therapeutic aims of 
psychoanalysis (p. 67). 
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making new theoretical claims (p.138).  While Fromm’s critique of Freud never 
was intended to weaken Freud’s influence, Fromm wished to point out that many 
of Freud’s theories were not as conclusive from an empirical-scientific 
perspective as they were taken to be by most of Freud’s followers.  As Fromm 
(1973) later noted, most psychoanalysts who criticized Freud nonetheless 
continued to follow Freud’s lead and the basic assumptions behind his theories 
(pp. 502-503).  By contrast, Fromm’s critique of the philosophical premises 
underlying Freud’s theories suggested that the consideration of social context 
and of a theorist’s own personal convictions are key elements in determining how 
to understand her or his theory for human behavior.   
                          Fromm’s Theory of Character Development  
     Along with his doubts concerning libido theory, Fromm (1934/1970) 
questioned Freud’s belief that character traits were exclusively a function of 
erogenous zone fixation that follows an ontogenetic sequence (p. 128).  Fromm 
(1970/1992) understood individual character as a “particular kind of 
relatedness…to the world outside” (p. 99) that is shaped by social and 
environmental demands of society.  He argued that most members of a group or 
society share a common set of traits that Fromm called a “social character.”  In 
order to comprehend individual character structure, Fromm stressed the 
importance of studying the social character.  As he said in Escape From 
Freedom (Fromm, 1941): 
The character structure of most members of the group are variations of this 
nucleus [core traits], brought about by the accidental factors of birth and life 
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experience as they differ from one individual to another.  If we want to 
understand one individual most fully, these differentiating elements are of the 
greatest importance.  However, if we want to understand how human energy 
is channeled and operates as a productive force in a given social order, then 
the social character deserves our main interest. (p.276) 
While there is a normative reference to the construction of social character in 
Fromm’s conceptualization of individual character development, he did not 
privilege a fixed statistical or a biological norm to establish this idea.  According 
to Fromm, traits may be durable over time, but as an adaptive response to a 
social environment, most (if not all) individual character traits are amenable to 
modification.79  It is also important to differentiate Fromm’s view of character 
development from the concept of behavior.  While behavior refers to an 
observable action, character orientation refers to the source of action that 
underlies behavior.  Another way of stating this is that “character structure 
determines action as well as thoughts and ideas” (Fromm, 1962, p. 74).   
     An example of Fromm’s dynamic understanding of character is found in his 
concepts of “reactive hatred” and “character-conditioned hatred,” which were 
timely social character constructions that he presented when first calling for an 
analysis of love (see Fromm, 1939, pp. 513-517). 80  Fromm depicted reactive 
                                                 
79One gets a sense of optimism in Fromm’s view of character regarding the potential for individual 
change that was absent from contemporaneous deterministic outlooks of unconscious instinct 
theories and behaviorism which were popular during Fromm’s time.   
80 Fromm’s examination of hatred led him to conclude that self-hatred goes more unrecognized 
as a contemporary cultural phenomenon than hatred of others. He equated this with the notion 
that love for others is preferable to self-love which is often portrayed as selfishness or narcissism 
in contemporary culture (Fromm, 1939, p. 521).  Following this examination, Fromm proposed 
that a new theoretical investigation of love is a top priority for psychology.  This will be discussed 
further in Chapter 5 and in the Conclusion of this dissertation. 
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hatred and character-conditioned hatred as distortions of the core human desire 
for love rather than being driven by a biological instinct.  As an example, reactive 
hatred could be seen in the response of many people throughout the world 
following the attack on the World Trade Center in New York City on September 
11, 2001.  The collective hatred towards “terrorists” that quickly ensued was a 
response to having one’s security, ideals, love for other human beings, and an 
overall positive affirmation for life threatened.  It is a protective response to 
aggression that is rooted in a malleable form of self-hatred.  On the other hand, 
character-conditioned hatred is a more durable form of hostility that is rooted in 
early childhood reactions.  The beating of Rodney King, an African-American 
man brutally beaten by four Los Angeles police officers in the early 1990’s, can 
be interpreted as a national display of character-conditioned race hatred on the 
part of the four policemen involved that was captured on videotape and viewed 
by an entire nation.  The body movements, gestures, verbal tauntings, and facial 
expressions of the policemen witnessed in the video, conveyed their sadistic 
satisfaction and pleasure.  It demonstrated a fundamental hostility that was 
grossly out of proportion to the expected police procedure for apprehending 
someone suspected of breaking the law.  “In the case of reactive hatred, [e.g., 
the collective hatred towards the terrorists following the collapse of the World 
Trade Center] it is the situation or event that creates the hatred.  In the case of 
character-conditioned hatred, [i.e., the case of the Rodney King beating] “an 
‘idling’ hostility is actualized by the situation” (Fromm, 1939, p. 514).  These 
incidents are contemporary examples of Fromm’s character formations of hatred 
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which presaged his later sadomasochistic modes of relatedness (Fromm, 1941, 
1956).      
     Putting aside his methodological differences from Freud for the moment, 
Fromm (1973) recognized that his own theory of the sadomasochistic character 
did not make sense without an understanding of Freud’s notion of the “anal 
character” (p. 327).81  According to Freud (1908/1957b), the adult traits of 
orderliness, parsimony and obstinacy develop as a reaction formation or a 
sublimation of an early childhood fixation on anal erotic desires.  Later, Freud 
added punctuality and cleanliness to this syndrome (Fromm, 1973, p. 327).   
     Fromm (1964) considered the anal character type as a partial glimpse of an 
overall “hoarding character” (p. 54) who avoids the risk of being vulnerable to 
other human beings and the outside world.  “The anal-hoarding character has 
only one way to feel safe in his relatedness to the world: by possessing and 
controlling it, since he is incapable of relating himself by love” (Fromm, 1973, p. 
328).  There may or may not be a fixation on anal interests and artifacts such as 
feces, dirt, useless things, and miserliness, etc.  Fromm (1964) understood this 
set of behaviors as a broader symbolic expression of a morbid “general affinity to 
all that is not alive” (p. 54).  The hoarding character type was Fromms reply to 
Freud’s partial libido theory for sadomasochistic character development.82  
Fromm, (1973) viewed the anal-hoarding character type as having “a close 
relationship to sadism as described by classic psychoanalysis” (p. 328).  
                                                 
81The concept of the anal character is found in “Character and Anal Erotism” (Freud, 1908/1957b, 
pp. 169-175). It was later expanded upon by Karl Abraham (1921/1966a).      
82 Again, Freud’s partial libido theory constructed sadomasochism as both a normal and abnormal 
perversion.  The anal character was an abnormal development based on a fixation in the anal 
stage of development “that showed traits of sadism and destructiveness” (Fromm, 1964, p. 54).   
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However, Fromm maintained that “because of the close connection between 
sadism and masochism it is more correct to speak of a sadomasochistic 
character, even though the one or the other aspect will be more dominant in a 
particular person” (p. 326).  
     The “authoritarian character” was the social manifestation of the psychological 
features of Fromm’s sadomasochistic character into a political attitude that 
gained ascendancy throughout Fascist and non-Fascist societies during Fromm’s 
era (p. 326).  Although the authoritarian person may appear “normal” from a 
psychoneurotic perspective on the surface, the sadomasochistic disturbance is in 
actuality found at a more profound level.  Underlying the pathology in Fromm’s 
authoritarian character is a disturbance of the self as opposed to a set of 
biological and or egoistic drives. 83 In Fromm’s (1941) own words: 
Since the term sado-masochistic is associated with ideas of perversion and 
neurosis, I prefer to speak instead of the sado-masochistic character, 
especially when not the neurotic but the normal person is meant, of the 
“authoritarian character.”  This terminology is justifiable because the 
sadomasochistic person is always characterized by his attitude toward 
authority.  He admires authority and tends to submit to it, but at the same time 
he wants to be an authority himself and have others submit to him. (p. 162)    
Fromm’s authoritarian character is a sadomasochist who is part of a social 
sadomasochistic ideology as opposed to an isolated instance of sexual 
perversion.  Fromm’s authoritarian character represents an important turning 
                                                 
83 A “self” implies a concept of the individual with an active sense of agency and responsibility for 
one’s thoughts and behavior.  This is an important difference between Fromm and Freud that will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.   
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point in history of understanding sadomasochism because it showed the 
pathology of sadomasochism to be more widespread than infrequent cases of a 
sexual perversion or a rare character disorder.  This is one reason why Fromm’s 
re-visioning of a theory of character formation has been under-appreciated as a 
contribution in psychology (Roazen, 2001).  Roazen (2001) suggests that 
Fromm’s reading of Freud’s theory of psychosexual development has been vastly 
underrated by most students of psychoanalysis (p. 60).  Part of the contemporary 
lack of appreciation of Fromm’s contribution to character theory may be due, in 
part, to Fromm’s own continued praise of Freud and his attempt to remain within 
a psychoanalytic framework in his later years.  But, I would like to argue that 
underneath Fromm’s “Freud piety” was a visionary who re-interpreted previous 
psychoanalytic conceptualizations of human character with a concern for the 
human values of freedom and love.  Fromm’s conceptualization of character was 
to be a key factor in his theory of sadomasochism because it emphasized the 
importance of social ideology as a source of real human influence to be reckoned 
with on individual character outcomes.  Also, Fromm’s theory of character 
stressed a balanced dialectical exchange between culture and the individual 
person.  Prior to Fromm individual-cultural dialectic theories of character 
development were (i.e., Reich) were one-dimensional and portrayed the 
individual as a helpless reactor to overwhelming cultural forces.   
Other influences, such as Fromm’s humanism, his views on gender, and his 
antipathy towards scientism which will all be discussed below played a big role in 
his turning to a new existential perspective of sadomasochism theory.           
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              Section B: Influences on Fromm’s Theory of Sadomasochism  
                       Fromm’s Humanism: Combining Marx and Freud     
     Fromm (1962) has stated that besides Freud, his biggest influence was Karl 
Marx (p. 3); he saw a common thread of humanism running through their 
theories.  He declared that the “basic element common to both systems is their 
humanism. Humanism in the sense that each man represents all of humanity; 
hence, that there is nothing human which could be alien to him” (p. 17).  He 
situated Marx and Freud in the tradition of the humanism of the Renaissance.  
According to Fromm, both viewed “the unfolding of the total, universal man…to 
be the highest flowering of natural development” (p. 25).  Fromm (1956) also 
emphasized Marx’s interpretation of the concept of love which stressed that love 
is itself recognized when it calls forth further acts of love (pp. 23-24).   
     Fromm considered Marx and Freud to be modern liberators for the person 
trapped by the illusion of individual and social freedom.  For Freud, liberation 
meant self-awareness through an analysis of the personal unconscious.  For 
Marx, it meant freedom from social alienation and economic oppression (p. 14).  
Fromm was convinced that Freud’s method was best suited to examine the 
Marxist principles of culture,84 subject to important modifications.  At a time when 
most analysts considered psychoanalysis and Marxism to be antithetical, Fromm 
was among a handful of thinkers who attempted to bridge a meaningful synthesis 
of these systems.  What distinguished Fromm’s attempt to accomplish this 
synthesis was his high regard for the individual and his focus on self-realization 
                                                 
84 Marx’s view of culture stressed that the economic structure of a society determined its “political 
and legal institutions, its philosophy, art, religion, etc.” (Fromm, 1962, p. 71).   
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(Fromm, 1941, pp. 256-257).  Fromm (1941) credited Freud for creating a system 
that engendered humanistic values.  “Only a dynamic psychology, the 
foundations of which have been laid by Freud, can get further than paying lip 
service to the human factor” (p. 13).  Although he was at times an astute critic of 
Freud, Fromm’s admiration for Freud led to a tendency to credit the father of 
psychoanalysis for some of his own most valuable insights.   
     Fromm’s (1941) humanism stemmed from his belief that each person desires 
to grow and experience themselves as an independent human being who is at 
the same time integrally related with others (p. 256).85  As a psychoanalyst, 
Fromm’s humanistic inclinations can be seen through his endorsement of an 
actively engaged posture with analysands that affirmed the right to each of his 
patient’s happiness (Burston, 1992, p. 212).  Fromm’s stance as an analyst 
contrasted sharply with the posture of the disinterested observer that was 
hegemenous throughout psychoanalytic practice during his era. 
     In Escape From Freedom (1941), Fromm’s humanism is also evident via his 
criticism of contemporaneous models of psychology and sociology that lacked a 
descriptive account of human vitality and agency.  Fromm chaffed at what he 
called the “neglect of the human factor” (p. 12) in the social sciences.  He 
concluded that the common denominator in most theories of human behavior 
was the notion that human nature was passive and lacked significance in terms 
of being able to make an impact on the status quo.  Fromm wrote:    
                                                 
85 Fromm’s humanism can intellectually be differentiated from the American humanism found in 
Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman which stresses self-reliance.  As a European, Fromm’s 
humanism was inspired by thinkers like Meister Eickhart, Spinoza, Marx, and Freud (Burston, 
1991, p. 184). 
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Common to all these theories is the assumption that human nature has no 
dynamism of its own and that psychological changes are to be understood in 
terms of the development of new “habits” as an adaptation to new cultural 
patterns. (pp. 12-13) 
An outstanding feature of Escape from freedom (Fromm, 1941), which will be 
examined in more detail in Chapter 5 is how Fromm injected a new dynamism 
into the portrayal of the individual human being.  Fromm characterized the 
individual as an active, responsible agent who faces daunting challenges in 
everyday social situations, and whose choices affect the course of human 
history.  Before we arrive at that point however, there is another theorist 
besides Freud and Marx who influenced Fromm deeply concerning his view of 
the connection between culture and the human character.  Without a doubt, the 
work of J.J. Bachofen plays an important but quiet role in Erich Fromm’s 
formation of a new theoretical perspective on sadomasochism. 
                                            Fromm and Bachofen  
     Fromm studied the matriarchal theory of J. J. Bachofen (1861).  Bachofen’s 
comparison of patriarchal and matriarchal societies was the subject of one of 
Fromm’s earliest and most provocative essays titled “The Theory of Mother Right 
and its Relevance for Social Psychology”  (Fromm, 1934/1970g, pp. 110-135).  In 
that essay Fromm examined the differences between matriarchal and patriarchal 
cultural influences as they impacted the contemporary individual character.  One 
example of the many insights that Fromm found from study of Bachofen was that: 
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The value system of matriarchal culture fits in with [a] passive surrender to 
mother, nature, and earth and to their central role.  Only the natural and 
biological are worthwhile; the spiritual, cultural, and rational are worthless…In 
contrast with the bourgeois natural law, where “nature” is patriarchal society 
turned into an absolute, matriarchal law is characterized by the dominance of 
instinctual, natural, blood-based values…there is no logical reasonable 
balancing of guilt and atonement. (p. 115) 
As seen in the above passage, Fromm was struck by the differences between 
matriarchal and patriarchal values. A patriarchal cultural mind-set includes 
anxiety, deliberation over action, dependence on fatherly authority, guilt, and 
atonement (p. 124).  Gynocratic (matriarchal) values by contrast, emphasize acts 
of spontaneous love, attachment to blood-bond ties, and “the ‘natural’ principle of 
talion, of returning like for like” (p. 115).    
     Fromm examined contemporary culture in light of Bachofen’s gendered 
societal analyses.  According to Fromm, the social character of his own particular 
era was over-saturated with patriarchal values “for great parts of the lower middle 
class in Germany and other European countries” (Fromm, 1941, p. 162).  The 
“authoritarian character,” which was alluded to earlier 86 is a social prototype of 
patriarchal culture that Fromm believed was at epidemic proportions during the 
rise of Fascism when he wrote Escape from freedom (Fromm, 1941).  The 
authoritarian is recognized by a deference to formal authority and the skillful 
manipulation over the behavior of others, which both suggest magnified 
patriarchal values. 
                                                 
86 See pages 111 and 120  
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     Fromm concluded that Freud’s minimization of the importance of pre-oedipal 
development and his dramatic devaluation of women could not be separated 
from the patriarchal value system that organized his Western bourgeois culture.  
The primary organizing principle behind patriarchal culture is generally 
considered to be the father-son relationship, which forms the template through 
which all forms of relationships are evaluated.  Fromm (1934/1970g) called the 
privileging of the father-son relationship the “patricentric complex” and described 
its social character:  
The patriarchal social structure is closely bound up with the class character of 
present-day society.  This society is based, to an important degree, on 
specific psychic attitudes that are partially rooted in unconscious drives; and 
these psychic attitudes effectively complement the external coerciveness of 
the governmental apparatus.  The patriarchal family is one of the most 
important loci for producing the psychic attitudes that operate to maintain the 
stability of class society. (p. 124)   
Fromm demonstrated that Freud lacked an important critically distant perspective 
towards his own social structure that would have helped him realize the 
limitations of his theories (p. 128).   
     Fromm also criticized Freud’s portrayal of the mother image as a weak, 
sentimental figure and his exclusion of mother-child dynamics in his theory of 
psychosexual development (Fromm, 1934/1970g, pp. 128-132; also see Suttie, 
1935, pp. 215-223).  As a cultural remedy for the contemporary imbalance of 
patricentric values over gynocratic ones, Fromm advocated for the “optimistic 
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trust in mother’s unconditional love, far fewer guilt feelings…and a greater 
capacity for pleasure and happiness” (p. 131).  The myth of Orestes, which 
Fromm appropriated from Bachofen’s interpretation of Aeschylus’ Oresteia 
reflects the matriarchal values found in gynecocratic culture (p. 115).  Orestes 
sought to avenge the murder of his father, King Agamemnon, by killing his 
mother Clytemnestra.  He is temporarily seduced by Clytemnestra’s charms and 
her protestations of love for him which renders Orestes passive until he realizes 
that his mother is dispensing pleasure only as a ploy to keep him under her 
power.  Orestes then summons the strength to strike the fatal blow (May, 1953, 
p. 126).  If one weighs the impact of the myth of Orestes and contrasts it with the 
continued popularity of the myth of Oedipus to explain personality development, 
then Fromm’s point regarding the imbalance between matriarchal and patriarchal 
values in contemporary western bourgeois culture is easily made (see p.128).  
Like Ian Suttie (1935, chap. 14) who also chafed at Freud’s misogyny, Fromm 
espoused the notion that the Oedipus complex and the concept of “penis envy” 
were cultural artifacts (Burston, 1991, p. 50).  Fromm used the ideas of Bachofen 
to inform him how gender bias exists via cultural norms and how accommodation 
to such norms does not necessarily imply a balanced psychosexual perspective 
nor a healthy personality.  This element in Fromm’s thinking led to his 
conceptualization of psychological well-being and human pathology as 
qualititative notions that do not rely on established societal norms as we shall 
see.87   
                                                 
87 Fromm’s (1955) qualitative concept of “normative humanism” (p. 22) will be discussed in 
chapter 5  
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     Fromm’s independent theoretical social vision was complimented by his 
proactive integration of individual relational theories of psychology, which as we 
will see next, took him outside the conventional boundaries of psychoanalytic 
thought on the concepts of ego and personality development.           
                                           Object Relational Insights  
    Alongside his dissatisfaction with libido theory, Fromm showed that he was 
also “involved [with] some prescient reflections on object-relationships” (Burston, 
1991, p. 60).  He sketched a developmental theory based on object-relationships 
that he contrasted with Freud’s psychosexual stages.  What stands out in 
Fromm’s early critique of Freud is a studious sense of caution as he teases apart 
the two approaches and an ability to present an independent theoretical outlook.  
As shown in the passage below, Fromm (1932/1970i) did not automatically 
assume, as other analysts did, that object relations theory was consistent with 
Freud’s psychoanalytic findings.  Fromm wrote: 
 It is important to make a distinction between…erogenous lust and the person’s 
object relationships.  The latter are the person’s (loving or hating) attitudes 
toward himself or other people he encounters; in a word, they are his emotions, 
feelings and attitudes toward the surrounding world in general.  These object 
relationships also have a typical course of development. (p. 167) 
We find Fromm in this early and pivotal essay being very careful to separate lust 
from other human needs.  Another noteworthy feature of Fromm’s perspective 
that immediately shines forth is his sense of the person having a self-view; an 
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awareness of one’s self in relation to others in the world. 88 As Fromm continued, 
he seems to be trying to avoid an explicit rejection of the idea that object-
relationships are fixed to bodily erogenous zones, yet he clearly differentiates 
between orgasmic pleasure and object relationships:    
…These object relationships are seen as having a very close connection with 
erogenous zones…At this point I really do not want to raise the whole 
question as to whether the connection is really as close as much of the 
psychoanalytic literature would have it; nor do I want to consider whether and 
to what extent an object relationship, typical of a particular erogenous zone, 
can also develop independently of the particular fate of that zone.  So let me 
just lay stress on the importance of making a basic distinction between organ 
pleasure and object relationships. (p. 167) 
As suggested in the above passage, Fromm emphasizes object relational 
dynamics as strategies that meet physical and emotional needs (and not strictly 
sexual ones).  Fromm was not part of the British psychoanalytic school, which 
included Melanie Klein and Ronald Fairburn and later became known as the 
object-relations school.  At the same time, Fromm’s views on character showed 
some convergence with the object-relational concepts of Fairburn (see Burston, 
1991, p. 62).     
     When one takes examples from Fromm’s (1941) later object-relational 
descriptions of sadomasochistic dynamics in his writings on different character 
                                                 
88 I believe that one can see in Fromm’s language even at this early stage of his career a 
grounding in existential and self/other relational thought. For example, Fromm uses the term 
“encounter” to depict an awareness of one’s self in relation to other people and things in the world 
which has a distinctly existential and relational structure to it.          
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types however, there is a distinctive sense of Fromm’s existential-humanistic 
inclinations.  A good example is found in Fromm’s description of symbiosis.89 
Fromm writes:  
Symbiosis…means the union of one individual self with another self (or any 
other power outside of the own self) in such a way to make each lose the 
integrity of its own self and to make completely dependent on each other (p. 
157).   
In the very next line we find Fromm stating that, “the sadistic person needs his 
object just as much as the masochistic needs his” (p. 157).  One can see here 
that Fromm is using object-relational language to depict how human beings can 
objectify one another in sadomasochistic relationships.90  This was clearly 
different from other contemporaneous object-relational models in psychoanalysis.  
While Fromm was cognizant of the object-relational school of psychoanalysis and 
had some convergence with Fairburn’s relational focus on those dynamics, 
ultimately Fromm’s use of object-relational thought was original and strongly 
influenced by his existential-humanistic disposition.  In the next section we will 
explore how Fromm borrowed from other individual psychologies and integrated 
them into his existential-humanistic theoretical framework of sadomasochism. 
                                     Interpersonal Psychology 
     In Escape from freedom (Fromm, 1941), Fromm shows how he was 
influenced by the interpersonal psychologies of Karen Horney (1937) and Harry 
                                                 
89 Symbiosis will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 5 
90 Fromm’s use of object-relational language to depict symbiosis is actually highly evocative of 
Martin Buber’s (1958) existential “I-it” dialogical structure. The “I-it,” mode (in contrast to “I-thou”) 
refers to the separation of the human body from its surrounding lived-world context.  All 
sadomasochistic relations are inherently objectified (‘I-it”) relationships.  
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Stack Sullivan (1953).  Fromm (1941) mentions how he and Horney bobth 
rejected the intrapsychic libido explanation for neurosis (p. 140).  Fromm also 
credits Horney for pointing out the masochistic tendencies in the neurotic 
personality (p. 149) and for articulating the milder forms of sadomasochistic 
behavior in the everyday custom of deferring to authority figures (p. 172).   
     Fromm (1941) also expresses solidarity with Sullivan’s idea “that individual 
psychology is fundamentally social psychology” (p. 288).  He points out how 
Sullivan supported his view that “man is primarily a social being, and not, as 
Freud assumes, primarily self-sufficient and only secondarily in need of others in 
order to satisfy his instinctual needs” (p. 288).  However, despite his many 
convergences with Sullivan and Horney, Fromm stood apart from them when 
proposing the concept of existential aloneness;  it hinted at a philosophical-
anthropological foundation embedded in Fromm’s concept of anxiety that is 
absent from Sullivan’s or Horney’s theories.  His position on existential aloneness 
separated Fromm from most psychoanalytic and social science thinkers of his 
era.  At the same time, Fromm (1973) made a point of separating his existential 
psychological concepts from the existential philosophy of Sartre and Heidegger 
(p. 27).     
 
Section C: Fromm’s Rejection of the Death Instinct and His Differences with Reich                
                    Fromm’s First Misgivings about Freud’s Death Instinct      
     Prior to Fromm, there is little question that Freud’s theory of the death instinct 
for primary masochism caused the biggest stir in sadomasochism theory since 
 131
Krafft-Ebing.  Fromm’s (1932/1970) immediate response to Freud’s new theory 
for sadomasochism was one of doubt:  
Impressed by the libidinal admixtures in the instincts for self-preservation and 
the special significance of the destructive tendencies, Freud has modified his 
original position.  Over against the life-maintaining [erotic] instincts, he now 
sets the death instinct.  Significant as Freud’s argument is for this modification 
in his original position, it is far more speculative and less empirical than his 
original position.  To me it seems to rest upon an intermingling of biological 
data and psychological tendencies, an intermingling that Freud has otherwise 
avoided. (p. 138) 
As seen in the above passage, Fromm was critical of Freud’s use of dualities and 
his increasing speculative psychobiology. 91  He understood quite well the 
philosophical underpinnings of Freud’s concepts and was familiar with other 
systems of thought.  As a result, Fromm was able to bring a level of depth and 
insight to his criticisms of the death instinct that stood apart from other rejections 
of the death instinct (Robinson, 1969, p. 47). 92
     While Fromm was aware of the limitations of Freud’s theory of the death 
instinct, he never losing sight of the deeper significance of Freud’s thought that 
underscored the essential struggle of life and death forces at the core of psychic 
life.  However, as the following synopsis suggests, Fromm (1941) never 
subscribed to Freud’s biologism which he used to explain destructive impulses:  
                                                 
91Freud’s use of dualities and speculation was discussed in Chapter 2. Also, see Holt (1989, pp. 
42-43). 
92 Lewin (1937/1999) has noted problems with Freudian psychoanalytic concepts in a similar way. 
He called them “a body of ideas rather than a system of theories and concepts” (p. 68).    
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The assumption of the death-instinct is satisfactory inasmuch 
as it takes into consideration the full weight of destructive tendencies, which 
had been neglected in Freud’s earlier theories.  But it is not satisfactory 
inasmuch as it resorts to a biological explanation that fails to take account 
sufficiently of the fact that the amount of destructiveness varies enormously 
among individuals and social groups. (pp. 180-181) 
Fromm developed his own concept of destructiveness into a major mechanism of 
escape.  He rooted it in the existential condition of “the unbearableness of 
individual powerlessness and isolation” (Fromm, 1941, p. 177).  Fromm’s 
interpretation of Freud’s notion of destructiveness embedded in his theories of 
sadomasochism is an indication of Fromm’s growing existential outlook which 
was becoming more explicit and attached to his theoretical framework of 
sadomasochistic dynamics.  I would now like to contrast Fromm’s critique of 
Freud’s death instinct with Wilhelm Reich’s contemporaneous critique of the 
same doctrine in order to show how Fromm’s unique existentialist perspective 
became explicit and separated from the scientism embedded in Reich’s (and 
others) psychoanalytic approaches to sadomasochism.  
Implications of Fromm’s Differences with Reich on His Theory of Sadomasochism 
     Reich was another vocal critic of Freud’s death instinct (Robinson, 1969, pp. 
31-38).  Like Fromm, he protested Freud’s penchant for depicting socio-historical 
processes by referencing the psychological tendencies of modern day neurotics.  
Both Fromm and Reich had “a keen appreciation for the role of the family, 
education, and religion in inculcating the attitudes and inhibitions that foster 
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widespread compliance to class rule and apathy or hostility toward social 
change” (Burston, 1991, p. 31).  Beyond these similarities, Fromm and Reich had 
very different approaches in their disagreements with Freud.   
     Reich saw no need for a theory of a death instinct.  In his view, sex-negating 
messages from the culture censor the ego and act as a destructive, “death-like” 
force to a healthy sexual libido.  Reich’s theory of the libido however, did build 
upon Freud’s first libido theory of sadomasochism.  Reich envisioned an 
intrapsychic genital libido seeking satisfaction from the environment.  When 
frustrated, the genital libido tends to re-cathect to earlier libidinal stages or 
“zones.”  This scientistic notion of the genital libido by Reich shows how much 
closer he was to Freud’s theoretical style than Fromm was because Reich 
subscribed to the rigid notion of fixation to specific bodily erogenous zones and 
an almost literal idea of regression (see Robinson, 1969, p. 47).  Reich’s critique 
of the death instinct really parted company with Freud only on the question of 
location for the source of destructiveness.  Reich viewed the source of 
destruction coming from a single source in the external environment (i.e., the 
inhibitory sex-negating messages of society) and acting as an overwhelming 
force that overtakes the intrapsychic libido.  Reich’s vision of the intrapyschic 
libido was a helpless, dependent, entity that absorbed sadistic pain.  As Reich 
(1932/1946) stated :  
The original genetic formula [e.g. Freud’s theory of the actual neuroses] of 
the neurosis is still correct: the neurosis develops from a conflict between 
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sexual drive and fear of actual punishment at the hands of an authoritarian 
society. … 
Thus, the hypothesis of the death instinct makes one forget completely that 
the “inner mechanisms” which constitute an antithesis to sexuality are moral 
inhibitions which represent the prohibitions imposed by the outer world, by 
society. (p. 209)         
Reich never got past the idea of two separate psychic entities (the individual and 
society respectively) being at war with each other to depict sadomasochistic 
processes.93  Either the sex-negating environment wins (which for Reich was 
always the case in patriarchal systems) or the intrapsychic libido is free to follow 
its genital needs. 
     While Fromm (1934/1970g) agreed with Reich that the impact of a sex-
negating culture had debilitating consequences for the individual, Fromm viewed 
each individual (and her or his psychic processes) as an active agent in a more 
human dialectical relationship with the culture.  Furthermore, Fromm did not need 
to revive Freud’s theory of the “actual neuroses,” which would have implied a 
commitment to mechanistic materialism (p. 126).  Nonetheless, if one takes a 
look at Fromm’s (1934/1970g) remarks on sex-negating culture, one can see 
important points of convergence with Reich.  Fromm agreed that culture played a 
major role in either facilitating or inhibiting sexual satisfaction.  In 1934, for 
example, Fromm wrote:  
                                                 
93 Reich’s model for sadomasochism like Freud’s model is a “dialectic of control” (Benjamin, 
1988, p. 53) that can never be    
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Sexuality offers one of the most elementary and powerful opportunities for 
satisfaction and happiness.  If it were permitted to the full extent required for 
the productive development of the human personality, rather than limited by 
the need to maintain control over the masses, the fulfillment of this important 
opportunity for happiness would lead to intensified demands for satisfaction in 
other areas of life… The development of the “genital character” is conditioned 
by the absence of sexual restraints, which impede the optimal development of 
a person. Among the qualities…is a psychic and intellectual independence, 
whose social relevance needs no further emphasis. (p. 126)      
Fromm’s “genital character” contrasted with Reich’s scientistic genital libido; it 
was less of a literal formulation that did not place as much emphasis on orgasm 
as the expression of genital sexuality.  Fromm (1969/1992c) later credited Reich 
for taking “into account the quality of the orgastic experience, not just its 
effectiveness” (p. 88).  But if one looks closer, Fromm’s notion of the genital 
character in the end is more humanistic and diversified when compared with 
Reich’s scientistic explanations for the genital libido.   
     The theoretical differences between Reich and Fromm cited above are 
germane to their respective ideas of sadomasochism.  For Reich, 
sadomasochism was viewed as a psychoneurosis.  For Fromm, sadomasochism 
is a character disorder based on existential realities such as the condition of 
having to deal with separateness from others in the world.  Another important 
difference is that Reich privileged sexuality at the core of his theory for 
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sadomasochism whereas Fromm’s model acknowledged sexuality without 
privileging it as the primary passion driving sadomasochism.   
 
  Section D: Erich Fromm’s Call for an Analysis of Love and Sadomasochistic             
             Pseudo-Love and His Existential Analysis of Destructiveness  
     It is interesting to note that at the same time Fromm’s interest in the 
authoritarian character was growing alongside his de-emphasis on the primacy of 
sexual needs in human character development, his interest was increasing on 
the subject and theory of love.  In “Selfishness and Self-Love” (Fromm, 1939, pp. 
507-523) we find Fromm calling for a psychological analysis of love and its 
masochistic and sadistic “pseudo-love” substitutes (p. 518).  Fromm wrote: 
There is no word in our language which has been so much misused and 
prostituted as the word “love”… it has been used …to force people into 
sacrificing their own happiness, into submitting their whole self to those who 
who profited from this surrender… Yet a psychologist may not properly 
succumb to this embarrassment…to make a…critical analysis of the 
phenomenon of love and to unmask pseudo-love─ is an obligation that the 
psychologist has no right to avoid. (p. 518) 
Following his call for an analysis of love, Fromm classified two different (passive 
and active) types of pseudo-love called “symbiosis” (p. 518) which he initially 
defined as “a basic inability to be independent” (p. 518).  After examining some 
contemporary examples of “sadistic” and “masochistic” pseudo-love, Fromm 
wrote, “It appears from what has been said that love cannot be separated from 
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freedom and independence” (p. 518).  With this last statement, Fromm was 
clearly attaching the notions of love and freedom together as a cohesive premise 
from which sadomasochistic behaviors and tendencies could be explored.    
     In Fromm’s next publication, Escape from freedom (Fromm, 1941) we find his 
first explicit existential critique of Freud’s death instinct and the beginning outline 
of a new existential-humanistic theoretical framework for sadomasochism.  One 
outstanding feature of Fromm’s critique of Freud’s death instinct was how he was 
able to step outside of the hegemony of scientism and infuse an original 
existential outlook into his discourse on sadomasochism. 94  A closer look at 
Fromm’s (1941) brief de-constructive analysis of Freud’s concept of 
“destructiveness” really marks the moment that an existential and humanistic 
psychological framework of sadomasochism arrived in the history of 
sadomasochism theory.  He starts out with a concise review of each of Freud’s 
three phases of theories of sadomasochism in Escape from freedom (Fromm, 
1941, pp. 147-148) and it is worth a closer look.95  As seen in the passage 
below, Fromm offers a perceptive summary of Freud’s early formulations on 
sadomasochism noting how he abandoned the sexual drive as the primary cause 
for sadomasochism.  Fromm writes: 
Freud…originally thought that sado-masochism was essentially a sexual 
phenomenon.  Observing…practices in little children, he assumed that sado-
                                                 
94 Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and nothingness (Sartre, 1941/1956, part III, chap. 1) offered another 
existential examination of sadomasochism from a philosophical standpoint during the same year 
that Fromm (1941) published Escape from freedom. 
95 Most of Fromm’s passage on Freud is included to highlight the point where he moves away 
from summarizing Freud’s theories and onto his insertion of a new existential perspective on the 
theme of destructiveness. 
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masochism was a “partial-drive” which regularly appears in the development 
of the sexual instinct…[and] that sado-masochistic tendencies are due to a 
fixation on an early level or to a later regression to it. (p. 147) 
Fromm next continued with a summary of Freud’s second phase, focusing on the 
major assumption of a primary death instinct to shift to a primary masochism 
theory for sadomasochism.  Fromm (1941) continues:     
Assuming that there is a biological tendency to destroy which can be directed 
either against others or against oneself, Freud suggested that masochism is 
essentially the product of this so-called death instinct. …He further suggested 
that this death-instinct, which we cannot observe directly, amalgamates itself 
with the sexual instinct and in the amalgamation appears as masochism if 
directed against one’s own person, and sadism if directed against others. (p. 
147) 
Unlike other Freudian critics who continued to maintain a separate mind-set 
about masochistic and sadistic processes, we see Fromm’s fluid interchangeable 
vision of sadomasochism as a phenomenon unto itself shining forth in the above 
passage. In the very next line, we find Fromm addressing Freud’s notion of  
destructiveness behind his theory of sadomasochism: 
In short, according to Freud man has only the choice of either destroying 
himself or destroying others, if he fails to amalgamate destructiveness with 
sex. [italics added] This theory is basically different from Freud’s original 
assumption about sado-masochism.  There, sado-masochism was essentially 
a sexual phenomenon, but in the newer theory it is essentially a nonsexual 
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phenomenon, the sexual factor in it being only due to the amalgamation of the 
death-instinct with the sexual instinct. (pp. 147-148)      
The italics show where Fromm first introduces the idea of human choice in 
reference to the destructive instincts that propel sadomasochism.  Fromm was 
offering a definite alternative to the scientistic formulation of sadomasochism that 
Freud was perpetuating for most of the first half of the 20th century.  Although 
Fromm’s highlighting of the notion of choice as seen above was a typically 
humanist and existentialist gesture on his part, I submit that his insertion of the 
existential theme in his criticism of Freud’s death instinct was a momentous 
occasion in the history of sadomasochism theory.  We see Fromm’s “existential 
turn” rescuing the theory of sadomasochism from the clutches of impersonal 
scientism threatening to marginalize sadomasochism into a rare sexual 
perversion that is irrelevant in the lives of most people.  Fromm’s critique which 
placed human subjectivity at the center of sadomasochism theory supplanted the 
excessive abstractionism that was losing site of sadomasochism at that time.  
Instead of burying sadomasochism theory with biological drives and sexual 
transgressions, Fromm showed that sadomasochism strikes at the very core of 
what it means to love others as well as to love one’s self.  He also attached the 
concepts of human freedom and personal responsibility to his notion of love and 
then integrated them into a theory of sadomasochism.  I do not believe that Erich 
Fromm gets enough credit for saving sadomasochism from drifting into scientistic 
obscurantism at this point in the history of psychology.  “Selfishness and Self-
Love” (Fromm, 1939, pp. 507-523) not only pointed out that deeper and more 
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serious issues besides sex are involved in sadomasochism.  Fromm started to 
develop a viable theoretical framework based on deeper human needs and 
values that shed light on sadomasochism.  Up until then, only Freud’s 
investigation of moral masochism and Reich’s Freudo-Marxist cultural theory 
suggested that sadomasochism was important beyond its manifestation as a rare 
sexual perversion.  However, both of those theorists remained fixed on a primary 
sexual theory to explain sadomasochism.  It is important to note that Fromm 
raised the issues of love, freedom, and responsibility in conjunction with 
sadomasochism during a time when the themes of love, personal responsibility, 
and freedom were still considered solely to be within the purview of philosophy 
and ethics.       
     Fromm began blending his existential-humanistic insights with a psycho-
analytically informed  appreciation of human character that led to a new 
nosography of sadomasochistic syndromes called “mechanisms of escape” 
which will be explored in chapter 5.  In Escape from freedom (Fromm, 1941) 
Fromm introduced the mechanisms of escape and in The Art of Loving (Fromm, 
1956) he explicated them further.                                       
     The shift in Fromm’s thinking on sadomasochism really began with his 
dissatisfaction of Freud’s libido theory and his de-emphasis on the primacy of 
sexual needs to explain human character.  Fromm’s theory of character 
formation, which tends to still be overlooked today, was another factor that led 
him to a different existential-social-humanistic theoretical outlook on 
sadomasochism.  The big “existential turn” in psychoanalysis came when Fromm 
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inserted the concept of choice into his critique of Freud’s death instinct and called 
for a theory of love.  Fromm’s publications of “Selfisness and Self-Love” (1939) 
followed by Escape from freedom (Fromm, 1941) and The Art of Loving (Fromm, 
1956) are the first sources that present a theory of sadomasochism based on 
existential-humanistic principles of psychology informed from a psychoanalytic 
perspective.  These works will be highlighted in the next chapter. 
     Sartre’s ‘Being and Nothingness’ and a New Era of Sadomasochism Theory   
      At about the same time that Fromm was calling for a psychological theory of 
love and examining sadomasochism from the perspective of existential and 
humanistic principles, Jean-Paul Sartre was investigating human relations from a 
rich phenomenological perspective called “the look” in Being and nothingness 
(Sartre, 1943/1956, chap. 3) which featured masochism and sadism as central 
themes.  Sartre proposed the look as an ontological foundation of human 
relations which renders all experience possible and his writings on the look 
extended the theoretical discourse on sadomasochism beyond psychoanalysis 
and traditional psychology.96   After Sartre, other existential-phenomenological 
thinkers followed his lead and shed new light on the pervasiveness of 
sadomasochistic relations in everyday life in important ways.  In chapter 5 we will 
be taking a closer look at the theories of Fromm, Sartre, and the post-Sartreans 
in terms of their similarities, differences, and overall contributions to the history of 
sadomasochism theory.  
      
                                                 
96 Although Sartre is a philosopher, he provides insights on sadomasochism that continue to have 
relevance from a psychological perspective which will be explored in Chapter 5. 
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                                                         CHAPTER 5 
             Fromm’s, Sartre’s, and Post-Sartrean Theories of Sadomasochism:
                                    A Comparison of Existential Approaches 
  
                                                        Introduction 
      
     In this last chapter, I will examine the existential approaches to sadomasochism of 
Erich Fromm, Jean-Paul Sartre, and various post-Sartrean existential-
phenomenological thinkers.  Because Fromm was a trained psychoanalyst with a 
background in sociology, his social-psychoanalytic perspective on sadomasochism 
differs from Sartre’s philosophical examination of sadomasochistic relations.  Despite 
their considerable differences, I hope to demonstrate that their similarities as 
existential thinkers and critics of scientism had a beneficial impact on current day 
sadomasochism theory.  Each theorist de-centered sexuality as the primary source of 
sadomasochism and stressed the primacy of sociality at the heart of sadomasochistic 
relations.  Up until the time of Fromm and Sartre, no one had addressed to the level of 
depth and inclusiveness the idea of de-centering sexuality in a theory of 
sadomasochism since Freud first suggested that sexuality might be loosened as a 
strict causal theory for moral masochism.            
     I will first, in section A of this chapter, examine the existential foundations 
embedded in Erich Fromm’s concept of love that became the theoretical framework for 
his conceptualization of sadomasochism.  Included in section A is a discussion of 
Fromm’s “mechanisms of escape” which offers a psychological nosology for different 
types of sadomasochistic relationships.  Section B examines Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
existential-phenomenological ontology of sadomasochistic relations, while section C 
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explores the ways in which post-Sartrean psychoanalysts and philosophers, such as 
Franz Fanon and Simone DeBeauvoir brought to light the pervasiveness of 
sadomasochistic dynamics that are embedded in the social context of race and 
gender relations.  Section C also includes an examination of Medard Boss’s 
daseinsanalytic theory of love based on the existential-phenomenological insights of 
Martin Heidegger (1927/1962).  Boss’s case study on sadomasochism is included to 
demonstrate the contributions that daseinsanalysis had on the psychotherapeutic 
treatment of sadomasochism.   
     Finally, in section D, after each existential thinker’s contributions are examined, I 
will compare the major similarities and differences between Fromm’s and Sartre’s 
perspectives of self/other relationships and their configurations of subjectivity as it 
affects their respective theories of sadomasochism.  My analysis of Fromm and Sartre 
will bring chapter 5 to a close.   
 
 
                          Section A: Fromm’s Theory of Sadomasochism 
 
Existential Foundations  
                                                                                                        
     Erich Fromm was the first psychologist to take the view that sadomasochism 
is a perversion of the human capacity to love.  For Fromm, sadomasochism is 
more than an erotic disturbance.  In one of his earliest reflections on the 
differences between love and symbiotic (sadomasochistic) pseudo-love, Fromm 
(1939) outlined a preliminary sketch of “existential aloneness” as a conceptual 
foundation that is intrinsic to his theory of love.  Fromm believed existential 
aloneness to be a universal condition that each human being must learn to face 
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and overcome in a productive way.  As Fromm viewed it, the ability to overcome 
existential aloneness allows one the possibility to achieve an authentic and 
mature love with another person.  In “Selfishness and Self Love” (Fromm, 1939, 
pp. 507-523), he wrote:  
It appears. . . that love cannot be separated from freedom and independence.  
In contradiction to the symbiotic pseudo-love, the basic premise of love is 
freedom and equality.  Its premise is strength, independence, integrity of the 
self, which can stand alone and bear solitude.  This premise holds true for the 
loving as well as for the loved person. (p. 518) 
Fromm’s premise of love, as explicitly stated in the above passage is indivisible 
from freedom and independence, and it contrasts sharply with what he called 
“symbiotic pseudo-love” (p. 519).  Fromm equated symbiosis,97 or pseudo-love, 
with sadomasochism.  According to Fromm, sadomasochistic love is borne out of 
the inability to stand alone and bear solitude.  When one is able to embrace his 
or her aloneness in the world, then the capacity to love another person 
increases; when one seeks to escape the anxiety that accompanies being alone,  
a collapse into sadomasochistic attachments is inevitable.  Although Fromm does 
not use the same philosophical language, a closer examination of the principles 
embedded in his conceptualization of love and independence (freedom) shares 
points of convergence with the existential-phenomenological thought of Martin 
Heidegger (1927/1962) and Jean-Paul Sartre (1943/1956) as will be examined 
next. 
 
                                                 
97 Symbiosis is discussed in part 2 of this chapter 
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Thrownness and Facticity 
     The starting point for Fromm’s outlook on humanity begins with the universally 
given condition of “thrownness,” 98 which he explained in The Art of Loving 
(Fromm, 1956) in a straightforward manner.  Fromm wrote: 
When man is born, the human race as well as the individual, he is thrown  
out of a situation which was definite, as definite as the instincts, into a 
situation which is indefinite, uncertain and open. . . 
     . . . this awareness of himself as a separate entity. . .makes his life an 
unbearable prison. . . 
      The experience of separateness arouses anxiety; it is indeed the source 
of all anxiety. (pp. 7-8) 99
Although not explicit in philosophical terms, there is another crucial principle of 
existential thought embedded in the above quote by Fromm besides thrownness.  
First, the fact that we are thrown into a condition of uncertainty from certainty as 
Fromm puts it, points at the limits of our control over our existence (Cohn, 1997, 
p. 13).  Throughout life, from birth onwards we find ourselves in situations that 
are not of our own choosing (thrownness), and this brings us into contact with the 
                                                 
98 The term “thrownness” (‘Geworfenheit’) was used by Heidegger to describe the unveiling of 
Dasein, usually translated as “being there” (Cohn, 1997, p. 12).  As Heidegger (1927/1962 stated, 
“we call it the “thrownness”1of this entity into its “there”; indeed it is thrown in such a way that, as 
Being-in-the-world, it is the “there” (p. 135).  Thrownness is a reminder of the limits of control that 
each of us has over the terms of our own existence (Cohn, 1997, p. 13). 
99 Fromm’s use of the possessive term “man” is a recognized convention in early and mid- 
twentieth-century psychological discourse that assumes a privileged male perspective in 
psychology and the sciences.  A distinction should be made, however, between Fromm’s 
perspective and the patriarchal attitude which suffused other natural scientific theories of 
sadomasochism during Fromm’s era.  While natural science theories typically rendered the 
feminine invisible, Fromm’s notion of femininity explicitly acknowledged the idea of inherent 
affirmative otherness as something more than a desire to act and behave the same as males 
(see Fromm, 1934/1970, pp. 116-117).       
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factical100 conditions of our life.  “Facticity” includes our past history, which 
cannot be changed, although our response to it can change (Cohn, 1997, p. 13).   
If we do not come to terms with these factical conditions, then the likelihood of 
our being able to accept ourselves and others in a loving and wholesome manner 
is compromised.  Consequently, according to Fromm, the stage is then set for 
the inevitable disintegration into sadomasochistic attachments.  When we 
recognize the fact of our helplessness in the face of our factical limitations 
embedded in our being thrown into the un-chosen circumstances of our life, then 
the ability to love ourselves and others is enhanced.   
     Fromm meant to call attention to the factical conditions of existence that 
presents an inherently psychological problem for each human being.  Whether we 
have the conscious experience of having chosen it to be this way or not 
(thrownness), each of us has to deal with an assorted and yet specific range of 
desires that are also rooted in the very fact of our existence called the “existential 
needs” (Fromm, 1955, chap. 3).  First of all, there is the primary need for 
relatedness, which is “the need [that] is behind all phenomena…[it] constitute[s] the 
whole gamut of intimate human relations, of all passions which are called love in 
the broadest sense of the word” (p. 36).  This is followed by the need for 
transcendence (creativity vs. destructiveness), rootedness (brotherliness vs. 
                                                 
100Facticity is central to the existential-phenomenology of Sartre and Heidegger.  Sartre 
(1941/1956) writes, “the facticity of freedom is the fact that freedom is not able to be free” (p. 
802). Heidegger (1927/1962) defines facticity as a way of being-in-the-world that “understands 
itself bound up in its destiny with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own 
world” (p. 56).  Fromm (1973) referred to the existentialism of Sarte (and Heidegger) as 
“abstraction[s] arrived at by the way of metaphysical speculations” (p. 27).  However, one can 
argue that Fromm’s use of thrownness and facticity are ontological principles of human existence 
which are at least partially convergent with the existential-phenomenology of Sartre and 
Heidegger.  
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incest), a sense of identity (individuality vs. herd conformity), and the need for a 
frame of orientation and devotion (reason vs. irrationality). 101  As Fromm 
understood well, the fulfillment of these needs for each person will vary according 
to an individual’s particular social-historical context and his or her own innate 
characteristics.  What is important to stress here however, is that the existential 
needs signify a human striving for fulfillment that is borne out of an awareness of 
being thrown into an uncertain existence and an apprehension of our factical 
condition of separateness from others in the world (Fromm, 1956, pp. 9-10).  
     Through reason, we come to accept our factical nature and along with this 
comes the painful awareness that we are separate from others and from the 
things of the world around us.  We now turn to this next crucial existential 
component of Fromm’s psychology.   
Existential Aloneness 
     According to Fromm (1941), sadomasochistic impulses are “not rooted in 
bodily processes but in the very essence of the human mode and the practice of 
life: the need to be related to the world outside oneself, the need to avoid 
aloneness” (p. 17).  Rather than focus on the transformations and displacements 
of the sexual libido to explain sadomasochistic attachments, Fromm examined 
the ways in which human beings -- as individuals and as part of the culture – 
attempt to deal with the daunting challenge of “existential aloneness.”  Existential 
aloneness presents each person with a life-long challenge:  Unless we reach out 
and attempt to join with others -- at least in a minimal way -- life will turn into an 
unbearable prison that leads to insanity (Fromm, 1956, p. 9).  Another way of 
                                                 
101 For a further discussion of the existential needs see The sane society (Fromm, 1955, chap. 3). 
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stating this idea is that as each of us comes to realize that we are helpless 
against the forces of nature and society and unable to control the terms of our 
existence, a sense of anxiety ensues.  As Fromm described it, “to be separate 
means to be helpless, unable to grasp the world -- things and people -- actively; it 
means that the world can invade me without my ability to react” (p. 8). 
     The anxiety aroused by the experience of separateness is at the core of our 
being, according to Fromm.  This anxiety impels us to seek out a source of relief 
that is constant and unaffected by the vagaries of interpersonal relationships or 
inhibiting social forces or circumstances.102  Fromm (1955) asserted that it is 
necessary to attempt to overcome separateness and unite with others in some 
capacity; otherwise, madness ensues (p. 36).  For example, in certain psychotic 
states, the need to withdraw from others and the outside world can be so deep-
seated that the psyche will deny their existence altogether.  Conversely, one 
could psychologically inflate one’s sense of self so much that a delusional feeling 
of omnipotence could develop that makes the outside world appear so small that 
any threat of being invaded by another is removed.103   
     According to Fromm, most people develop at least a modicum of individuation 
based on a capacity to tolerate some separateness and to bear solitude.  Fromm 
stressed however, that the degree to which a human being can embrace her or 
                                                 
102 Karen Horney’s (1945) concept of “basic anxiety” and H.S. Sullivan’s (1953) interpersonal 
model for anxiety were two other contemporaneous models of anxiety that looked at cultural 
influences and are often thought to be based on the same premises as Fromm’s model because 
of their shared rejection of Freud’s theory of anxiety.  The key difference, however, is that 
Fromm’s theory of anxiety is based on existential aloneness.      
103 These extreme forms of withdrawal and psychological inflation in response to existential 
aloneness, which are consistent with psychotic states, were considered by Fromm to have very 
minor social consequences.  He considered the more ordinary methods of escape, such as herd 
conformity and orgiastic rituals, which will be discussed later in this chapter to be more culturally 
significant (Fromm, 1941, p. 183).    
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his individual separateness is crucial towards being able to achieve a meaningful 
union with another person.  If the escape from existential aloneness precedes the 
formation of a grounded sense of self, then panic and threat ensues, which 
engenders sadomasochistic attachments. Herein lies the problem of existential 
aloneness as it relates to sadomasochism theory.  It is the fleeing from 
aloneness that generates the desire to submerge the self with others and/or with 
the things of the world so that we can be relieved from the unbearability of 
anxiety and panic that is set off by each person’s sense of isolation (Fromm, 
1941, pp. 139-140).  In mature loving relationships, which Fromm noted to be 
rare, one can see an inner foundation of strength and integrity of character 
stemming from the capacity to tolerate anxiety and face the uncertainty of 
existential aloneness (p. 29).   
     Another feature of existential aloneness is how it can lead to the disavowal of 
responsibility for making our own interpretations in the world.  According to 
Fromm (1956), rather than bear the experience of a disunited, separate 
existence from others, most human beings are overtaken or “invaded” by the 
interpretation of what other people hold to be true about the world (p. 8).  There is 
a sense of helplessness that leads the person to yield to others and things 
surrounding her or him and to see “that the world can invade me without my 
ability to react” (p. 8).104  Fromm stresses that it is easier to allow others to 
                                                 
104 If one accepts the idea that the fear of separateness is an extension of a fear of death or 
annihilation, then Fromm’s description of helplessness in the face of being overtaken by the 
opinion of others is reminiscent of Heidegger’s (1927/1962) notion of “falling” into the “Everyday-
Being-towards-Death”  (p. 254). “As falling, everyday Being-towards-death is a constant fleeing in 
the face of death …[and] has the mode of evasion in the face of It ─ giving new explanations for 
it, understanding it inauthentically, and concealing it” (p. 254).  
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interpret the meaning of our existence than it is to do the daunting work of 
creating our own interpretations based on an authentic reckoning with our given 
condition of aloneness in the world.  
     As each person tries to come to terms with her or his existential aloneness 
there are many choices that are available which provide possible solutions; but 
they are not limitless.  Fromm focused on the failed solutions (methods of 
escape) to the primary need of overcoming separateness and achieving union 
with others in order to explain sadomasochism.  What is interesting is how 
Fromm’s methods of escape can serve as a system that differentiates among 
different types of sadomasochistic relationships that occur on an everyday basis 
alongside of the more atypical clinical disorders.  Next, we will examine the five 
major mechanisms of escape that Fromm explicated which all have a bearing on 
sadomasochistic outcomes.   
                                  Fromm’s Mechanisms of Escape:   
     A Different Psychological Nosography of Sadomasochistic Relatedness  
    Fromm explicated a variety of escape mechanisms that fail to provide 
solutions to the primary existential need for aloneness along with the other 
existential needs in life, as noted earlier. 105  The first three mechanisms that 
Fromm explores are symbiosis, authoritarianism, and destructiveness.  Each of 
these leads directly to manifest sadomasochistic outcomes.  The last two 
mechanisms -- orgiastic rituals and herd conformity -- were not explicitly 
addressed by Fromm as to how they lead to sadomasochistic outcomes.  One 
can see upon closer examination however, that these two social modes of 
                                                 
105 See page 153 for a brief explanation of the existential needs. 
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escape can create conditions that engender sadomasochistic dynamics of 
relatedness.   
     Fromm’s  mechanisms of escape provides a comprehensive psychological 
overview of different individual and social sadomasochistic contexts that are all 
based on the simple and accessible premises of thrownness, facticity, and 
existential aloneness.  We will start by first looking at the mechanism of escape 
from aloneness that Fromm associated most directly with sadomasochism as a 
sexual perversion; namely symbiosis    
Symbiosis 
     The term “symbiosis” is a concept from biology which refers to an association 
between two or more species that is to their mutual benefit.  Symbiosis may also 
be interpreted as an “excessive or pathological inter-dependence of two persons” 
(Stedman’s Medical Dictionary, 2000, p. 1741).  As defined below in Escape from 
freedom (Fromm, 1941), Fromm chose the latter psychological interpretation. He 
wrote: 
I suggest calling the aim which is at the basis of both sadism and masochism: 
symbiosis.  Symbiosis, in this psychological sense means the union of one 
individual self with another self (or any other power outside the own self) in 
such a way to make each lose the integrity of its own self and to make them 
completely dependent on each other. (pp. 156-157)  
As implied above, Fromm’s definition of symbiosis as a loss of self-integrity that 
leads to a dependency on another person re-configured the sexual features of 
sadism and masochism as a secondary manifestation of a characterological 
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disturbance based on existential anxieties-- and not vice-versa (pp. 149-150).  
According to Fromm, the erotic nature of sadomasochism is a by-product of 
symbiotic attachment.  In Escape from Freedom (Fromm, 1941), he made an 
argument to supplant the sexual libido theory with his existential conceptualization 
of symbiosis.  Fromm wrote: 
I come now to the main question… what is the common root of both the 
masochistic and the sadistic strivings? 
. . .Both the masochistic and sadistic strivings tend to help the individual to 
escape his unbearable feeling of aloneness and powerlessness.  
Psychoanalytic and other empirical observations of masochistic perversions 
give ample evidence…that they are filled with a terror of aloneness and 
insignificance (p.150)     
This passage shows that Fromm’s unique existential frame to symbiosis came 
from his own refined psychoanalytic perspective blended with empirical 
observations. He concluded that at its core, sadomasochism (i.e., symbiosis) is 
a flight from the anxiety of aloneness and the ability to love another person 
(Fromm, 1939, p. 518) which shifted the focus away from a biological sex drive.   
     When Fromm (1939) first introduced symbiosis, he sketched out two forms: 
the first type, “masochistic-love”, is “the giving up of one’s individual self in order 
to attach to another person who is felt to be stronger” (p. 518);  the second is 
called “sadistic-love” (p. 518) and is defined as the “desire to swallow” another 
person and turn them into “a will-less instrument in one’s own hands” (p. 518).106  
                                                 
106According to Fromm (1939), both of these symbiotic pseudo-love types were prominent in mid 
20th century Western cultural ideals of romantic love and family “happiness.” Based on clinical 
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According to Fromm, the sadomasochist would rather settle for one or both types 
of pseudo-love than face the fact of his or her helplessness in the face of death 
and the factical conditions of separateness from others; by contrast, a healthy 
person embraces aloneness and is able to love others more fully.  Taking 
Fromm’s definition of symbiosis a step further, slavish sexual urges to submit to 
the will of another person, or to sexually dominate another individual would be 
viewed by Fromm as different modes of escape with the same existential aim, 
which is to escape the anxiety that accompanies the factical conditions of 
existence and the terrors of isolation. While sexual sadomasochism fits easily 
under the concept of Fromm’s symbiosis, it really is just one aspect of “pseudo-
love,” which also includes emotional, spiritual, and intellectual dependency as 
intrinsic to its symbiotic processes.107  We now turn to another mode of escape 
that Fromm based on the avoidance of existential aloneness.  “Authoritarianism” 
is a social and manifestly non-sexual mode of sadomasochistic expression that 
Fromm popularized following his introduction of symbiosis.  
Authoritarianism     
     Another original contribution by Fromm that brought even more depth to the 
understanding of sadomasochism was his analysis of the sadomasochistic 
                                                                                                                                                 
experience and social observations, Fromm cited the systematic debasement of individuality 
enacted through symbiotic parent-child dynamics in “authoritarian” and “permissive” family 
structures that were considered “normal” (p. 518).  He criticized the tendencies of many long-term 
term “loving” relationships which switch back and forth between sadistic and masochistic roles in 
a “struggle for dominance and submission” (p. 518)    
107 It is interesting that for Fromm, consensual validation has no bearing on whether an 
attachment is symbiotic or healthy (Fromm, 1955, p. 23).  Fromm wrote, “Just as there is a “folie à 
deux” there is a “folie à millions”. He espoused the concept of “normative humanism” to explain all 
of the mechanisms of defense which takes the position that there is a “right and wrong, that is, a 
satisfactory and unsatisfactory solution to the problems of human existence” (pp. 22-23). 
Normative humanism will be discussed in Section D.
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individual who becomes an “authoritarian character.”  Just as sexual 
sadomasochism is a distortion of erotic urges as discussed in symbiosis, the desire 
to dominate the will of other people can be viewed as a depravity of a genuine 
sense of potency borne out of helplessness, powerlessness, and inferiority.   
According to Fromm (1972), an underlying “sense of vital impotence” (p. 326) is at 
the root of the authoritarian character, which is reflected in the seductive influence 
that hierachies of power have on the authoritarian individual (Fromm, 1941, p. 
166).  As Fromm (1941) wrote, “Power fascinates… [the authoritarian] not for any 
values for which a specific power may stand, but just because it is power.  Just as 
his ‘love’ is automatically aroused by power, so powerless people or institutions 
automatically arouse his contempt”(p. 166).  The most notable characteristic of the 
authoritarian character is an outward political expression of inward 
sadomasochistic tendencies.  As explained by Fromm (1973) below: 
The sadomasochist has also been called the “authoritarian character,” 
translating the psychological aspect of his character structure into terms of a 
political attitude.  This concept finds its justification in the fact that persons 
whose political attitude is generally described as authoritarian (active and 
passive) usually exhibit (in our society) the traits of the sadomasochistic 
character: control of those below and submission to those above. (p.326) 
Fromm shows us in this passage how the authoritarian character, trapped in a 
dynamic of dominance and submission within hierarchies of unequal power 
distribution (pp. 142-143), can enact sadistic and/or masochistic tendencies.  Both 
the active and passive forms of authoritarianism stem from the same origin of 
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primary powerlessness (impotence) that is embedded in the factical conditions of 
our aloneness and separateness from others in the world.  Just like in symbiosis, 
where the need for primary relatedness and erotic fulfillment are sought through 
individual pseudo-love attachments that are ultimately unfulfilling, so in 
authoritarianism, the attachment to someone or something deemed more or less 
powerful outside the self may temporarily ameliorate the fear of powerlessness in 
the psyche of the person, but a deeper sense of human vitality and empowerment 
is sacrificed.   
     For Fromm, authoritarianism and symbiosis are different modes of 
sadomasochistic escape from existential aloneness that attempt to resolve our 
existential needs through pseudo-attachments which offer a temporary respite 
from the fears of isolation and powerlessness.  Both are shown to be inadequate 
by Fromm as answers to our more human need for relatedness with others.  In 
the next mechanism of escape, as we shall see, Fromm again expanded the 
parameters of sadomasochism theory by exploring a more sinister and actively 
violent solution to the problem of existential aloneness.      
Destructiveness 
     “Destructiveness” is the attempt to escape the terror of aloneness by 
completely annihilating the outside world.  Whereas symbiosis and 
authoritarianism seek to submit to and/or dominate others outside the self, the 
destructive person wishes to remove all possible threat of needing another by 
obliterating the feared other-as-object.  Destructiveness is related to the need 
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for transcendence, which is rooted in our very existence. 108  According to 
Fromm, we all seek to transcend the accidental and passive nature of our given 
existence.  If rooted in love, then our need for transcendence will lead to 
creative activity that is productive and grounded in freedom.109  Fromm (1955) 
noted however, that alongside the need to create out of freedom and love, 
there co-exists a desire to destroy which can fill our need for transcendence (p. 
41).  Acts of destructiveness vary according to the social conditions and 
characteristics of the individual, and can take many forms (Fromm, 1941, p. 
178).  For example, though warfare may be rationalized as inspired by 
transcendent values such as love, duty, conscience, or patriotism, it has the 
potential to be destructive at its core, which again, is embedded in our very 
existence.  On the surface, destructiveness appears to be linked with the same 
kind of hostility seen in sadistic and masochistic tendencies because of its 
original escape from the anxieties of separateness.  Indeed, it is rooted in the 
same “unbearableness of individual powerlessness and isolation” (Fromm, 
1941, p. 177).  But, unlike ordinary sadomasochistic hostility, which is borne out 
of a dependency on its object, destructiveness aims at the elimination of its 
object.  The destructive individual seeks to escape powerlessness by 
destroying any other person or thing that poses a threat to the self.  A good 
example of a destructive personality is Hitler or Stalin.  Symbiosis, 
                                                 
108 The need for transcendence is closely connected with the need for relatedness. It comes from 
our desire to surpass the accidental and passive conditions of our existence.  The urge to 
transcend leads to an awareness of being created and the desire to create for ourselves (See 
Fromm, 1955, p. 41).  
109 Examples of creative transcendence include a woman giving birth to an infant, men and 
women raising children, creating art, creating ideas, planting seeds, and producing material 
objects. 
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authoritariansism, and destructiveness are all explicit modes of 
sadomasochistic escape from aloneness that redefined sadomasochism theory.  
The next two mechanism of escape were never explicitly examined by Fromm 
as having sadomasochistic outcomes, but their connection to sadomasochism 
is worth noting and easy to overlook.  
Herd conformity 
     The calming, friction-free escape of herd conformity is, for Fromm, another 
solution to existential aloneness that provides a temporary solution to the need 
for a sense of identity.110  On the surface, the conformist appears free of 
complications, operating under the illusion that he or she has self-agency and is 
a “true individual” (Fromm, 1941, p. 184).  Below the surface however, the 
conformist is participating in the disavowal of their true inner self by accepting the 
“personality offered to him [or her] by the culture” (p. 184).   
     The sadomasochistic dynamics that are implicit to conformity emerge from the 
inherent existential need to have an identity that start with the primary bonds of 
attachment to parents and nature (Fromm, 1955, p. 62).  In our contemporary 
society, the development of individuality is stressed as desirable.  We are taught 
to think for ourselves without pressure from authority and to believe that we are 
politically and economically “free.”  The hope is that we will experience our 
freedom as empowering and that this will affect all of our endeavors, but, as 
Fromm (1955) noted: 
                                                 
110 For a discussion on the relationship of the existential need for an identity and herd conformity 
see The sane society (Fromm, 1955, chap. 2, sect. D)  
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 Many substitutes for a truly individual sense of identity were sought for and 
found.  Nation, religion, class and occupation serve to furnish a sense of 
identity.  “I am an American,”  “I am a Protestant” (p. 63)            
According to Fromm, instead of fostering a real sense of individual identity, the 
above “formulae…help a man [or woman] experience a sense of identity after the 
original clan identity has disappeared and before a truly individual sense of 
identity has been acquired” (p. 63). For this reason, Fromm considered 
conformist identities such as nationalism and patriotism to be forms of “idolatry 
[and] insanity” (p. 60) that interfere with the building of a core authentic self that 
is based on one’s own values and a true affirmation of self and others.  The 
consequences are a numbing of the individual’s capacity to listen to their own 
inner convictions and a decline of sincerity in everyday emotional expression.  
The upshot of conformist cultural pressure is that as the authentic self gives way 
to the “social self” as the primary mode of self/other relations, pseudo-
relationships engendering symbiotic (sadomasochistic) attachments between 
individuals increase and indirectly establish group authoritarian norms that 
reinforce sadomasochistic behaviors.111  
The Orgiastic Solution  
     Orgiastic rituals provide brief spasmodic relief from loneliness and isolation 
that allow the individual to fuse with the larger group or with the “cosmos.”  This 
mode of escape tends to be intense, transitory, and involves a complete 
immersion of the self in body, mind, and spirit.  Rituals that foster communion 
with the larger group and a loss of individuality can be traced back to tribal and 
                                                 
111 See Section D for a further discussion of the “social self.”  
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ancient religious customs.112  Current examples include rock concerts, large 
sporting events, political rallies, and certain religious gatherings.  As long as 
orgiastic expressions are a matter of common practice in a society there is no 
problem with guilt or anxiety.  Sadomasochistic tendencies and behaviors like 
drug abuse, alcoholism, compulsive sex and gambling are more pervasive in 
cultures that deny some form of sanctioned orgiastic expression (p. 11).  
     A good example is Fromm’s (1970/1992) analysis of the hippie culture which 
he compared to a religious mass movement that permitted its members to 
experience unity and solidarity.  Fromm interpreted the concert at Woodstock as 
a kind of pilgrimage for the hippie culture which blossomed into an intense 
orgiastic ritual of music, drug use, free sexual expression, all with a sense of 
order and lack of aggressiveness that included an attitude of kindness and 
helpfulness among its participants.  It also served as an escape from the 
sadomasochistic self-estrangement that comes out of the middle-class emphasis 
on competition and the worship of technology.  The hippie movement provided a 
temporary haven for thousands; it was intended to be based on a faith in love, 
equality, peace, and life, which as Fromm predicted, would be short lived  
due to the power of the established idolatry of mainstream values (Fromm, 
1970/1992 pp. 86-87). 
     As indicated at the end of chapter 4, around the same time that Fromm was 
asserting a new existential foundation for a psychological theoretical framework 
                                                 
112 Some examples of rituals are prayer offerings, dancing, chanting, insults to evil spirits, and 
performance of magic acts.  Shamans and priests have conducted orgiastic rituals as a treatment 
for psychological deviance in early Chinese, Egyptian, and Hebrew cultures (Comer, 2001, p. 9).   
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of sadomasochism, Jean Paul Sartre was writing on sadomasochism as an 
ontological structure113 that he considered to be embedded in all human 
relationships.  As a philosopher, Sartre’s existential-humanism as it applies to 
sadomasochism differed significantly from Fromm’s psychological existential-
humanistic view in many ways.  Before conducting a comparative analysis of 
their respective approaches to sadomasochism, which should prove interesting, 
an examination of Sartre’s ontology of sadomasochistic relations will take place.   
It will be followed by a review of the work of various post-Sartrean philosophers 
and psychoanalysts who extended Sartre’s ontological version of the 
sadomasochism discourse to different social contexts.  
 
       Section B: An Overview of Sartre’s Existential-Phenomenology of  
                                      Sadomasochistic Relations  
     In Being and nothingness (Sartre,1943/1956), Jean-Paul Sartre presents a 
rich phenomenological description of “the look”  which reveals three different 
attitudes of “being-for-others” (chap. 3).114  These three different attitudes lay out 
Sartre’s ontological principles of human relationships which renders all 
experience possible.  According to Sartre, the look refers to the self’s experience 
of “being-seen-by another” (Frie, 1997, p. 52) in the form of a possession (Sartre, 
1943/1956, p. 475). It pre-supposes the factical existence of a bodily self that is 
                                                 
113 Ontology was already defined in the Introduction (see p. 16, FN 7).  Sartre (1943/1956) also 
described Ontology as “the study of the structures of being…taken as a totality (pp. 804-805).   
114 For Sartre (1943/1956), “being-for-others” is a “new dimension of being in which my Self exists 
outside as an object for others.  The For-others involves a perpetual conflict as each…seeks to 
recover its own Being by directly or indirectly making an object out of the other” (p. 800).  
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in an ongoing, non-causal relationship with the body of another person.115  The 
first attitude of being-for-others is called “love, language, [and] masochism”(p. 
474); the second is described as “indifference, desire, hate, [and] sadism” (p. 
494).  According to Sartre, the third attitude, the “Being-with” (Mitsein) -- also 
called the “We-mode” (p. 534) “could not constitute an ontological structure of 
human reality…[and is]… “at its origin a metaphysical and contingent fact” (p. 
536).  Therefore, according to Sartre, the third attitude is derived from the first 
two (masochistic and sadistic), which he saw as the real ontological structures for 
human relationships.  I will first examine the masochistic and sadistic attitudes 
before considering the third.         
     Sartre coined the term the “look” to describe the masochism embedded in the 
first attitude.  The look is what I experience when I become aware of being an 
object for another person.  Up until that point, I am freely engaged as a subject.  
Once I become aware of the other’s objectifying presence, I am immediately 
forced to deal with being seen as an object by the other, which I experience as 
“my being-as-object in shame” (p. 492).116  Below is a further description of the 
look by Sartre (1943/1956):    
The Other’s look fashions my body in its nakedness, causes it to be born, 
sculptures it, produces it as it is, sees it as I shall never see it.  The Other 
holds a secret— the secret of what I am.  He makes me be and thereby he 
                                                 
115 According to Sartre (1943/1956), all meaning is constituted through the body (p. 471). 
116 Sartre (1943/1956) cites the example of being discovered peeping through a keyhole to 
capture the experience of “my-being-an-object-as-shame.”  The moment of awareness when the 
self becomes an object-for-the-other is an experience of shame (pp. 349-350).   
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possesses me, and this possession is nothing other than the consciousness 
of possessing me. (p. 475)    
Sartre’s language in this passage is dramatic.   The “look” of the other is depicted 
in oppressive terms, as an inescapable masochistic experience for the self of the 
observed.  Sartre added to the above description “Masochism, like sadism, is the 
assumption of guilt…due to the very fact that I am an object…. [I] cause myself to 
be fascinated by my objectivity-for-others….as a species of vertigo…before the 
abyss of the other’s subjectivity” (p. 492).  Sartre seems to suggest through his 
descriptions of the first attitude that the subject can become seduced by the 
experience of becoming an object for others which can lead to distraction.  For this 
reason, Sartre’s ontological description of the first attitude suggests a 
psychological quality that is embedded in the experience of the self being 
objectified by another.         
     In the second attitude (the “look at the look”) (p. 495), a shift occurs in self-
consciousness.  The look at the look entails a move away from being an object-for-
the-other by making the other-as-an-object-for-me.  Sartre used the terms 
“indifference, desire, hate [and] sadism” to describe the second attitude and 
referred to it as a kind of blindness on the part of the subject (or sadist) who 
disregards the subjectivity of others. He wrote:  
I am my own blindness with regard to others, and this blindness includes an 
implicit comprehension of being-for-others; … I practice then a sort of 
factual solipsism…I do not even imagine that those people can look at me.  
Of course they have some knowledge of me, but this knowledge does not 
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touch me… they express what they are, not what I am, and they are the 
effect of my action upon them.  Those “people” are functions. (p. 495)  
From this passage, we see that in sadism, a sense of self arises through the 
negation of another self (Friedman, 1998, p. 66).  By negating the subjectivity of 
others, the sadist reduces the being of another to the level of a function and an 
extension of his or her own subjectivity which is assumed to be sovereign.  For 
example, the toll booth collector is merely a function who collects my money so I 
may pass; the waiter is nothing but the function of serving the patrons.  
According to Sartre, in the sadistic mode, one does not seek to look past the 
function that the other serves in relation to the self.  Whereas in masochism, the 
movement is towards the total objectification of the self in the sight of others, in 
the sadistic attitude, the self abstracts his/her identity into a process of 
subjectivity that strips others of their subjectivity (Gordon, 1995, p. 19).   
     As contrasting modes of being-for-others, the masochistic and sadistic 
attitudes each seek to reclaim the self by directly or indirectly making an object 
out of the other person (Sartre, 1943/1956, p. 800).  The consequences of 
Sartre’s both attitudes reveal the person’s ongoing struggle of internal conflicts 
with respect to relating with others.  Moreover, neither position is a totalized 
experience; what the irony for the masochist is that even as he or she wishes to 
give up self-agency by becoming a total object for another, agency is exercised 
in the attempt to fix the gaze of the other onto the self.  Conversely, the sadist 
acts as if she/he is hidden from the gaze of others by denying the subjectivity of 
others.  The irony for the sadist however, is the denial of the sadist’s dependency 
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on others to play out his/her sadistic illusion.  According to Sartre then, even if 
one attempts to immerse one’s self in the masochistic or the sadistic attitude, an 
experience of inadequacy remains.  As he explains, “like all bad faith it is the 
state itself which furnishes us with the motive for getting out of it” (Sartre, 
1943/1956, p. 496). 117   
     The Sartrean attitudes of sadism and masochism do not support mutual 
sociality in the sense that one’s self is affirmed at the same time that another 
person is affirmed.  Both attitudes are present, at least to some degree, in the 
same individual simultaneously and each attacks mutual sociality between the 
self and another person from different angles.  As sadism strengthens, 
masochism weakens and vice-versa.  According to Sartre, the inability to resolve 
the dilemma of wishing to avoid becoming an object for others in the first attitude 
and the counter attempt to objectify the other in the second attitude leads to a 
“perpetual feeling of lack and uneasiness” which is the distinguishing feature of 
consciousness that is embedded in the first two attitudes (Gordon, 1995, p. 
21).118   
     Sartre’s (1943/1956) third attitude of human relationships, more salutary than 
the sadistic and masochistic attitudes, is called the being-with (Mitsein) 
                                                 
117 According to Sartre (1943/1956), “Bad faith…has in appearance the structure of a falsehood. 
Only what changes everything is the fact that in bad faith it is from myself that I am hiding the 
truth” (p. 89). In contrast to a lie, bad faith lacks the dual consciousness of a deceiver and the 
deceived. Instead, it implies the unity of a single consciousness.     
118 There is a similarity between Sartre’s masochistic and sadistic attitudes of “being-for-others” 
and Hegel’s (1807) dialectic of the self-consciousness between the master and the slave found in 
Phenomenology of Spirit.  Both suggest the idea of consciousness as fundamentally alienated.  
Even though Sartre insists that his existential-phenomenology of human relations is better 
understood as a “circle” and not as a dialectic (Sartre, 1943/1956, p. 474), the similarities with 
Hegel (1807/1977, p. 111) on this point are striking, nonetheless (Priest, 2000, p. 223; Gordon, 
1995, p. 21).          
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dimension, or the “We-mode” (see pp. 534-537).  Here, Sartre is referring to 
those social experiences where we find ourselves in a form of solidarity with 
others.  In the following description, Sartre (1943/1956) offered a further 
clarification of the third attitude.  He wrote: 
In the “we,” nobody is the object.  The “we” includes a plurality of 
subjectivities which recognize one another as subjectivities. Nevertheless, 
…this is not the object of an explicit thesis; what is explicitly posited is a 
common action or the object of a common perception. (p. 535) 
As suggested in Sartre’s description, the third attitude is an idea of group 
consciousness where each subject recognizes other subjects as co-spectators in 
reference to an external action or perception. In fact, Sartre uses the example of 
being a spectator at a theatrical performance to illustrate the third attitude (p. 
535).  For Sartre, it is not necessary that every subject in a group be conscious of 
the we-mode “in order for me to experience myself being engaged in a ‘we’ with 
them” (p. 536).    
     Sartre (1943/1956) made a further distinction between two different types of 
we-mode.  There is an “us-as-object” mode, where I experience myself as part of 
a collective “they.”  Sartre characterized the us-as-object mode as an experience 
of shame that can be described as a group of “alienated ‘Me’s’” (p. 537).  A 
dramatic example is if a well dressed person enters a room full of criminals   
There is also a “we-as-subject” mode where the subject can become “engaged 
with others in a common rhythm” (p. 549).  A good example of the “we-as-
subject” mode is the experience of a soldier marching along to the cadence of 
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other soldiers (p. 549).  Sartre underscores the notion that the rhythm of the 
marching soldiers emanates from each individual soldier as opposed to the idea 
that the rhythm is an “immediate experience of…transcendence” (p. 549).  He 
refers to the we-as-subject mode as a kind of impersonal “double objectivizing 
apprehension” (p. 549) whereby an object is transcended in common by a group 
of individuals.  In this way, Sartre ruled out the possibility that the group is “an 
inter-subjective consciousness, nor… parts [of]… a synthetic whole in the 
manner of [a] collective consciousness” (p. 536).   
     Sartre did not explicitly differentiate the us-object or the we-as-subject in the 
third attitude as ontological modes in the same way he defined the first 
masochistic attitude and the second sadistic attitude of being-for-others.  
According to Sartre, the third attitude is an “experience…of the psychological 
order and not the ontological …[that] in no way corresponds to a real unification” 
(p. 549).  Before comparing and contrasting Sartre’s ontological structure of 
being-for-others with Erich Fromm’s existential-humanistic perspective of 
relationships as it concerned their respective theories on sadomasochism, we will 
first consider various post-Sartrean philosophers and psychoanalysts who made 
contributions to the history of sadomasochism theory from an existential-
phenomenological perspective.  With the exception of Medard Boss, who was 
influenced by the ontology of Heidegger, each of the following existential-
phenomenological thinkers are influenced by Sartre’s ontology of being-for-
others.  Each conducted ontological examinations of sadomasochistic relations in 
different social contexts that helped transform the understanding of 
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sadomasochism as a rare sexual perversion into an everyday phenomenon.  We 
start however, with Medard Boss, who like Erich Fromm was interested in 
sadomasochism from both a theoretical and clinical perspective.  Also like 
Fromm, Boss privileged a theory of human love to explain sadomasochism rather 
than a theory that privileged sexuality. 
 
               Section C:  Post-Sartrean Perspectives of Sadomasochism  
              Medard Boss’s Daseinsanalytic Approach to Sadomasochism 
     Medard Boss was a psychoanalyst who explored all of the sexual perversions 
from a perspective informed by Martin Heidegger’s (1927/1962) existential-
phenomenology set forth in Being and time, which Boss called 
Daseinsanalyse.119  Like Erich Fromm, Boss objected to the reductionism in 
Freud’s libido theory and he de-centered the sexual drive as the core disturbance 
in his theory of the sexual perversions.  Boss (1947/1949) developed a 
qualitative conceptualization of love as a “norm-conformable reality”(p. 35), which 
was unhampered by statistical notions of normalcy.  Boss viewed love as a 
“‘dual-mode of existence’. . . [that]. . .overcomes all anxiety, narrowness, 
meaninglessness and nothingness. . .[and] reaches its maximum of possibilities 
in the loving communion of ‘You and I’” (p.  33). When a person realizes love 
according to Boss, he or she is able to surmount the restrictions imposed by the 
physical-mental barriers of human existence and participate in the “super world 
infinity of the human mind and soul” (p. 36).  Boss also viewed love as taking 
                                                 
119 The literal translation of Daseinsanalyse means “the analysis of being there” (Cohn, 1997, p. 
4).   
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place in the sphere of impulses and partakes in the widening and overcoming of 
earthly boundaries (p. 36).  Boss described a person who loves as being at total 
peace with one’s self, devoid of any intentions.  In the concrete reality of 
everyday living however, people are confined to varying degrees by egoistic 
pettiness, or what Boss referred to as a “fear-laden existence” (p. 37).   
     As a sexual perversion, sadomasochism is based on fear, which Boss 
described as the “ontological antithesis of love” (p. 92).  By this statement, he 
meant to suggest that at the core of the disturbance of love and sex in 
sadomasochism is an “isolated, autocratic, petty and fear-laden individual” (p. 
37), who attempts to have others conform to his/her will.  Boss believed that 
authentic love can overcome the egoistic pettiness and fears that enable 
sadomasochistic behavior.  The case study of E.K., a 36 year old single male 
with “pronounced sadistic behavior” (p. 79) shows how the client’s experience, 
rather than any preconception by Boss led him to the analysis of Dasein in the  
psychotherapy with his sadomasochistic client (see Boss, 1963, p. 4).  Below, 
Boss cites E.K. in his own words:   
Each time when I really crave something, I must force it, break it open.  I live 
among opposing clods, and I am a clod myself.  My reason for forcing a 
woman into physical submission is that I myself never had any direct 
relationship to another human body, neither to my own body nor to the body 
of a woman.  I could never recognize flesh as something alive.  (p. 87) 
The self-description offered by E.K. in the above passage discloses how E.K.’s 
experience of sadistic intentions is a more complex and vulnerable human 
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experience than is commonly realized.  One gets a first-hand sense of E.K. being 
cut-off from others and himself in a perceptual and bodily manner that has 
profound emotional consequences.   Boss understood sadomasochism to be the 
result of “specific concealments and restriction of possibilities for loving” (Boss, 
1963, p. 186) others, which affects one’s entire being-in-the-world.  As   E.K.’s 
words show, he does not feel connected to his own body and feels alienated 
from the body of a woman.  Boss allows E.K.’s poignantly expressed self-
descriptions to indicate how sexual sadomasochism is a way of being-in-the-
world that conceals a fundamental desire to be social and how the body is the  
primary conduit through which the experience of self and others takes place 
(Boss, 1972, p. 101).   Sexual sadomasochism, when understood through Boss’s 
daseinsanalytic perspective is revealed as a much more profound experience 
than as a need to sexually dominate or to be sexually overpowered by another 
person.  Boss dignifies E.K.’s struggle to overcome his sadomasochism and rid 
himself of the need to use violence in order to achieve sexual union with his 
partner.  In the quote below, Boss never loses sight of E.K.’s desire to love and 
connect with others that is buried within him.  Boss finds E.K.’s common 
humanity underneath his sadomasochistic inclinations.  Boss wrote: 
If [E.K.] would have been purely a hating person, he would have felt nothing 
else but life-opposing barriers in the concrete forms of the world… Factually, 
[a] depth of love was buried to him and hidden from behind…obstacles in his 
clod like world, but …still accessible…in contrast to the all-hating, all 
destroying person (p. 94). 
 170
Boss assumes that love and hate are the core components of E.K.’s 
sadomasochism rather than the sexual instincts.  By stressing E.K.’s 
sadomasochistic impulses as a conflict between love and hate, Boss normalized 
the deeper existential human needs that are being frustrated in sexual 
sadomasochism.   
     The brief passages selected from Boss’s case study of E.K. demonstrate how 
a daseinsanalytic approach reveals the realities of human love and the existential 
need to be connected with another person as the core disturbances behind acts 
of sexual sadomasochism.  One can see that an interpretation based on an 
intrapsychic sexual libido would not be able to access the level of depth and 
human distortion that the sadomasochist’s way of being-in-the-world is affected 
when compared with Boss’s daseinsanalytic therapeutic model.  One sees how 
Boss’s approach was centered on the self-descriptions of his client’s experience 
as well.   
     It should be noted that Boss’s theory of love was problematic and fell prey to 
many of the modern moralisms embedded in other theories of sadomasochism 
during his time.  For example, Boss espoused the heterosexual union of two 
independent personalities as “love’s fullest expression” (p. 36), which is highly 
reminiscent of Krafft-Ebing’s originally biased “golden standard” of healthy sexual 
behavior.120  Boss later dropped his theory of love after becoming a student of 
Heidegger, who never endorsed the idea of love as a dual-mode of existence.  
Boss however, continued to refine an effective daseinsanalytic psychotherapeutic 
                                                 
120 Another curiosity of Boss’s conceptualization of love was his spiritual notion of “You and I,” 
which he envisioned as a “oneness,” and which he depicted as a male and female essence, 
similar to Jung’s intrapsychic images of  the “animus” and “anima” (Boss, 1947/1949, p. 31).   
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model for the treatment of sadomasochism but without a theory of love attached 
to it (see Boss, 1963, chap. 11). 
          Beauvoir’s Use of the Master/Slave Dynamic in ‘The Second Sex’ 
     Simone De Beauvoir scrutinized the realities and myths surrounding the lives 
of women in The Second Sex (Beauvoir, 1949/1989).  Beauvoir used disparate 
methodologies from literature, biology, history and philosophopy to examine the 
problems that confront women and took particular aim at the way psychoanalysis 
consigns the role of the feminine.  One sees the influence of Sartrean ontology in 
Beauvoir’s analysis of existence and the role of women in psychoanalysis.  
Referring to the psychoanalysts of her generation, Beauvoir wrote: 
In the sense in which the psychoanalysts understand the term, “to identify 
oneself” with the mother or with the father is to alienate oneself…to prefer a 
foreign image to the spontaneous manifestation of one’s own existence, it is 
to play at being.  Woman is shown to us as enticed by two modes of 
alienation.  Evidently to play at being a man will be for her a source of 
frustration; but to play at being a woman is also a delusion:  to be a woman 
would mean to be the object, the Other ─ and the Other nevertheless remains 
subject in the midst of her resignation. (p. 51)    
Beauvoir’s analysis, as seen above, may be considered as an existential critique 
of the gender bias that suffused modern psychoanalysis.  According to Beauvoir, 
the way psychoanalysis understood identity engendered self-alienation because 
of the assumption that the self had to prefer an outside image (either mother or 
father) to establish an identity.  For women, as Beauvoir viewed it, the problem of 
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identity presents a twofold mode of alienation because masculinity is the only 
identity that can reach self-transcendence.  For example, if a young girl identifies 
with her father, there is the obvious inherent problem of being female, which is a 
source of frustration.  However, the alternative of identifying with the mother is 
just as problematic because, according to Beauvoir, to be female is to be 
implicitly denied the possibility of transcending one’s circumstances, which 
afforded only to the male.  Therefore, a woman learns to resign herself to the role 
of the other as proscribed by the culture because there is no clearly defined role 
for a woman other than not being a male.    
     Beauvoir’s assertion of otherness for women further stresses the themes of 
dominance and submission.121  For example, she clarifies the important 
distinction between the psyche of a woman who chooses to become an 
objectified “thing,” or other in the eyes of the male - - what she calls true 
masochism - - and the erotic value of physical pain, which does not necessarily 
entail passive submission and has no greater place in female sexuality than it 
has for male sexuality (Beauvoir, 1952/1989, p. 398).  Beauvoir also spoke out 
against the “bad faith”122 gendered binarisms that were historically embedded in 
psychoanalysis and in the model of sadomasochism during her era. In the 
passage below, she critiques the hetero-normative construction of 
                                                 
121 The themes of Beauvoir’s examination of how women experience dominance and submission 
can be traced back to Hegel’s master/slave dialectic that Sartre (19414/1956) also used in Being 
and Nothingness.  Another influence on Beauvoir’s analysis comes from Merleau-Ponty’s notions 
of bodily existence and her work anticipates the post-phenomenological ethical views of 
Emmanuel Levinas (Barber, 2001, pp. 71-77).      
122 See Section B, page 170, FN 125 for a definition of bad-faith. 
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sadomasochism theory embedded in psychoanalytic thought that tends to render 
the feminine as invisible.  She wrote:    
The sexual role of woman is largely passive; but the actual performance of 
that passive part is no more masochistic than the normal aggressive behavior 
of the male is sadistic; woman can transcend caresses, excitement, and 
penetration, toward the attainment of her own pleasure, thus upholding her 
subjectivity; she can also seek union with her lover and give herself to him, 
which represents transcendence of self and not abdication.  (p. 399) 
What is remarkable about Beauvoir’s critique is how she advocates a non-
pathological and affirmative sense of feminine sexuality and agency.  Beauvoir 
also shows in the above passage that she rejected the male/aggressive /sadist 
conflation alongside the myth of female passivity which were both embedded in 
the popular imagination of sadomasochism theory from a psychoanalytic 
perspective. 
     Beauvoir was critical of the “pathology of normalcy”123 embedded in 
psychoanalytic thought as it pertained to sadomasochism during her era.  She 
pointed out how male sadism and female masochism are both exercises in bad-
faith because both ideas perpetuate the privileging of male transcendent values 
as the standard for human behavior.  As she accurately declared, “among the 
psychoanalysts in particular…man is defined as a human being and women as a 
female—whenever she behaves as a human being she is said to imitate the 
male” (p. 52).  In concurrence with Erich Fromm (1934), Beauvoir (1952/1989) 
                                                 
123 The “pathology of normalcy” is an idea developed by Erich Fromm (1955) which will be 
discussed in Section D, p. 189 
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also questioned bourgeois society’s defense of the rights of women as an 
abstraction while the concrete reality of women’s economic dependence on men 
continued (p. 93).   
     According to Beauvoir, “true” masochism involves the splitting of one’s 
consciousness between an interior sense of self and the ego, which becomes 
disembodied in masochism as if it were a double or a “stranger.”  As Beauvoir 
(1952/1989) wrote, “Masochism exists only when the ego is set up as separate 
and when this estranged self, or double, is regarded as dependent upon the will 
of the others” (p. 399).  Beauvoir was able to humanize masochism by amplifying 
its universal existential themes and by exposing the cultural biased attitude 
towards women.   
Below is an example of how Beauvoir was able to capture the essence of the 
masochistic experience beyond the superficialities of gender and even the 
restrictions of biology.  She wrote: 
Masochism exists when the individual chooses to be made purely a thing 
under the conscious will of others, to see herself as a thing under the 
conscious will of others, to see herself as a thing, to play at being a thing.  
“Masochism is an attempt not to fascinate the other by my objectivity, but to 
be myself fascinated by my objectivity in the eyes of the other. (p. 399).                
Beauvoir’s insight is remarkable throughout her exploration of masochism and 
she should be considered as an important figure in the history of sadomasochism 
theory.  Her critique of the psychoanalytic paradigm revealed the hegemony of 
gender oppression that had been embedded in the sadomasochistic discourse 
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going back to Krafft-Ebing.  I do not think that this can be understated.  By 
uncovering the “bad-faith” assumptions implicit the notion of gender differences 
in 20th century Western culture, particularly as it pertained to masochism, 
Beauvoir was more persuasive than any other thinker of her time in demystifying 
the distorted image of the female as a passive masochist and the male as an 
aggressive sadist.    
               Africana Existentialism:  Franz Fanon’s “Fact of Blackness” 
     Franz Fanon was an important theorist in the African struggle for liberation in 
the 20th century.  Fanon was a psychiatrist who was interested in Sartre’s 
ontology of human relationships as it applied to his experience of being a black 
man in a white world.  Fanon’s reaction to Sartre’s moral indictment of whites, 
which is quoted below from Black orpheus (Sartre, 1948/2001) served as a 
springboard to Fanon’s own phenomenological inquiry into the existence of  
blackness.  Sartre posed the following question to whites on the issue of white 
racism: 
When you removed the gag that was keeping these black mouths shut, what 
were you hoping for?  That they would sing your praises?  Did you think that 
when they raised themselves up again, you would read adoration in their eyes 
of these heads that our fathers had forced  down to the very ground? (p. 115) 
For Fanon, Sartre’s question to other whites concerning their treatment of blacks 
denies the voice of the black man.  Sartre’s question expresses a classic liberal 
sentiment that focuses on white guilt rather than on the black man’s experience, 
which Fanon understood as being missed by Sartre.   
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     Fanon’s answer to Sartre’s question, quoted below from Black skin, white 
masks (Fanon, 1967), exposes the subtle yet powerful weakness in Sartre’s 
position.  Fanon wrote: 
I do not know; but I say that he who looks into my eyes for anything but a 
perpetual question will have to lose his sight…and if I cry out it will not be a 
black cry.  No, from the point of view adopted here, there is no black problem.  
Or…if there is one it concerns the whites only accidentally. (p. 29) 
One sees in Fanon’s reply to Sartre, that Fanon understood Sartre’s morally 
compromised position.  According to Fanon, the black man’s experience can 
never be addressed when posed as a white problem because of the implicit 
assumption that whiteness is the only perspective of subjectivity that can render 
the black man’s experience intelligible.  If we recall Sartre’s second attitude of 
human relationships for a moment, it becomes clear that the question Sartre 
posed to other whites in Black Orpheus (1948/2001) is presented from a sadistic 
perspective.   By assuming whiteness as the privileged perspective from which to 
understand the black man’s experience, Sartre problematized the situation of the 
black man for white culture.  As Fanon correctly noted, Sartre was oblivious to 
his own bad-faith assumption of subjective sovereignty (Gordon, 1995, p. 23).   
     Fanon (1967) exposed the toxic consequences of whiteness as an inherently 
sadomasochistic position for the black man from multiple vantage points.  His 
complex self-analysis of his desire to attach to a white woman is an excellent 
example of how black accommodation to white values can be a form of cultural 
symbiosis involving a complicated web of master/slave dynamics.  In the 
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passage quoted below, one sees through the eyes of Fanon how the sadistic 
world of whiteness grants full privileges to the white male while objectifying the 
white female and rendering the black man invisible.  Fanon wrote: 
Out of the blackest part of my soul, across the zebra striping of my mind, 
surges this desire to be suddenly white. 
   I wish to be acknowledged not as black but as white.  
Now─ and this is a form of recognition that Hegel had not envisaged─ who 
but a white woman can do this for me?  By loving me she proves that I am 
worthy of white love.   
   I am loved like a white man. 
Her love takes me onto the noble road that leads to total realization…. 
   I marry white culture, white beauty, white whiteness. (Fanon, 1967, p. 63) 
Fanon’s self-analysis, as depicted above, suggests that being black in a white 
world can be an inherently split form of masochism, whereby the authentic self is 
split from the external ego of being seen as “black” by the white other.  As Fanon 
(1967) declared, “for not only must the black man be black; he must be black in 
relation to the white man” (p. 110).  One can see how forceful Fanon’s analysis of 
the look was and how it shed new light on the thrown nature of non-reciprocal 
black and white power relations in contemporary culture.  Fanon’s exploration of 
blackness is a historically significant extension of Sartre’s analysis of the look 
which revealed whiteness as a form of a pathology of normalcy can be inherently 
sadomasochistic.  
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 Section D: Contrasting Fromm with Sartre and Post-Sartrean Perspectives 
     At this point, I ask the reader to pause and take a step back for a minute to 
consider how far we have come in this theoretical narrative on the discourse of 
sadomasochism.  We began with Krafft-Ebing’s classification of two rare sexual 
perversions and moved towards the de-centering of sexuality as the core impulse 
behind sadomasochism.  Then, primarily based on a comparative analysis 
among the perspectives of Freudian psychoanalysis, the existential-humanistic 
orientation of Erich Fromm, and Jean-Paul Sartre’s ontology of sadomasochistic 
relations, we saw how sadomasochism was transformed from the notion of a rare 
sexual perversion into a phenomenon that takes place in everyday life and in 
multiple contexts.  In this last section of chapter 5, I will turn to a comparative 
analysis of the similarities and differences between Fromm’s and Sartre’s 
theoretical perspectives of sadomasochism.  
        Similarities      
The Rejection of the Sexual Libido as the Core of Sadomasochism  
     Fromm clearly situated the sexual instinct secondary to the instincts for self 
preservation (Fromm, 1932/1970c, p. 140).  His overview of the human passions 
espoused sexuality as a flexible and postponeable urge among rival urges that 
also clamor for fulfillment.  According to Fromm, the need for love, power, 
sadism, and the desire to submit to a greater power outside of oneself co-exist 
on the same psychological plane as the need for sensual and erotic fulfillment 
(Fromm, 1941, p. 15; 1955, chap. 3).  
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     A similar de-centering of the sexual passion is seen in Sartre’s existential 
analysis of being.124  According to Sartre (1943/1956), all sexuality -- “my being-
sexed and his being-sexed” (p. 500) -- is an external feature of the desire to 
transcend another person or object.  For Sartre, it is the desire to possess the 
other or to be possessed by the other that reveals the other’s sex to me.  While 
sex may accompany one’s desire for the other, according to Sartre sex is not 
posited in any thematic way (p. 501).  As Sartre viewed it, the sexual act is 
actually a temporary release from desire (p. 500).  We can now see how for both 
Sartre and Fromm sexuality is subsumed under a broader and more complex 
theoretical vision of the human passions than the material monism implicit to the 
libido theory.   
     One finds the contrivance of material monism absent in the theoretical 
explanations of sadomasochism by Fromm and Sartre also.  Both perspectives 
present sadomasochism as emerging from a thrown situation of human existence 
that excludes any reference to contradictory aims of biological instincts 
consistent with any stage of Freud’s libidinal theories.  In Fromm’s (1939) theory 
of symbiosis, for example, the self seeks an attachment to another person-as-
object who appears stronger and/or weaker based on the inability to withstand 
the anxiety of one’s aloneness.  In Sartre’s first two attitudes of being-for-others, 
sadomasochism is articulated as an imbalance in human power relations based 
                                                 
124 According to Sartre (1943/1956), existential analysis is a method which seeks to uncover a 
person’s “original project,” which is the desire to become someone or something. One cannot 
reduce the existential project to a behavioral empiricism or a system of classification system 
based on the libido theory.  According to Sartre, each person’s original project is part of the 
ontological structure of “being-for-itself,” which includes “being-for-others,” also referred to as the 
attitudes of sadism and masochism (p. 474).      
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on the desire to possess the other and/or to be possessed by the other.  In both 
schemas, sex is a secondary attribute that is non-essential to explicate 
sadomasochistic processes. 
     As a corollary of each theorist’s rejection of the libido theory, both avoided 
privileging heredity and/or environmental factors as causative agents.  At the 
same time however, both attempted to synthesize the influences of historical and 
social factors in their existential perspectives (Fromm, 1941, p. 296; Priest, 2001, 
p. 4; Burston, 2003, p. 166).  We can see then, that each theorist’s rejection of a 
biological instinct theory of human behavior not only de-centered sexuality as the 
primary passion for sadomasochism, but their respective focus on the social 
aspects of existence had important implications for the conceptualization of 
human subjectivity as it concerns sadomasochism theory, to which we now turn.    
Agreement on the Unsuitability of the Natural Sciences as a Basis for Human 
Subjectivity    
     Alongside of Fromm’s and Sartre’s respective approaches towards their 
theories of sadomasochism, each developed a configuration of human 
subjectivity that left behind the Freudian ego and rules of natural science.  
Fromm understood the implausibility of deploying natural science principles to 
illuminate the qualities of the human subject (Burston, 2003, pp. 164-165).  He 
was one of the first psychoanalysts to reject the tripartite schema of the id, ego, 
and super-ego as an adequate model for the interpretation of individual 
subjectivity.  Fromm (1941) argued that the Freudian model was too simplistic 
because it assumes that whatever part of consciousness does not belong to the 
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id and superego is left for the ego to claim (p. 296).  Fromm called for an 
articulation of socio-historic-economic conditions that envelop the individual in a 
clinical context (Burston, 2003, p. 166) which de-emphasized the analysis of 
intra-psychic aims to elucidate individual subjectivity.125   
     In Sartre’s presentation of the subject any model of conscious reflection such 
as the Freudian model of the id, ego, and superego is an inadequate template for 
self-consciousness because the subject is incapable of grounding his/her own 
being through a self-relation (Frie, 1997, p. 35).  Sartre separated human 
subjectivity (or the self) into three basic modes of self-consciousness; 126  the 
pre-reflective, the reflective (which can also be called ego consciousness), and a 
“pure” or ideal reflective state of consciousness (Barnes, 1980/1993, pp. 41-
48).127  The second mode of personal consciousness (i.e., the self as ego) is of 
particular interest because it highlights the ontological difference in Sartre’s 
approach from Freud’s cultural anthropological approach, which was the 
accepted natural scientific model of the ego.  For Sartre, the ego is a personal 
consciousness that allows one to distinguish one’s own self among other selves 
(p. 43).  It is what is called “I” or “me” in popular usage, and what is typically 
identified with a natural attitude (p. 43).  For Sartre however, the personal mode 
of consciousness is not to be viewed as independent from absolute self-
consciousness.  According to Sartre, the ego imposes a unity of present-time 
                                                 
125 It should be pointed out that Fromm’s concept of social processes went beyond the idea of 
historical factors and class consciousness.  Fromm called attention to the culturally specific rules 
of language and logic that impact human subjectivity by creating “filters” or templates through 
which reality is interpreted (Burston, 2003, p. 166).  
126 For Sartre, every form of consciousness is self-consciousness (Barnes, 1980/1993, p. 42). 
127 While Barnes (1980/1993) adds a fourth category called “embodied consciousness” she notes 
that for Sartre all consciousness is embodied (p. 49).  
 182
orientation on all future and past intentional acts which includes mental and 
emotional objects of reflective consciousness.  Within this structure, the Freudian 
ego comprises only a small portion of what Sartre considered to be the realm of 
personal consciousness.  
     In their respective theories of sadomasochism, both Fromm and Sartre 
represent subjectivity as involving an experience of alienation from others.  For 
Fromm, each individual is confronted with a sense of separateness that must be 
overcome.  For Sartre, alienation is always present and is captured in the 
experience of shame whenever confronted with another person.  Although there 
are critical important differences in how these two existential thinkers approach 
the concept of alienation of the self in their respective theoretical perspectives of 
sadomasochism, they both took a dialectical approach towards the 
understanding of the self, which is always situated in relation to others.  For 
Sartre (1941/1956), the look is an examination of the conflict that the self 
experiences with other people which presupposes the facticity of a body that 
renders all consciousness (subjectivity) intelligible.  For Fromm, sadomasochism 
is a subjective experience of fusion of the self of one individual with another 
borne out of the fear of facing aloneness.  Another convergent feature of each 
thinker’s views on subjectivity is found in their mutual resistance to the “pathology 
of normalcy,” which will now be considered.  
Fromm’s and Sartre’s Resistance to the Pathology of Normalcy    
     Fromm and Sartre both recognized that human subjectivity is not depicted 
through models based on statistical normalcy.  While standards of normalcy can 
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minimize inner and interpersonal conflict, existential-humanists such as Fromm 
and Sartre consider freedom and human relationships to be matters related to 
the quality of life that defy reductions to statistical formulae.  Fromm (1955) 
coined the term “pathology of normalcy” to make the controversial claim that a 
society as a whole can be sick or “insane” insofar as it does not address the 
existential needs which are vital to the growth and development of the individual 
(Burston, 1991, p. 133).  According to Fromm, the “normal,” or well adjusted 
individual who accommodates to the culture at the expense of failing “to attain 
[their] freedom, spontaneity, [and] a genuine expression of self” (Fromm, 1955, p. 
23) is more likely to be crippled from the standpoint of human growth than the 
person who is diagnosed as a neurotic.  As Fromm viewed it, if enough people 
accommodate to the larger social group by giving up their freedom and 
spontaneity, sadomasochism can become a pathological group norm by rising to 
the level of an ideal virtue (p. 23).  Ideals based on quantified standards of 
normalization can engender superficial accommodation to externalized abstract 
ideas that sacrifice authentic existential needs.  Relationships in a “culture of 
normalcy” could be described as sadomasochistic as they stem from a flight from   
anxiety that engenders pseudo-attachments which lack sincerity and 
compassion.  When the core self is estranged and supplanted by the need to 
accommodate to external norms, relationships tend to coalesce around patterns 
of submission and/or dominance to others.  As a countervailing idea, Fromm 
developed the concept of “normative humanism” to call attention to the difference 
between a society that fosters growth of the authentic self and enhances loving 
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relationships from a society that deploys statistical behavioral norms that 
reinforce accommodation to cultural ideology in terms of content.  The latter 
tends to create obstacles towards the realization of authentic self-love and love 
for others (chap. 2).  
     Sartre’s remarks on freedom, which are quoted below espouse the same 
existential-humanistic themes of freedom and relatedness with others that are 
synchronous with Fromm’s concept of normative humanism.  Like Fromm, Sartre 
is critical of cultural standards of normalcy to explain mental illness.  As Sartre 
said:                 
I…would put freedom first, so that mental illness, or what is known as mental 
illness, might appear as an aspect of freedom, and not as a disease resulting 
from a malfunctioning of the brain…within society…one could understand the 
nature of… madness …[as] an attitude that prevents a real contact with 
others and which is nevertheless a consequence of freedom (pp. 38-39). 128    
From this passage, one can see that Sartre, like Fromm considered cultural 
context to play an important role in the establishment of the psychological well-
being of the individual.  The two ideas of freedom and positive human contact 
with others are clearly expressed by Sartre and are the same two notions 
connected by Fromm in his first explanation of love and symbiotic pseudo-love 
found in “Selfishness and Self-Love” (Fromm, 1939, p. 518).  We see then, that 
Sartre and Fromm both took a clear existential-humanistic stance towards the 
concept of mental health in contemporary culture.     
                                                 
128 Sartre’s remarks are taken from an interview he gave in 1975 explaining his work as it 
concerned R.D. Laing’s anti-psychiatry movement, which Sartre supported (see “Sartre, Laing, 
and Freud” in Sartre and psychology, 1980, pp. 23-39).  
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Fromm’s and Sartre’s Rejection of the Psychoanalytic “Spirit of Seriousness” 
     Both Fromm and Sartre were critical of the “spirit of seriousness” 129 that was 
embedded in most natural science and sociological theories of behavior during 
their time.  In existential terms, a “spirit of seriousness” stems from two 
problematic assumptions that go unexamined in a theory of human behavior.  
The first problematic assumption associated with a serious attitude in a theory is 
when values are viewed as having an independent existence outside the realm of 
human consciousness.  Another way of saying this is that a theory embedded in 
a serious attitude assumes that ideas or values are real objects that exist in the 
material world.  A second problematic feature of a theory that is fixed in a spirit of 
seriousness is when a theory lacks a method of self-reflexivity towards its own 
premises.  As already mentioned, many of the concepts from psychoanalysis 
were assumed to be justified from a scientific perspective without ever 
addressing the speculative nature of their claims.  Whenever an assumption in a 
theory is automatically justified without explanation, a tendency towards “self-
importance beyond the scope of judgment” (Gordon, 200, p. 122) can occur.130  
Another way of expressing this point is that in a serious theory, it is not enough 
whether an idea is true or not.  Its premises must be true, or ought to be true.  A 
serious theory is a form of bad-faith because it calls for the elimination of 
reflection and responsibility for deciding whether a theory is viable or not (p. 122).   
                                                 
129 Sartre (1941/1956) first coined the term “spirit of seriousness” (l’esprit de sérieux) to describe 
any perspective that views man as an object and subordinates him to the world.   
130 The Aristotelian and post-Galilean models of scientific values used in the evaluation of natural 
science theories of sadomasochism are theories presented in “the spirit of seriousness” because 
both assume that values are abstracted from the laws of the universe which imply an independent 
world outside the realm of human consciousness. Secondly, both models assume an authoritative 
posture towards the positing of scientific values which does not consider an evaluation of its own 
assumptions to be necessary.            
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     An example of an existentialist critique of a serious theory can be seen in 
Fromm’s (1970/1992) criticism of Freud’s concept of regression as it relates to 
the sadomasochistic character perversion.  Fromm noted that Freud’s concept of 
regression regarding the anal character syndrome carries a latent value system 
that “came in through the back door” (Fromm, 1970/1992b, p. 95).  There are two 
versions of regression posited by Freud in his theory of development of the 
sadomasochistic character.  In the first version, regression “is not subject to 
indignation” (p. 95); that is, while the subject   regresses, it is in the service of the 
psychosexual maturity integrated into the personality of the child, though 
perverse tendencies remain.131  The second version posited by Freud, also noted 
by Fromm, identifies regression as “a failure of development (and hence 
pathological and undesirable)” (p. 95).  In the latter notion of regression, the 
sadomasochistic perversion is depicted as a subjective transgression that 
violates the moral order (i.e., sinfulness).  In both cases, regression is assumed 
to be a necessary principle that operates independently and determines the 
outcome of a normal or abnormal sadomasochistic character.  Good and evil are 
abstracted outside the realm of consciousness and embedded in the concept of 
regression.  It is never questioned whether regression exists or not.  It is simply 
assumed to be a real objective fact that exists in the material world.  In this 
sense, we see that the concept of regression was a theory developed in a spirit 
of seriousness that was typical during Freud’s time.           
                                                 
131 Heteronormative regression as an acceptable form of perversion was first established by 
Freud in “A Child is Being Beaten” (Freud, 1919/1962c, pp. 175-204).  See chapter 2    
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     Sartre critiqued the inherent lack of reflexivity embedded in many 
psychoanalytic concepts.  One example is Sartre’s critique of the ego and the id, 
which he called a “substitute for the notion of bad-faith, the idea of a lie without a 
liar” (p. 92).  According to Sartre, if we take the attitude that we don’t play a 
central role in the determination of what we call the unconscious then we act as 
though our fate is not in our own hands (Gordon, 2000, p. 123).  If the id is 
accepted as an idea outside the realm of self-consciousness, then the self is 
consigned to a helpless dependency on a “thing” (id) outside itself.  Therefore, 
Sartre maintained that “it is not accurate to hold that the “id” is presented as a 
thing…indifferent to the conjectures we make concerning it” (p. 92).132  In a 
likewise manner, Fromm discouraged dependence on concepts and/or people 
which disburden the self from having to decide one’s own values in life.  Fromm’s 
(1970/1992b) theory of sadomasochism stresses the centrality of the subject’s 
ability to provide his or her own authentic answers in life in contrast to the values 
of others (p. 93).   We can see then, that both theorists took the approach that 
any theory which overrides the individual’s anguish of being confronted with the 
responsibility of making choices in one’s own situation is a theory borne out of an 
attitude of seriousness that distorts the appropriation of the phenomenon in 
question.  Now that these main points of convergence between Fromm’s and 
Sartre’s theoretical approaches to sadomasochism have been identified, we can 
proceed to an examination of their differences.  
                                                 
132 Although Sartre was a critic of psychoanalysis, he valued its assumption that all outward 
manifestations of consciousness are revealing of the “psychic life” and symbols of fundamental 
structures of the person.  For a full discussion see Sartre’s “Existential Psychoanalysis” 
(1941/1956, Part Four, chap. 2, sect. I)  
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 Differences 
Sartre’s and Fromm’s Different Inscriptions of Subjectivity 
     The inherent conflict embedded in the look has ramifications for Sartre’s 
inscription of the subject.  Because the self is locked in an eternal conflict with 
the other which can never be resolved, the subject (or self) is constituted by 
Sartre as a perpetual emptiness, or lack motivated by an insatiable desire to 
subjugate the other (Frie, 1997, p. 57).133  According to Sartre, consciousness, -- 
which is always “self” consciousness (Barnes, 1980/1993, p. 42) -- is perpetually 
in search of establishing its own absolute autonomy.  Given this intention, 
whenever the self is confronted with another person, it is thrown into an 
unavoidable experience of shame.  As Sartre said, “Hell is other people” (cited in 
Priest, 2001, p. 224).  Sartre’s schematic outline of shame is based on the look: 
“By the mere appearance of the Other, I am put in the position of passing 
judgment on myself as an object, for it is as an object that I appear to the Other” 
(Sartre, 1943/1956, p. 302).134  As one can see, the subject for Sartre is placed 
in a position of conflict whenever in the presence of another person who 
becomes an obstacle to be overcome.     
     On the other hand, we find Fromm espousing the notion of a subject that can 
realize the fulfillment of its (his/her) existential needs through involvement with 
others.135  According to Fromm (1941) “positive freedom,” which is “the 
                                                 
133 Sartre’s pessimistic interpretation of subjectivity is repeated in the work of Lacan, who also 
denied the full possibility of mutual recognition between the self and other.  Like Sartre, Lacan 
emphasizes the perpetual lack and unfulfilled desire of the subject (Frie, 1997, p. 57).  
134 Sartre’s (1941/1956) example of being discovered peeping through a keyhole illustrates how 
the look of the other is an experience of shame (pp. 347-348).   
135 See pp. 152-153 of this chapter for an definition of the existential needs  
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spontaneous activity of the total integrated personality” (p. 257) is possible for 
everyone. 136  In contrast to Sartre’s notion of the self as an embodied 
consciousness, Fromm emphasized the growth of the intellectual, emotional, 
sensual, and spiritual dimensions of self, all of which are viewed as potentialities 
that may or may not grow to be realized. 137 In Fromm’s conceptualization of the 
self, values, beliefs, and spiritual orientation are all significant dimensions of 
understanding human existence.  With regards to sadomasochism, Fromm points 
out the dimensions of spiritual beliefs and character values as important areas for 
assessment (see Fromm, 1970/1992, p. 93).138   
     Fromm and Sartre both viewed interior psychic life and exterior psychic life to 
be indivisible from each other.  However, Fromm’s notion of a “core” self and an 
exterior social self contrasts with Sartre’s notion of the prereflective, reflective, 
and the ideal reflective forms of self-consciousness (Barnes, 1980/1993, pp. 42-
48).  Fromm believed that there is an authentic personal (core) self which reflects 
the genuine strivings of each individual that can be separated from a social self.  
For Sartre, ego consciousness (personal self-awareness) is void of any unique 
                                                 
136 Fromm’s concept of the self is reminiscent of Abraham Maslow’s theory of self-actualization 
insofar as both humanists regarded the presence of the self as an innate potential that could be 
fully realized.  What separates the two is Fromm’s historical-anthropological explanation of the 
self. Both theories have been referred to as “acorn theories of the self” (Barnes, 1980/1993, p. 
48).  
137Fromm (1964) later referred to a ‘syndrome of growth’ that extended his idea of comprehensive 
self-development.  The syndrome of growth leads to a “love of life, independence, and the 
overcoming of narcissism as against a ‘syndrome of decay’ formed by love of death, incestuous 
symbiosis, and malignant narcissism” (p. 13)   
138 Fromm’s attention to spiritual concerns as part of a clinical assessment was another prescient 
feature to his work.  He anticipated current existential approaches to clinical assessment as seen 
in the current British school of existential psychotherapy. Van-Duerzen Smith (1988)  notes that a 
person’s connection to the abstract ideas, beliefs, and spiritual themes beyond the self is an 
important aspect of living that discloses an individual’s world-view and is clinically useful (pp. 96-
97; see also Van-Deurzen, 1997, chap 7)         
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individualizing qualities and is more aptly described as a non-personal form of 
consciousness (p. 42).  
    Fromm (1939) argued that the authentic or “real” self has gradually been 
relinquished in Western civilization throughout the last millenium due to the faulty 
moral and religious teaching that selfishness is the ultimate evil and that love for 
others is the highest good (p. 507).139  As a result, Fromm believed that the 
“social self” has been overdeveloped at the expense of the authentic self for most 
people in contemporary culture to the point of having become a current cultural 
crisis for the average individual.  The term, “pseudo-self” was coined by Fromm 
to represent the common mode of inauthentic thinking and feeling that 
supplanted individual sincerity and the exercise of “original acts of thinking, 
feeling, and willing” (Fromm, 1941, p. 202) in order to capitulate to the ideas of 
others.140  For Fromm, in the current climate of self-estrangement from the 
authentic (core) self, the proliferation of sadomasochistic relationships in 
everyday life rises concomitantly.141  Clearly Fromm and Sartre differed on their 
respective inscriptions of the subject.  Perhaps, a more revealing difference as it 
concerns their respective approaches to sadomasochism theory is seen through 
their configuration of the self/other relationship. 
                                                 
139  Fromm (1939) noted that the conceptualization of love for oneself as sin finds its classic 
expression in Calvin’s theology during the Protestant Reformation.  According to Fromm, it was 
then that the false belief started that “man is essentially bad and powerless” (p. 507) and that a 
person must give up his or her ability to reason and exercise free choice in order to be pleasing to 
God.    
140 The pseudo-self is responsible for the automatization of the individual and “the culture of 
insecurity and helplessness” that has become pervasive among persons in current day living 
(Fromm, 1941, p. 203).  See “herd conformity” in Section A, p. 163 of this chapter     
141 Fromm (1941) considered the respect and cultivation of the original “core” self to be the 
highest achievement of human culture (p. 256). 
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Sartre’s Lack of Intersubjective Reciprocity vs. Fromm’s Notion of 
Intersubjectivity as Mutual Reciprocity   
     According to Sartre’s analysis of the look, intersubjective relations is a project 
that is doomed to failure because there can never be any mutual or reciprocal 
recognition between the self and the other.  In the look, the only possible 
outcome is that “slavery becomes a personal and insurmountable human 
condition” (Frie, 1997, p. 57). 142   According to the look, one can only exist as a 
master or a slave at any given instant though there is a perpetual switching of 
roles.  I can never stop to recognize my own self in the other person, because 
the only way I can recognize myself is by negating the other person’s presence 
as a subject for me.  For Sartre, one can never escape from living in a perpetual 
sadomasochistic prison. This renders intelligible his statement that “conflict is the 
original meaning of being-for-others” (Sartre, 1943/1956, p. 475).  Given that the 
aim of the look is to subjugate the other who has the power to subjugate me, all 
attempts to meet the other in an intersubjective encounter, results in the loss of 
my subjectivity.  
     Fromm (1939) maintains a more optimistic view of self/other relationships.  
Whereas for Sartre, intersubjectivity rules out the possibility of mutual 
recognition, for Fromm, the recognition of the self and the recognition of the other 
are mutual processes co-existing on the same psychological plane.  As Fromm 
asserted, “there is no solidarity of man in which I myself am not included.  A 
                                                 
142 Although Sartre’s look assumes the same Hegelian structure of the dialectic between the 
master and slave, Sartre ends up pessimistically concluding that the opposition between the self 
and the other can never be reconciled.  For Hegel on the other hand, the dialectic of the master 
and slave moves towards synthesis in the full mode of mutual recognition of self-consciousness 
at the higher level of reason (Frie, 1997, pp. 56-57) 
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doctrine which proclaims such an exclusion proves its objective insincerity by this 
very fact” (p. 517).     
     Fromm considered faulty moral and religious teaching to be responsible for 
the idea in psychology that self-affirmation is antithetical to the affirmation of the 
other.  The idea that “it is virtuous to love others [while]it is sinful to love oneself” 
goes far back in the history of Western thought (Fromm, 1956, p. 57).  This 
distorted moral axiom has become embedded in popular consciousness through 
education, literature, movies, and other forms of social suggestion (Fromm, 1939, 
p. 510).  As a countervailing argument, Fromm contested that the true meaning 
of the biblical passage “Love thy neighbor as thyself” means that “the discovery 
of myself is inseparably connected with the discovery of any other self” (p. 
513).143  He further translates this spiritual message into a corrollary principle of 
psychology that may be stated in the following way: “not only others, but also we 
ourselves are the object of our feelings and attitudes; the attitude towards others 
and towards ourselves, far from being contradictory, runs basically parallel” (p. 
513).   Fromm has an answer for Sartre, who is caught in a never ending battle of 
trying to master the other while attempting to escape being dominated by the 
other at the same time.  Fromm’s answer is to simply look into the face of the 
other and to recognize that self-recognition is taking place at the same instant 
that the other is being recognized.  Whereas Sartre schematizes this as a 
                                                 
143 Fromm’s model of reciprocal self/other relationships is highly synchronous with Martin Buber’s  
philosophy of “genuine dialogue” (Buber, 1965, pp. 75-78).   
 
 
 193
conflict, for Fromm, the self’s ability to be present to the other is an important 
moment of self-discovery that can offer joy and hope as well as conflict.  
     The difference between a non-reciprocal notion of intersubjectivity and an 
intersubjective perspective that endorses mutual reciprocity between the self and the 
other holds profound significance for a theory of sadomasochism which can now be 
explored.  In my Conclusion, I will examine the different conceptualizations of love as 
proposed by Freud, Sartre, and Fromm, which is an extension of their respective 
configurations of intersubjective relations.  I will argue that each theorist’s 
conceptualization of love is most intimately connected to their respective views on 
sadomasochism.  I will also suggest that Fromm’s theory of love based on the notion 
of existential aloneness and the explication of sadomasochistic pseudo-love offers a 
concise and comprehensive understanding of sadomasochistic enactments that is 
simultaneously a practical insight that resists sadomasochism.  I will further contend 
that Fromm’s theory of love and sadomasochistic pseudo-love should be considered 
as part of the contemporary psychoanalytic discourse on sadomasochism theory 
instead of being overlooked.  It was Fromm’s ability to articulate a grounded 
theoretical framework of human love based on the idea of separateness and the 
desire for a meaningful connection with other people that was truly prescient during 
his era.  Fromm brought clarity to the understanding of sadomasochism as more than 
a sexual perversion.  When contrasted with the theoretical approaches of Sartre and 
Freud on the concept of love, Fromm’s theory offered hope and the insight that 
productive loving relationships are the best protection against conditions that lead to 
sadomasochistic pleasures derived from the exaltation of power.  I will begin with a 
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summary of the two major themes that have emerged from my examination of the 
sadomasochism theories reviewed in this dissertation and introduce some findings by 
more recent theorists of sadomasochism which are highly convergent with Fromm’s 
insights which he wrote about over a half century ago.  
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         CONCLUSION       
             Fromm’s Concept of Love as a Response for Sadomasochism         
     The history of sadomasochism theory is a cautionary tale that has an 
important message for psychology not only as a theory, but clinically as well.  
One of the central ideas concerning sadomasochism that I have concluded after 
conducting this study is that the degree of pleasure derived from the 
destructiveness of sadomasochistic enactments extends beyond the sexual act─ 
as it so often is portrayed.  Moreover, there is a strong argument to be made 
based on a review of the case studies and theories of sadomasochism examined 
in this dissertation that there is essentially an inverse relationship between the 
presence of sadomasochistic attachments and the reality of love as a freely 
chosen human commitment.  If this is the case, then a critical examination of our 
conceptualizations of love as it concerns sadomasochism should be a priority.   
     As was alluded to in Chapter 5, I argue that Erich Fromm has developed the 
most grounded framework for a theory of strong loving relationships that can be 
contrasted with its fallen state, what Fromm referred to as sadomasochistic 
pseudo-love.  Fromm (1939, pp. 507-523) called for a theory of love when he 
critically examined contemporary pseudo-love substitutes that he identified as 
masochistic-love and sadistic-love.  Although Fromm made his call more than a 
half century ago, the commonly held conflation of sadomasochism, sexuality, 
gender norms, and aggression has yet to be dislodged from the contemporary 
imagination within psychology, psychoanalysis, and post-modern theories of 
sadomasochism.  Yet, as can be demonstrated in two recent psychoanalytic 
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reviews of sadomasochism by Jessica Benjamin (1988) and Franco DeMasi 
(2003), however, there is a growing awareness of sadomasochism beyond the 
parameters of gendered norms, sexuality, and themes of aggression.  Benjamin 
(1988), for example, notes that Freud’s concept of aggression has created an 
“impasse for social thought” (p. 4) on sadomasochism and suggests that the 
problem should be reconfigured as “an extension of the bonds of love” (p. 5).  De 
Masi (2003), a more recent psychoanalytic theorist of sadomasochism 
differentiates between sadomasochism as an unconscious form of sexualized 
pleasure attached to destructiveness (what he refers to as evil), and other forms 
of sadomasochism where the inability to love and the perception of hate is more 
explicit (chap. 14).  Both of these theorists’ findings suggest that a 
conceptualization of the power of strong and healthy relationships as is seen in 
Erich Fromm’s theory of love enhances the understanding of sadomasochism 
and offers direction in preventing sadomasochistic attachments.  One can argue 
that Freud has provided the basis for a new theory of sadomasochism that 
emphasizes loving relationships.  
     Despite his continued focus on the libido theory, Freud was the first to notice 
that sadomasochism may be connected to something other than sexual desire.  
In “Mourning and Melancholia” (Freud, 1915/1962h, pp. 243-258), he noted that 
the introjection of the loved person as a “good-object” is key in overriding 
interpersonal sadomasochistic acts,  which can occur at various points along the 
process of mourning a loved one (p. 251).  Freud contrasted the successful 
introjection of the “good-object,” which occurs in normal grief through the help of 
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others, from melancholia, where the subject is not conscious of what has been 
lost.  The melancholic takes refuge in the unconscious satisfaction derived from 
enactments of sadomasochistic destruction.  Though Freud did not make a direct 
connection with his theory of sadomasochism from his findings in “Mourning and 
Melancholia,” it is one of the first references in the history of sadomasochism 
theory to suggest that strong relationships are needed to deal with life’s 
contingencies and may, in fact, protect us from sadomasochistic attachments.     
     Despite the aforementioned observations, Freud, was uncomfortable with a 
conceptualization of love that was not framed in mechanistic terms, that is, as a 
zero-sum game.  Although he refers to the notion of love, he treated the idea with 
a hermeneutics of suspicion that becomes apparent in the following example.  In 
“On Narcissism” (Freud, 1914/1962k, pp. 67-102) Freud described love as “a 
certain reciprocity between the ego-libido and the object-libido.  The more that is 
absorbed by the one, the more impoverished does the other become.  The 
highest form is seen in the state of being in love” (p. 33).  In this binary schematic 
representation of love offered by Freud, we see that his theoretical construction 
of love implies a self (as ego) that is in a decidedly non-reciprocal relationship 
with the external other (as object).  Another way of stating this is that in Freud’s 
self/other construction of love, the ego and the external object are never on the 
same psychological plane.   
     Freud’s utilitarian notion of reciprocity was noted by Erich Fromm (1939) in 
“Selfishness and Self-Love” (pp. 512-513).  Fromm commented on the lack of 
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mutual reciprocity between the self and the outside world in Freud’s theoretical 
construction of love.  Fromm (1939) wrote: 
According to Freud, there is almost a mechanical alternative between ego-
love and object love.  The more I turn toward the outside world the less love I 
have for myself, and vice-versa.  Freud is thus moved to describe the 
phenomenon of falling in love as an impoverishment of self-love because all 
love is turned to an object outside of itself. (pp. 512-513)  
As Fromm’s commentary suggests, Freud’s conceptualization of love precluded 
the possibility that self-love and love for others could be viewed as mutually 
reciprocal processes.  Fromm noted that Freud replicated a definition of love that 
is embedded in the idealistic philosophy of Kant that has pervaded Western 
cultural thought on love since the time of Calvin (p. 508).144  Fromm’s notion of 
love provides a sharp contrast and a way out of this utilitarian view of love.    
     Fromm’s notion of love implies that self-love and a love for others are mutually 
reciprocal processes, rather than the zero-sum game described by Freud.  Using 
the premise of a mutually reciprocal concept of love, Fromm reasoned that, “not 
only others, but we ourselves are the ‘object’ of our feelings and attitudes” 
(Fromm, 1956, p. 59).  For Fromm, it was a psychological principle that the 
process of self-awareness is indivisible from awareness of other people.  
Furthermore, one’s own self is as much an object-recipient of love as another 
person is an object-recipient of one’s love (p. 60).  Fromm argued that most 
                                                 
144 According to Fromm (1939), while there are fundamental differences between Calvin’s 
theology and Kant’s philosophy their basic attitude towards love and self-love are the same.  For 
Kant, it is a virtue to want the happiness of others while to want one’s own happiness is ethically 
indifferent (p. 508). 
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Western thinkers however, like Freud, did not ascribe to the notion that self-love 
and love for another person are mutually reciprocal processes because of the 
historical conflation between the ideas of self-love and “selfishness” (p. 60).  For 
centuries, Western culture has been pervaded by a taboo against selfishness.  
Selfishness has been considered an evil that is antithetical to the idea of love for 
others, which is acknowledged as the highest good.  According to Fromm (1939), 
selfishness is commonly viewed as co-terminous with self-love (p. 507).145 
Fromm (1956) argues however, that far from being identical inclinations, 
selfishness and self-love are in fact, opposites (p. 60).  It is not that the selfish 
person loves himself/ herself too much Fromm argues, but rather, it is the case 
that the selfish, that is, narcissistic individual does not love himself/herself 
enough, thereby enacting a form of pseudo-love.  In the narcissistic presentation, 
there is, in fact, an absence of real self-love that is often portrayed as loving 
oneself too much, thereby creating vulnerability to sadomasochistic enactments 
through excessive displays of dominance over others and/or through acts of 
submissive identification to those who appear to wield power over others.       
     There are two additional significant points of difference worth examining 
between Fromm’s reciprocal notion of self-love and love for others as it 
compares with Freud’s non-reciprocal formula.  The first point is that Fromm’s 
notion of self-love and love of another is based on the principle of indivisibility, 
which can also be referred to as a sense of “oneness.”  By indivisibility, Fromm 
meant that one’s own self awareness is impossible to separate from the 
                                                 
145 The view that selfishness is an evil and synonymous with self-love can be traced to Calvin’s 
description of self-love as “a pest” and his depiction of man as essentially bad and powerless 
(Fromm, 1939, p. 507).      
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awareness of other people.  The second important point that separates Fromm’s 
approach to the conceptualization of love and self-love from Freud’s idea is that 
Fromm uses paradoxical logic to explain love while Freud remained within the 
framework of Aristotelian logic whenever discussing the concept of love.146      
     If we take Fromm’s (1956) idea of oneness, which can be stated as “That 
which is one is one.  That which is not-one, is also one” (p. 68), the difference 
between both types of logic may be illustrated.  Using Aristotelian logic, only the 
first statement (“that which is one is one”) of the two-statement axiom can make 
sense.  The second sentence -- “that which is not-one, is also one”-- must be 
rejected as a negation of the first statement.  The second statement is also 
nonsensical as a statement on its own terms from an Aristotelian point of view.  If 
however, one uses paradoxical logic to appropriate the axiom, “That which is one 
is one.  That which is one is not one,” there is no problem.  Embracing the 
opposite ideas is viewed as harmonious and in balance with the principle of all 
existence.           
     For Freud, the idea of oneness was problematic.  In “Civilization and its 
Discontents” (Freud, 1930/1962a, pp. 59-145), Freud admitted that a sense of 
“oneness” was difficult for him to grasp.  Writing about the oceanic feeling of 
oneness described by the poet, Romain Rolland, Freud (1930/1962a) stated that, 
                                                 
146 Fromm holds that Aristotelian logic, which is deeply embedded in the thinking of Western 
science is based on three laws: the law of identity (A is A); the law of contradiction (A is not non-
A); and the law of the excluded middle (A cannot be A and non-A, neither A nor non-A) (Fromm, 
1956, p. 67).  In Aristotelian logic, the statement that “X is A and not A” is nonsensical and a 
contradiction that is irreconcilable (p. 68).  In paradoxical logic on the other hand, which is the 
predominant mode of thinking in Chinese and Indian philosophy and in the philosophy of 
Heraclitus, there is harmony in the apparent contradiction between the positing of A and non-A, 
which can both be considered as predicates of X (p. 68).   
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“From my own experience I could not convince myself of the primary nature of 
such a feeling. But this gives me no right to deny that it does in fact occur in other 
people” (p. 65).  Later in that same essay, Freud betrays his disavowal of 
oneness and makes a connection between that which takes place in the feeling 
of oneness and that which takes place in the state of love.  Freud wrote:  
At the height of being in love, the boundary between ego and object threatens 
to melt away.  Against all evidence of his senses a man who is in love 
declares that ‘I’ and ‘you’ are one and is prepared to behave as if it was a fact 
(p. 66).   
It is arguable, based on the above remarks, that Freud viewed the notion of 
oneness as a threat to self-other differentiation, which he deemed to be crucial to 
the development of human selfhood, and crucial to the coherence of his theories 
of sadomasochism.  In Freud’s view, oneness, which is intrinsic to the concept of 
adult love is rendered as a pathological process where the boundaries of the ego 
and the external world “become uncertain or…are actually drawn 
incorrectly”(Freud, 1930/1962a, p. 66).  In his closing remarks on oneness and 
love, Freud situated adult love in the boundless state of primary narcissism that 
exists prior to the infant’s separation from the mother (p. 66).  In the end, Freud 
reduced love to the world of infantile dependence on internal and external 
parental objects (pp. 66-67). 
      Clearly, Fromm’s position of oneness and love is very distinct from Freud’s.  
Fromm embraced the notion of oneness and viewed it as the core feature to an 
act of love.  Oneness is implied in Fromm’s declaration that, “I love from the 
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essence of my being ─and experience the other person in the essence of his or 
her being” (Fromm, 1956, p. 52).  Whereas Freud implied that the experience of 
oneness is a threat to one’s identity and treated the experience of oneness with a 
hermeneutics of suspicion, Fromm viewed oneness as a paradoxical process of 
coming to an awareness of one’s similarity with another as well as one’s 
differences from another, which are not incompatible processes.  According to 
Fromm, a feature of a productive loving relationship is the willingness to embrace 
the paradox of sameness and difference.  His statement, “We are all One― yet 
every one of us is a unique, unduplicable entity” (p. 52) expresses the intimate 
connection between sameness and difference that the self experiences in 
relation to others.   
     For Fromm, the understanding of sadomasochism cannot be gained through 
objective knowledge, or by having the right value system, or set of beliefs.  
Having knowledge of the libido can produce information, but it cannot grant 
insight concerning the nature of sadomasochism as a way of being-in-the-world.  
Fromm’s human scientific theory of love offers an articulation of the experience of 
love which exposes its fallen states of sadomasochistic pseudo-love in a variety 
of forms.  When contrasted with the libido theory, Fromm’s theory of love and 
sadomasochistic pseudo-love types is neither gendered nor mediated by 
instinctive aggression.  Fromm offers a psychologically accessible explanation of 
love as oneness with an economical explication of sadomasochistic pseudo-love 
types (i.e. sexual, non-sexual, social) all organized as various patterns of 
relatedness that fall short of, or deny the possibility of oneness.  As 
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demonstrated in previous chapters, no other theory of sadomasochism offers an 
alternative to the libido theory that articulates what constitutes a loving, 
productive relationship than Fromm’s theory of love.  Recent psychoanalytic 
examinations of sadomasochism theories show more and more convergence 
with Fromm’s ideas.  It is increasingly agreed upon by current theorists of 
sadomasochism that the weakness of love as a human commitment is inversely 
related to excess pleasures derived from human destructiveness (Brenmann, 
2003, pp. x-xi).  Yet, despite this recognition, it remains unnoticed that no theory 
has articulated the dimensions of healthy loving relationships and contrasted 
them with sadomasochism and destructiveness to the extent that Erich Fromm 
has.  
     Returning to Freud’s bleaker conceptualization of love, one can see how 
Freud’s notion of non-reciprocity anticipated Sartre’s (1943/1956) outline of 
interpersonal love as a nihilistic “fusion of consciousnesses” (p. 489).  Sartre 
characterizes love as an impersonal and tragic affair, one that centers on the 
impossibility of trying to control how the self is perceived in the eyes of the other. 
Sartre’s references to love take place in the first attitude towards others, that is, 
in the attitude of “love, language, [and] masochism” (p. 474).  According to 
Sartre, “to love is in essence the project of making oneself loved”(p. 488).  Put 
another way he states, “‘love’… is … a fusion of consciousness in which each of 
them [i.e., both partners] would preserve his otherness in order to found the 
other”(p. 489).  In Sartre’s formularization of love, each person focuses on how 
the other perceives one’s self.  The best that can be hoped for is that the other 
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person will find the subject “as a privileged object” (p. 490).  In other words, the 
person in love is concerned with making oneself desirable in the eyes of the 
other.  According to Sartre’s conceptualization of the masochistic attitude147 
however, the project is hopeless; each person “in love” demands to be the 
privileged object to the other, thereby evading awareness of one’s own 
subjectivity.  Instead of affirming the vulnerability of one’s subjectivity to the 
other, each of the lover’s humiliates their own existence by deifying the other and 
remaining fixed on how the other person sees them.  Thus, for Sartre, the project 
of love is paralyzed by mutually opposing wills trying to remain as a being-for-
the-sight-of-others (Gordon, 1995, p.20).  Sartre acknowledged that ideal love 
(i.e., as a reciprocal process), is a “deception” (p. 490) because both lovers are 
stuck with being “swallowed up in… [the] objectivity” (p. 490) of the other.  One 
can see then, how Sartre’s depiction of love in the masochistic attitude is set up 
as an irresolvable dilemma (p. 490) of non-reciprocal intentionalities.  It becomes 
another variant of the zero-sum game that is reminiscent of Freud’s non-
reciprocal mechanistic explanation of love between the ego-libido and object-
libido.    
     In the sadistic attitude,148 the project of love is also doomed for Sartre 
because the subject in the sadistic attitude believes that his or her desire to be 
loved is unfathomable by the other.  No matter how much the other person may 
desire to be possessed by the subject in the sadistic mode, the sadist wishes the 
                                                 
147 It will be recalled that Sartre depicted the masochistic attitude as the experience of being an 
object-for-others, as in the form of a possession.  (See chapter 5, section B, p. 168) 
148 It will be recalled that Sartre discussed the sadistic attitude as a blindness where it is imagined 
that others cannot see the self as a he or she truly is. (See chapter 5, sect.B, p. 169) 
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other person to be independent of his or her clutches so that real love may be 
freely offered.  One can see that for Sartre, oneness is not an option in either the 
first or second attitudes of being-for-others.  As he stated, “the problem [of 
love]…remains…without a solution”(p. 488).  Love, for Sartre, is “an ideal out of 
reach. The more I am loved, the more I lose my being”(p. 491).  As in Freud’s 
non-reciprocal mechanistic description of ego-love and object love -- where the 
self turns toward the outside world at the expense of diminishing the love for 
one’s own self, and vice-versa -- Sartre’s description of interpersonal love 
similarly negates the possibility of self/other reciprocity.  Moreover, any self-
realization that comes from the “impulse of love” (p. 491) for Sartre, is 
experienced by the self ultimately in isolation rather than as a union that is 
mutually satisfying.  As he stated, “the more I am loved, the more I lose my 
being, the more I am thrown back on my own responsibilities”(p. 491). One is 
bound to conclude from Sartre’s account of love that he, somewhat like Freud, 
viewed the notion of interpersonal love as a threat to the self.       
     The possibility for oneness is not any more hopeful in Sartre’s “We-mode” 
(Sartre, 1943/1956, pp. 534-556).  For Sartre, love in the third attitude of the We-
mode is a form of “mob psychology” (p. 546), whereby each subject passively 
submits to a group “project of love” (p. 546) and sacrifices her/his own individual 
freedom for the purposes of joining the group.  As each individual grows 
inevitably disappointed by not having achieved the real love promised by the 
group, each individual member (if they are to remain in the group) turns to 
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masochism, which is depicted as a collective rush into servitude where everyone 
“asks to be treated as an object” (p. 546).149   
     The existential situation presented by Fromm in his concept of oneness (i.e., 
love) is very different from Sartre’s existential depiction of love.  Whereas for 
Sartre (1943/1956), love is a contradictory effort conducted by the person to 
surmount the negation of the self by the other and vice-versa (p. 490), in 
Fromm’s existential conceptualization of love, the other is not perceived as a 
threat to the self or as having the power to negate the self.  Although Fromm 
(1939) did not dwell on its philosophical ramifications, he did consider the 
concept of love for others and the love for one’s self as a contradiction to be an 
untenable one (p. 513).  Whereas for Sartre, the experience of union between 
the self and another is impossible rendering all love as a form of solipsism; 
Fromm viewed the experience of oneness on the same psychological plane as 
existential aloneness, that is as co-existing together.  In Fromm’s 
conceptualization of human existence, aloneness and oneness are intrinsic to the 
rhythms of life, part of the indivisible connection that each person has to 
themselves, to other persons, and to the surrounding world of objects.  It is not a 
perfect world, by any means for Fromm, but it is not the world of hopelessness 
and despair implied by Sartre’s explanation of an ultimately inequitable love (p. 
491).  I argue here that Fromm’s existential notion of love, which embraces the 
paradox of separateness and oneness described previously, serves as a 
counterweight to Sartre’s articulation of love as a doomed conflict.  Fromm’s 
                                                 
149 Sartre’s description of group love is reminiscent of Fromm’s authoritarian mechanism of 
escape. When one gives up one’s freedom in order to attach to others, sadomasochism ensues.  
This appears to be what Sartre is describing when explaining love as mob psychology.        
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existential focus of concern is on the “action of love,” that is, on oneness.  The 
action of love is a choice that leads to enactments of productive love that can be 
concretely differentiated from enactments that descend into sadomasochistic 
pseudo-love.      
     This dissertation started as an examination of the theories of sadomasochism 
that emerged out of sexology and moved to exploring the topic from an 
existential psychological perspective.  Krafft-Ebing was the first to identify the 
psychology of sadomasochism though he defined it as two separate sexual 
perversions according to the biology and physiology of the male and female.  
Ellis diversified Krafft-Ebing’s strictly morbid psychopathological configuration of 
sadism and masochism and was the first to consider sadism and masochism as 
different faces of the same psychological entity, that is, as falling under the rubric 
of sadomasochism.  Ellis also challenged the heteronormative construction of 
sadomasochism that reflected the patriarchal ethos of early psychology, a 
mindset which has remained surprisingly resilient.  Freud launched an elaborate 
and exhaustive theoretical journey to explain sadomasochism.  Freud’s theories 
privileged the themes of sex, death, and aggression.  At the same time, his 
clinical investigations of sadomasochism opened up the possibility for other 
theories that de-centered sex, and loosened the strictness of his concepts of 
death and aggression as the primary causes of sadomasochism.  Though the 
immediate reaction to Freud’s last theorization of sadomasochism, referred to as 
primary masochism, which he based on the death instinct raised some alternate 
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theoretical outlooks on sadomasochism, its follow-up has not yielded the broad 
shift in perspective that might have been expected (Chancer, 1992, p. 88). 
     At the same time, the existential and existential-phenomenological theories of 
sadomasochism examined in this text have expanded the discourse of 
sadomasochism theory outside the bounds of sexuality and other intra-psychic 
instincts beyond other intellectual traditions of the 20th century.  With the arrival of 
Fromm and Sartre, it was no longer possible to view sadomasochism as a rarely 
occurring sexual perversion.  Instead, with a close reading of their texts, one is 
led to conclude that existential and existential-phenomenological thought has 
been pre-eminent in de-centering purely sexualized views of sadomasochism, 
establishing human relatedness as the core issue behind the vicissitudes of 
sadomasochism, and responsible for raising the awareness of sadomasochism 
as an everyday occurrence that is part of being-in-the-world.  Following Sartre, 
the work of Beauvoir and Fanon demonstrated the presence of sadomasochistic 
social relations in the cultural contexts of gender and race.  Beauvoir’s analysis 
of female masochism presented in psychoanalysis demonstrated how the 
subjectivity of women has been marginalized in sadomasochistic ways in a 
culture that privileges male subjectivity.  Fanon’s ontological analysis of 
blackness exposes the sadomasochistic social structures that are inescapable 
for the black man in white culture.   
     As a contemporary extension of Sartre’s existential-phenomenological outlook 
on sadomasochistic relations, Lewis Gordon (2000) takes Sartre’s definition of 
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the “spirit of seriousness”150  a step further by differentiating between serious 
sadomasochism and playful sadomasochism; a notion that helps reinforce the 
idea that choice and the willingness to question how the self and the other are 
assessed constitute the central existential themes on the issue of 
sadomasochism.  The “serious sadomasochist” possesses a posture of “bad-
faith” (p. 77), which Gordon notes was omitted by Sartre in his explication of 
sadomasochistic relations (p. 78).  According to Gordon, the serious sadist, 
acting from bad-faith, denies not only others’ points of view, but also the reality 
that one’s own sadism cannot emerge without the presence of others (p. 77).  
There is also the serious masochist, who fails to recognize his or her own self-
agency being enacted via the attempt to fix the sadist’s vision on him or herself 
as an object (p. 77).  In both cases, the serious sadomasochist assumes others 
and/or the material world to be the “cause” of their sadomasochism (p. 75).  A 
good example of a serious sadist is the religious terrorist who takes the position 
that he or she has no choice but to attack the enemy because it is “God’s plan.”  
For the terrorist/sadist, there is no schism between choice and option.151 He or 
she situates himself or herself on the level of God and becomes the view of God 
as if they themselves are God. As Gordon points out however, the best the sadist 
can do is to “play God, but the sadist cannot be God.  According to Gordon, the 
                                                 
150 See chapter 5 section D, pp. 192-195 
151 Gordon (2000) differentiates between “choosing” and having options, which are not identical. 
One is always able to choose even in the face of not having options that can transform the 
material conditions imposed upon the situation.  For Gordon, theories (or acts) that fail to make 
the distinction between choice and options carry the danger of using gods (i.e., absolutist ideas) 
as the model for human choice, thereby dictating what will be (p. 76)      
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sadist stops playing God once he or she assumes to be on the level of God, 
which is an obvious lie that is a form of bad faith (p. 77).152    
      On the other hand, there is the “playful sadist,” who according to Gordon, 
recognizes the condition of his or her freedom by embracing the idea that one 
“chooses the rules of the game [as to] what constitutes reality (p. 76). As Gordon 
sees it, one can participate in sadistic sexual play, for example, without being in 
bad faith.  When the erotic charge emerges for the sake of playing, the conditions 
of one’s freedom are affirmed along with an awareness that one’s role is not 
absolute.  For Gordon, playful sadomasochism is possible whenever roles are 
experienced as un-fixed and contingent on one’s individual sense of agency to 
shift the rules of the game.  As soon as roles become embedded in the “reality of 
the situation,” playfulness is suspended and the return of bad faith, which denies 
that roles are co-constituted by the sadist and the masochist takes over.  While 
Fromm never discussed sadomasochism in terms of its playful and serious 
forms, he did privilege the themes of choice and the primacy of human sociality 
in his theory of love.  Fromm’s theory of love and his analysis of sadomasochistic 
pseudo-love forms is consistent with Gordon’s assumptions concerning serious 
and playful sadomasochism.   
     Fromm stood at the crossroads where psychoanalytic thought intersected with 
the ideas that choice and sociality were at the heart of human existence.  Fromm 
was an outspoken analyst who reflected deeply on the philosophical and social 
                                                 
152 It is interesting to note that both Gordon (2003) and Fromm (1956) stress the existential 
situation posed by God and “the tree of knowledge of good and evil” in the story of Adam and 
Eve.  Both existentialists also emphasize the freedom to disobey as intrinsic to the construction of 
good and evil and that the anguish over having to choose is not ameliorated by the presence of  
God (See Fromm, 1956, pp. 8-9; also see Gordon, 2003, pp. 46-47 &123-124).
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ideas embedded in the clinical thinking prevalent during his time.  He placed an 
emphasis on how clinical thought related to social processes.  Fromm 
concentrated on the dialectical relationship between individual character 
formation and social ideology.  He did not emphasize innate character traits that 
develop as a result of fixations at various psychosexual stages.  His examination 
of the sadomasochistic (authoritarian) character advanced the understanding of 
character from a psychoanalytic perspective that remains a significant 
contribution.  Rather than being a departure from psychoanalytic theory, Fromm’s 
work on the social dimensions of sadomasochism was an important 
psychoanalytic insight that recognized human sociality (i.e., the primary need for 
relatedness) as a precondition to the formation of individual character.  In 
contrast to other contemporaneous psychoanalytic views which held a fixed view 
of character development based on infantile psychosexual development, Fromm 
emphasized the malleability of character development throughout the life span.  
Fromm should be remembered as the first analyst to conceptualize 
sadomasochistic enactments and serious acts of destruction as distinctly human 
phenomena arising from the inability to overcome the experience of 
separateness (existential aloneness) from other human beings while embracing 
the primary need for relatedness.   
     A review of contemporary psychoanalytic theories of sadomasochism shows 
that current analysts are taking a more relational approach that include 
conceptualizations of love and erotic desire.  It is also clear that the importance 
of self-love and the ability to love others as a deterrent to sadomasochistic 
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indulgences can be recognized as central to the problem of destructiveness (De 
Masi, 2003, p. 142).  Furthermore, there is a greater emphasis in current 
psychoanalytic theories of sadomasochism on questions of personal 
responsibility and the assumption of an innate sense of good and evil as intrinsic 
to each person (De Masi, 2003, p. 144).  More than a half-century ago, Fromm’s 
writings in “Selfishness and Self-Love” (1939), Escape from freedom (1941), and 
The art of loving (1956) anticipated these current findings as discussed in 
chapters 4 and 5.153 Yet, as has been demonstrated in this dissertation, Fromm’s 
work has been undersold as a contribution to the history of sadomasochism 
theory.  Franco De Masi’s recent psychoanalytic examination of sadomasochism 
in The sadomasochistic perversion: The entity and the theories (De Masi, 2003) 
is a good example.  De Masi is a psychoanalyst who vigorously challenges 
psychoanalytic theories of a sexual basis of sadomasochism with a metaphorical 
framework he refers to as a “sadomasochistic monad” theory (p. 4).154  He 
organizes sadomasochism theories into three paradigms (p. 47).  The first 
paradigm emphasizes theories that favor a sexual disturbance as a cause of 
sadomasochism.  The second paradigm comprises the relational theories that 
help to explain sadomasochism.  In the second group, the focus is on anxiety as 
a threat to personal identity and sexuality as a defensive reaction to narcissistic 
                                                 
153 As mentioned earlier, Fromm (1964) articulated an innate striving towards growth within each 
person referred to as the “syndrome of growth” that co-exists with life-thwarting strivings called 
the “syndrome of decay” (p. 13).  De Masi (2003) points out that Klein’s ideas confirms that an 
intuitive basis of natural morality exists within each individual (p. 143), a concept which is 
reminiscent of Fromm’s syndrome of growth.      
154 De Masi (2003) coined the term “sadomasochistic monad” to introduce the idea of an isolated 
fantasy world of a certain kind of destructive pleasure that occurs in a single compulsive act.  For 
De Masi, sadomasochistic monad refers to the sexualization of destructive pleasure but does not 
rule out other kinds of pleasure that may be “connected with the traumatic unpleasure of past 
negative experiences” (p. 4). 
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wounds, which are both considered central themes in relational theories.  The 
third paradigm is derived from Klein’s psychobiological theory of sadomasochism 
and stresses the triumphant experience of power and sexualized cruelty as the 
nexus of sadomasochistic pleasure.   
     De Masi’s review of sadomasochism theories demonstrates that current 
psychoanalytic understanding of sadomasochism has gone beyond a strict 
libidinal theory, especially the second paradigm of relational theories.  
Throughout all of his explorations on sadomasochism, it is striking that De Masi 
does not make any reference to Fromm’s writings on destructiveness, love, or 
sadomasochistic pseudo-love.  Herein lies a stark example of how Fromm 
continues to be dismissed from current psychoanalytic discourse on 
sadomasochism theory.  This dissertation therefore serves as a recuperative 
effort to re-inscribe Erich Fromm’s theory of love and sadomasochistic pseudo-
love within the history of psychoanalytic thought concerning sadomasochism 
theory.    
     It is important to speculate as to why Fromm’s work has been undervalued in 
current psychoanalytic and other post-modern theories on sadomasochism.  One 
likely reason is that Fromm incorporated spiritual ideas from outside the realm of 
conventional science and translated them into secular psychological principles.  
Fromm’s re-constitution of the Christian New Testament passage “Love thy 
neighbor as thyself,” which he uses to distinguish narcissism from authentic self-
love and love for others, is a good example.  Fromm was open to allowing 
insights from many of the world’s great spiritual practices to inform his theories.  
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Fromm’s use of paradoxical logic from Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, and 
Sufism formed an explicit theme in his theory of love and self-love as oneness.  
He incorporated these influences in his theories during a time when having a 
valid theory meant that one had to be scientifically “objective.”   
     Another factor that may inhibit a wider reception of Fromm’s theories on 
sadomasochism by current psychoanalysts may have come from his refusal to 
yield to the modern angst over the erotic nature of love.  While Fromm did not 
deny the importance of erotic love, he refrained from over-determining the role 
that the erotic plays in acts of submission and domination, sexual or otherwise.  
Consequently, Fromm is often accused of ignoring the erotic in his theorizations 
of sadomasochistic attachments as is captured by Jessica Benjamin’s brief 
critique of Fromm found in The bonds of love (Benjamin, 1988, p. 246).   
     Benjamin (1988), a feminist psychoanalyst, states that “Erich Fromm 
developed the idea of the search for the ‘magic helper’ in Escape from freedom.  
Fromm’s emphasis on the avoidance of anxiety rather than on instinct, while 
useful, lost sight of the erotic nature of submission”(p. 246).  The “magic helper” 
is defined by Fromm in Escape from freedom (1941) as a “person or power on 
whom [one] is dependent…[and whose] essential quality is to protect, help, and 
develop the individual, to be with him [or her] and never leave him [or her] alone” 
(pp. 172-173).  If one cares to look a bit more closely however, Fromm did, in 
fact, stress the importance of the erotic in the attachment to a magic helper such 
as a teacher, a therapist, a husband, a wife, or other authority figures as the 
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following passage will demonstrate.  In explaining some of the reasons that a 
person may become attached to a magic helper, Fromm (1941) wrote: 
A person with that kind of relatedness to the magic helper seeks to find him in 
the flesh and blood.  For some reason or other─ often supported by sexual 
desires─ a certain other person assumes for him those magic qualities, and 
he makes that person into the being to whom and on whom his whole life 
becomes related and dependent. (p. 173)   
One can see in the above account that Fromm is describing what could be called 
an erotic transference.  I argue that Fromm is wrongly accused and did, in fact, 
account for the role that erotic passion played in strong intimate attachments, 
although he may not have stressed it to the extent that others did.  At the same 
time, he asserted that erotic desires should not be the exclusive focus of 
sadomasochistic acts and other acts of destructiveness that exalt power.  I argue 
that the perception that Fromm ignored the importance of sexuality remains a 
popular misconception which is not borne out from a closer examination of his 
writings.        
     Fromm viewed sexual pleasure as an act of spontaneous joy, which can 
spring from a desire for erotic love and an exclusive aim to unite with another 
person as an expression of oneness.  He viewed sexuality from the perspective 
of “abundance,” which meant that sexuality is one of a multitude of human 
desires that seeks fulfillment and which can be blended with the idea of human 
love.  Fromm’s conceptualization of sexuality as abundance was at odds with 
Freud’s modernist notion of sex, which can be described as a psychology of 
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want, or as Fromm liked to describe it, as derived from “a concept of scarcity” 
(Fromm, 1969/1970, p. 46).  The view of sex as a scarce entity is at the heart of 
Fromm’s rejection of Freud’s reductionist view of the sexual libido.  Although 
Fromm’s theory of sexuality was admittedly heteronormative, as can be 
expected, given its time frame, I argue that his view of sex based on the notion of 
abundance helped to humanize sexuality rather than de-emphasize or privilege 
sex as an instinctive drive.  Yet, like many of Fromm’s ideas, his ideas on 
sexuality are undersold, particularly by current theorists of sadomasochism.   
     As I have argued throughout this dissertation, Erich Fromm’s value as a 
theorist of sadomasochism should be reconsidered.  To summarize his 
contributions, one can point to three significant reasons that warrant a better 
reception of Fromm’s work by more current theorists of sadomasochism.  First, 
there is the fact that Fromm was the first psychoanalytically informed theorist of 
sadomasochism to infer that the understanding of sadomasochism is beyond 
natural science theories which deny the primacy of human sociality and rely on 
theoretical constructs that privilege sexuality.  Second, it was Fromm who first 
articulated that the inability to love, the disavowal of personal responsibility within 
relationships, and the internal distorted sense of right and wrong, are central 
matters regarding sadomasochism.  Third, Fromm’s theory of love, despite its 
limitations, offers a robust and grounded human conceptual framework of 
sadomasochism that can serve as an antidote to sadomasochism.  It is Fromm’s 
emphasis on the paradox of separateness and oneness as basic to the formation 
of loving productive relationships that continues to offer a counterweight theory 
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which is psychoanalytically informed and affords insight into the formation of 
pleasures that exalt power.  Fromm’s examination of the sadomasochistic 
(authoritarian) character, self-hatred and destructiveness, and his call for a 
theory of love that accompanied an analysis of sadomasochistic pseudo-love 
took place over a half century ago.  Today, his perspective remains vital and is 
convergent with current views of sadomasochism theorists and should therefore   
be included in the history of sadomasochism theory.   
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